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I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this note is to examine the decisions of the Virginia
Supreme Court during the period between 1970-1980 in the area of crimi-
nal procedure and substantive criminal law. Legislative changes will not
be dealt with in depth except as they have affected these decisions. Be-
cause of space constraints, a complete review of all areas is impossible;
therefore, review has been limited to those issues most likely to be of
interest to the practicing attorney. The discussion will also attempt to
establish the position of the Virginia Supreme Court on these matters in
relation to the United States Supreme Court and the majority of state
courts.
Although it is difficult to generalize such a broad area, any changes that
have occurred throughout this period do not reveal a change in philoso-
phy on the part of the Virginia Supreme Court but rather reflect United
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States Supreme Court decisions, changes by the Virginia General Assem-
bly, or a deference to the position of the trial court. While some states
have found matters of criminal procedure an area fertile for successful
enlargement of federal constitutional rights, the Virginia Supreme Court
has generally been reluctant to accord any more than the minimum guar-
antees required by the federal constitution as interpreted by the United
States Supreme Court.
II. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
A. Introduction
Since 1970, the Supreme Court of Virginia has dealt with many contro-
versial search and seizure issues in areas which are undergoing significant
change by the United States Supreme Court.' This section of the note
first reviews how the Virginia Supreme Court has treated many of these
controversial issues. It then briefly reviews a limited number of cases
where the Virginia Supreme Court has directly applied recent United
States Supreme Court holdings.2 This section is intended as a general
1. Search and seizure law evolves from interpretation of the United States Constitution:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONsT. amend. iv.
The Virginia counterpart reads:
That general warrants, whereby an officer or messenger may be commanded to
search suspected places without evidence of a fact committed, or to seize any person
or persons not named, or whose offense is not particularly described and supported
by evidence, are grievous and oppressive, and ought not to be granted.
VA. CONST. art. I, § 10.
"[T]he requirements of the Virginia statutes controlling the issuance of search warrants and
forbidding searches without a warrant ... are in substance the same as those contained in
the Fourth Amendment." Kirby v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 806, 808, 167 S.E.2d 411, 412
(1969).
2. Not included in this note are areas of search and seizure where the Supreme Court
decided issues not encountered by the Virginia court, areas where neither court resolved a
question, and areas of search and seizure which are governed by statute in Virginia. During
the past decade the United States Supreme Court decided significant issues not yet reached
by the Virginia court, including, but not limited to, decisions that: an arrest within the
subject's residence generally must be pursuant to a warrant, Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573 (1980); certain procedures must be available to allow attacks on search warrants based
on claimed lack of veracity, Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978); there is no "murder
scene" exception to the warrant requirement, Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978); upon
a traffic violation stop, a driver may be compelled to get out of his vehicle, Pennsylvania v.
Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1978); if goods are seized in transit, a warrant must be obtained
before they are searched, United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977); information volun-
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survey of the Virginia court's approach to fourth amendment doctrines
and is not meant to be exhaustive or definitive on any given issue.
B. Means of Entry
An otherwise valid search and seizure can be illegal because of the
means used to enter a dwelling. The issue is whether and when unan-
nounced, forced entry is reasonable. At early common law the rule in
Semayne's Cases required the sheriff "to signify the cause of his coming,
and to make request to open doors"' before breaking in. While many
American jurisdictions retain this common law "knock and announce"
rule,5 some have established by statute that officers must identify their
authority and purpose and be actually or constructively denied admit-
tance before forced entry is allowed.6 The knock and announce rule was
given constitutional status in Gouled v. United States.7 It has, however,
tarily lodged with third parties may be obtained from them by subpoena duces tecum, with-
out a warrant, United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976); grand jury subpoenas are not
within fourth amendment protections, United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973); notwith-
standing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), a informant/participant in a conversa-
tion may be wired for recordation, United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971). In some
developing areas of important search and seizure law Virginia has not encountered cases
since 1970; these include border search doctrines, airport searches, and wiretapping and
eavesdropping in light of Katz.
Areas where neither court resolved an issue include the degree to which plain view or
open view observations may be enhanced by binoculars and other devices and how promptly
search warrants must be executed (although by the provisions of VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-56
(Repl. Vol. 1975) a time limit of 15 days is imposed).
Among the more important statutory provisions are VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-52 to -60
(Repl. Vol. 1975) (search warrants); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-71 to -76 (Repl. Vol. 1975) (ar-
rest warrants); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-81 (Repl. Vol. 1975) (warrantless arrest); VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-83 (Repl. Vol. 1975) (stop and frisk); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 27-32.1, -34.2, -58, -79 to
-79.8, -85.1 (Repl. Vol. 1979) (various provisions for warrantless inspections of premises for
fire hazards and subsequent to fires); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-110, -249 (Repl. Vol. 1975); VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 4-54 to 56 (Repl. Vol. 1979), and VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46.1-3, -7 to -9, -351.1
(Repl. Vol. 1974) (warrantless stopping, inspection, and seizure of vehicles under certain
conditions).
3. Semayne's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B. 1603).
4. Id. at 195.
5. See People v. Lujan, 174 Colo. 554, 484 P.2d 1238 (1971); Dyton v. State, 250 A.2d 383
(Del. Super. Ct. 1969); State v. Johnson, 102 R.I. 344, 230 A.2d 831 (1967).
6. For illustrative listing of states enacting knock-and-announce statutes, see Blakey, The
Rule of Announcement and Unlawful Entry: Mitler v. United States and Ker v. California,
112 U. PA. L. REv. 499, 560 (1964).
7. 255 U.S. 298, 305 (1921). The Court stated: "The prohibition of the Fourth Amend-
ment is against all unreasonable searches and seizures ... [including] entrance to a man's
house or office by force . . . ." Gouled dealt, in part, with a challenge to admissibility of
evidence gained after warrantless entry to defendant's premises by ruse of a government
588 [Vol. 15:585
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always been recognized that certain circumstances could justify unan-
nounced forced entry.8 Indeed, some jurisdictions by statute authorize
magistrates to issue so-called "no knock" warrants.9
In 1972, Johnson v. Commonwealth0 established Virginia's no knock
policy."1 Two 1974 cases, Carratt v. Commonwealth1 2 and Heaton v. Com-
monwealth,1 8 amplified the court's approach. As the 1975 revision of Vir-
ginia's criminal code did not propose a "no knock" statute, these cases
seem to begin a case law evolution of no knock policy.14
In Johnson, the court looked primarily to Ker v. Californias for gui-
dance. In Ker, a divided Court16 approached no knock from two different
perspectives. The plurality held that no general rule could be fashioned
since exigencies did exist which justified the no knock entry. The Court
concluded that a case-by-case analysis was required.17 On the facts of
Ker,16 the Court upheld the entry because the evidence sought, narcotics,
"could be quickly and easily destroyed," and because the defendant
"might well have been expecting the police."1'
agent, not force. The Court held either means of entry subject to fourth amendment re-
quirements. This rule is codified for federal officers:
The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house, or any
part of a house, or anything therein, to execute a search warrant, if, after notice of his
authority and purpose, he is refused admittance or when necessary to liberate himself
or a person aiding him in the execution of the warrant.
18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1948).
8. For example, Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 589-90 (1968) recognizes that 18
U.S.C. § 3109 is a codification of the common law and is subject implicitly to exceptions
recognized at common law.
9. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw (McKinney) § 690.45 (1971 & Supp. 1980-81): "A search
warrant must contain... [a]n authorization, where the court has specially so determined,
that the executing police officer.., enter the premises to be searched without giving notice
of his authority and purpose .... "
10. 213 Va. 102, 189 S.E.2d 678 (1972).
11. Id. at 105-06, 189 S.E.2d at 680-81.
12. 215 Va. 55, 205 S.E.2d 653 (1974).
13. 215 Va. 137, 207 S.E.2d 829 (1974).
14. See Note, Revision of Virginia's Criminal Code, 10 U. RICH. L. Rzv. 133, 153-54
(1975).
15. 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
16. Id. at 24.
17. Id. at 33-34.
18. In Ker, police entered defendants' apartment with a passkey, arrested them, and
searched for and found marijuana. Although there was no search warrant, the police had
probable cause for an arrest, and under the circumstances the means of entry was reason-
able given the possibility of the destruction of contraband if they knocked and announced.
Id. at 28-29, 38-41.
19. Id. at 40.
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The Ker dissent, however, proposed a general rule to judge no knock
entries. It would limit such entries to the following situations:
(1) where the persons within already know of the officers' authority and
purpose, or (2) where the officers are justified in the belief that persons
within are in imminent peril of bodily harm, or (3) where those within,
made aware of the presence of someone outside (because, for example, there
has been a knock at the door), are then engaged in activity which justifies
the officers in the belief that an escape or the destruction of evidence is
being attempted.2"
In Johnson the court held that a no knock entry was reasonable where
the officers knew that the occupants had installed surveillance and delay-
ing systems. Further, the evidence was being distributed from a bath-
room, and was readily destructible.2 1 It adopted the ruling of the Ker plu-
rality which recognized exigencies, demanded particular case analysis,
and refused to propose general rules. Both courts clearly indicated that
ready destructibility of drugs is an acceptable exigency.
22
In Carratt, which followed Johnson,28 the court believed that the "exi-
gent circumstances. . . [were] even greater. ' ' 24 The officers believed that
the defendant was armed and dangerous, that he knew he was under in-
vestigation, and that he expected them.2 5 Carratt implied that an exi-
gency exists whenever knock and announce would frustrate the undertak-
ing, increase the officers' peril, or permit destruction of evidence.26
20. Id. at 47 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
21. In Johnson, police possessing a valid warrant obtained entry to an apartment with a
sledge hammer, without knocking, identifying themselves, or making any announcement of
their presence.
The officers knew from prior investigation that there were two locks on the door, that
it was equipped with a peephole which was used by the occupants for surveillance of
anyone who knocked on the door; that approximately 3 to 4 feet from the room they
intended to enter there was a bathroom furnished with a commode and a shower, and
that this room was being used for the distribution of narcotics.
Johnson v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. at 102-03, 189 S.E.2d at 678-79.
22. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. at 40-41; Johnson v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. at 105-06,
189 S.E.2d at 681.
23. Carratt v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. at 58-59, 205 S.E.2d at 655-56.
24. Id. at 58-59, 205 S.E.2d at 656.
25. In Carratt, the defendant was convicted of running a numbers game. With a valid
warrant, officers seized numbers paraphernalia from his dwelling. They surrounded the
house at 6:00 a.m., knocked on the front storm doors, and forced the main door after hear-
ing nothing and waiting about a minute. All the while a dog aroused by their appearance
was barking outside. They announced their presence and identity at both doors they pene-
trated. The officers knew the defendant was armed, expected the police, and was prepared
to destroy evidence. Id. at 55-58, 205 S.E.2d at 654-55.
26. Id. at 59, 205 S.E.2d at 656. In Carratt, the dog barked. The officers did knock. They
[Vol. 15:585
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In Heaton, the court however, retreated somewhat from Carratt and
Johnson. It held a no knock entry illegal because the police had no basis
for fearing imminent destruction of evidence or any greater peril to them-
selves if they announced.27 The court established that no emergency ex-
ists "where the only exigent circumstance is the readily disposable nature
of the contraband that is the object of the search,"28 and refused to ex-
tend the no knock privilege to "every case where a search for drugs is
involved. 29
Thus Virginia has adopted a no knock rule in accord with the Ker plu-
rality. Based on the facts of each case, the entry will be upheld if the
prosecution can establish that the officers made a reasonable, subjective
judgment that no knock entry was necessary to prevent destruction of
evidence or increased peril to themselves. While the rule is not wholly
permissive,30 it ignores the Ker dissent, by whose standards the entries in
Johnson and Carratt would have been illegal,3 1 and establishes only nom-
announced themselves and identified themselves as police, but they did not announce their
purpose and were not denied entry. After a minute they broke in. The court agreed with the
trial court "that this constituted a no-knock entry." Id. at 57, 205 S.E.2d at 655. But it has
been held that imperfect announcement (stating identity but not purpose) has been viewed
as harmless error; and no response from within has been held to justify forced entry within
less than a minute in comparable fact situations. Arguably the officers waited long enough to
be deemed to have been constructively denied admittance (particularly given the barking
dog); their failure to announce a purpose was of little impact; their entry complied with the
general knock and announce rule. See Davis v. State, 525 P.2d 541 (Alaska 1974) (after
knock and announcement of purpose at front and back door, where police seeking narcotics,
forced entry after 30-45 seconds legal when no response from within); People v. Doane, 33
Mich. App. 579, 190 N.W.2d 259 (1971) (knock, announcement of identity, demand to be
admitted, allowance of reasonable time for occupants to answer was substantial compliance
with knock and announce rule, notwithstanding failure to state purpose); State v. Harris, 12
Wash. App. 481, 530 P.2d 646 (1975) (officers knocked, identified selves, waited only 30-45
seconds before forced entry because believed defendant would destroy narcotics if
confronted).
27. Heaton v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. at 139, 207 S.E.2d at 831.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. The rule is permissive, however, in that it favors the objective of police enforcement
of the law over constitutional protections of privacy and presumptions of innocence, by not
requiring an objective showing of probable cause for an exigency to justify no knock entry.
Such a showing, pursuant, for example, to N.Y. Craum. PRo. LAw (McKinney) 690.45 (1971 &
Supp. 1980-81), quoted in pertinant part supra at note 19, would have been possible under
both Johnson and Carratt, given the degree to which the officers' prior knowledge (rather
than on-scene discoveries) justified no knock entry. 213 Va. at 102-03, 189 S.E.2d 678-79;
215 Va. at 58-59, 205 S.E.2d at 656.
31. Neither Johnson nor Carratt had the requisite elements (prior knowledge by the oc-
cupants of the police authority and purpose, imminent danger to one within, actual knowl-
edge of apparent attempt to flee or destroy evidence). Ker v. California, 374 U.S. at 47.
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inal outer limits governing the -extent to which the willing police may
make unannounced, forceful intrusions.
3 2
C. Consensual Searches
A search 3 not made pursuant to a valid warrant and not meeting the
requirements of established exceptions to the warrant requirement s" may
nevertheless be reasonable and therefore legal.3 5 This will be true if either
the individual whose person or property is to be searched or an autho-
rized third party consents to the search. Such consent may function as a
legitimate waiver of fourth amendment rights,3 6 whether or not the per-
son who consents is in police custody.3 7
When a defendant challenges the validity of consent, the prosecution
must prove that consent was freely and voluntarily given per Bumper v.
North Carolina.3s Acquiescence to lawful authority is insufficient proof
alone, 9 and a search pursuant to an invalid warrant is not legitimized by
consent induced by the warrant.40 Being in custody, however, does not
per se vitiate consent, as made clear in United States v. Watson,1 and no
Miranda-style warning of the right to refuse consent is required as estab-
32. See generally 7 U. RicH. L. REV. 565 (1973) (for discussion of Johnson); Annot., 70
A.L.R.3d 217 (1976).
33. A "search" is an intrusion, physical or otherwise, into an area wherein a person has a
"reasonable expectation of privacy." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967)
(Harlan, J. concurring). Two requirements, if met, indicate an intrusion constituting a
search in constitutional terms has occurred: the person alleging intrusion has "exhibited an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy," and "society is prepared to recognize [the expec-
tation] as reasonable." Id. at 361.
34. Exceptions to the warrant requirement are searches incident to a lawful arrest, hot
pursuit, certain vehicle searches, stop and frisk, certain administrative searches, border
searches, airport searches, and searches in emergency circumstances (e.g., investigation of
the cause of a fire at the scene before the fire is out).
35. See note 1 supra. The Constitution protects only against unreasonable searches by
government representatives or their agents.
36. See Rees v. Commonwealth, 203 Va. 850, 864-66, 127 S.E.2d 406, 416-17 (1962), cert.
denied, 372 U.S. 964 (1963) (reiterating validity of consensual searches). See also Zap v.
United States, 328 U.S. 624, 630 (1946); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 593-94 (1946).
For discussion of third party consent searches generally, see Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 1078
(1953). For discussion of consent searches subsequent to custody, see Annot., 9 A.L.R.3d 858
(1966).
37. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424 (1976).
38. 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968).
39. Id. at 548-49.
40. Id. at 549.
41. 423 U.S. at 424.
592 [Vol. 15:585
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lished in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte.42 There are no general rules as to
what constitutes requisite "duress or coercion, express or implied"43 nec-
essary to vitiate consent; "[violuntariness is a question of fact to be deter-
mined from all of the circumstances.""
With one interesting exception, Ritter v. Commonwealth,'45 the Virginia
court narrowly but reasonably applied the Bumper, Schneckloth, and
Watson concepts concerning what is valid consent and what the burdens
and means of proof are.46 Prior to Ritter, consensual search cases in Vir-
ginia focused on whether a fourth amendment "search" had occurred at
all, v whether consent was invalidated by duress, misrepresentation, or co-
ercion,'4 the scope of a search conducted pursuant to admittedly valid
consent,'49 and the power of third parties to consent.
5 0
Ritter v. Commonwealth51 is the exception. In Ritter, an officer con-
fronted the mother of an eighteen year-old boy with a valid warrant to
search for narcotics in their dwelling. Finding none inside, after inquiry
he obtained from her a package addressed to her son marked "First Class
Mail" which she removed from the mailbox.5 2 The court held "there was
no search of the mailbox by the officers or seizure, of the package by
them. '53 It stated, "[T]he mother had a legal right to remove the contents
from the box ... [and] voluntarily surrendered" the package." The im-
plication is that the mother, validly possessing and controlling the
mailbox, consented to a search for the package and seizure of it by the
42. 412 U.S. 218, 246-48 (1973).
43. Id. at 248.
44. Id. at 248-49.
45. 210 Va. 732, 173 S.E.2d 799 (1970).
46. See text accompanying notes 38, 41, & 42 supra.
47. 210 Va. at 732, 173 S.E.2d at 799. For a lengthy examination criticizing Ritter, see
Case Comments, Family Consent to an Unlawful Search, 28 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 207
(1971); also discussed in The Fifteenth Annual Survey of Virginia Law 1969-1970, 56 VA. L.
REv. 1500, 1589-91 (1970).
48. Stamper v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 260, 257 S.E.2d 808 (1979); Lowe v. Common-
wealth, 218 Va. 670, 239 S.E.2d 112 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 930 (1978); Hairston v.
Commonwealth, 216 Va. 387, 219 S.E.2d 668 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 937 (1976);
McMillon v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 505, 184 S.E.2d 773 (1971); Ritter v. Commonwealth,
210 Va. 732, 173 S.E.2d 799 (1970). For a discussion of McMillon, see Seventeenth Annual
Survey of Developments in Virginia Law: 1971-72, 58 VA. L. REv. 1158, 1206-07 (1972).
49. Lugar v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 609, 202 S.E.2d 894 (1974).
50. Henry v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 48, 175 S.E.2d 416 (1970); 210 Va. at 732, 173
S.E.2d at 799.
51. 210 Va. 732, 173 S.E.2d 799 (1970).
52. Id. at 733-34, 173 S.E.2d at 800-01.
53. Id. at 736, 173 S.E.2d at 802.
54. Id. at 739, 173 S.E.2d at 804.
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police on behalf of her son.
However, if there was no "search" in fourth amendment terms, the case
need not have been decided on the issue of consent. The fourth amend-
ment is inapplicable when there is no search or merely a private search. If
the mother's actions were a private search and not an extension of the
officers' search of the dwelling pursuant to their warrant, it seems unnec-
essary to judge the "legal right" 55 of the mother or the legitimacy of her
consent. Further, it is arguable that there was a police search. As stated
in Bumper, when an officer searches a home under a warrant, "he an-
nounces in effect that the occupant has no right to resist the search. The
situation is infused with coercion, albeit colorably lawful coercion. Where
there is coercion there cannot be consent."" If such coercion were pres-
ent, it would not have been dissipated when the police inquired about the
mail, and the search would have been merely continuing at that point.
Arguably, the conviction could have been reversed on two alternative
grounds. First, if the consent was valid, the police ought to have known
that the mother lacked authority to surrender the property.57 Secondly,
the consent was invalid under Bumper.
Justice Gordon, dissenting, felt reversal was required under Bumper.
After noting that the majority tacitly conceded that a police search of the
mailbox would have been illegal, he wrote:
Looking in the mailbox was part of an overall search of the premises, osten-
sibly made under the authority of a search warrant. And Ritter's mother did
not, I believe, look freely and without compulsion. Rather, I must conclude
that Ritter's mother looked into the mailbox and handed over the package
because she knew that the officers would look and seize what was found, if
she did not. This conclusion, that her actions resulted from coercion, ap-
pears dictated by Bumper...
Justice Gordon's dissent did not affect later consent search decisions.
The court either applied Bumper, Schneckloth and Watson strictly, or
avoided the issue altogether deciding cases on the basis of harmless er-
ror.5 9 In the recent case of Craft v. Commonwealth,6" however, the court
55. Id. It is not clear whether the court means no public or private search occurred (i.e.,
the mother had authority from her son by course of usage to remove the mail and the two
tests of Katz were not met; see note 33 supra).
56. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 550.
57. See Case Comments, supra note 47 at 207 which points to Ritter as a good reason
why vicarious waiver of fourth amendment rights by third party consent should not be
permitted.
58. 210 Va. at 743, 173 S.E.2d at 807.
59. "Harmless error" was the rationale in Vass v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 740, 745, 204
594 [Vol. 15:585
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did recognize that a challenge to a search and seizure could be rejected.
Iii Craft, a robber admitted himself to a hospital for emergency treatment
of a gunshot wound. The emergency room surgeon removed the robber's
shirt and the bullet incident to providing medical care, and gave them to
the police. 1 The court pointed out that the police had done nothing ex-
cept receive articles from a private party who was in lawful control of
them and capable of surrendering them.
In Hairston v. Commonwealth,6 2 officers arrested a massage parlor op-
erator and asked an employee to provide some identification. Flustered,
she fumbled through her purse, finally emptied it and told the officer to
"look for it." He found her wallet, "examined it, and discovered four tab-
lets [drugs] in one of its compartments. '63 The court assumed, without
deciding, that a search had occurred." It held the evidence showed "an
unequivocal display of a free and voluntary consent to search....
The court did not consider the issue of whether the officer exceeded the
scope of the consent, and thus vitiated it.66
Lowe v. Commonwealthe7 gave the court its only in-custody consent
case. Officers arrested, handcuffed, and placed defendant on the floor of
his apartment; they then surrounded him and sought his consent to a
search for drugs. The defendant verbally agreed.68 The court held his
claim of duress and coercion had "no merit."" The court's pronounce-
ment at first glance seems harsh; however, here, as in Stamper v. Com-
monwealth,70 the police read and explained a "Consent to Search Form"
to the defendant prior to his consent. This constituted a meaningful Mi-
S.E.2d 280, 284 (1974).
60. 221 Va. 271, 269 S.E.2d 797 (1980).
61. Id. at 277, 269 S.E.2d at 800-01.
62. 216 Va. 387, 219 S.E.2d 668 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 937 (1976).
63. Id. at 387-88, 219 S.E.2d at 668.
64. Most would generally agree that a person has a "reasonable expectation of privacy"
that is "recognized... as reasonable" by society in one's wallet; the test per Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) would appear to be satisfied.
The court, by assuming that a search had occurred, avoided deciding whether by dumping
its contents the defendant merely consented to a search, or negatived any subjective mani-
festation of a Katz expectation of privacy and thus made the inspection not a search.
65. 216 Va. at 389, 219 S.E.2d at 669.
66. He may well have discovered the drugs after finding the I.D. or in a compartment of
the wallet he knew or ought to have known was not customarily used to store an I.D. The
court, however, is sensitive to the scope issue. See note 77 infra and accompanying text.
67. 218 Va. 670, 239 S.E.2d 112 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 930 (1978).
68. Id. at 674-75, 239 S.E.2d at 115.
69. Id. at 678, 239 S.E.2d at 117.
70. 220 Va. 260, 257 S.E.2d 808 (1979).
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randa-style warning, though not constitutionally required, of the right to
refuse. 1 This process, the court stated, validly counterbalanced the custo-
dial setting. The court reasonably weighed the factors present, and found
that the defendant's will had not "been overborne" nor his "capacity for
self determination. . . critically impaired. '1 2
In McMillon v. Commonwealth,7 the court held defendant's consent
invalid because it was induced by an invalid warrant.74 In Stamper, the
police again benefitted from the use of a "Consent to Search Form" to
validate consent.75 Despite the atmosphere of a station-house interroga-
tion and that the request for consent was accompanied by a statement
that a search warrant was being sought, the court believed that the defen-
dant had consented freely, knowingly, and voluntarily.
In Henry v. Commonwealth,"6 the court applied the general rule that a
passenger does not have standing to contest the search of a vehicle when
a lawful driver has validly consented. In Lugar v. Commonwealth,77 the
court held a search validly consented to after a lawful arrest was con-
ducted in a manner which exceeded the scope of the consent. The consent
71. 218 Va. at 678, 239 S.E.2d at 117.
72. Id. (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 225).
73. 212 Va. 505, 184 S.E.2d 773 (1971).
74. Defendant consented to give officers a package addressed to his wife after being
handed a search warrant which later was proven to have been issued without probable
cause. He further consented to surrender narcotics paraphernalia from his pocket after be-
ing arrested. The court, relying on Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968), as to the
effect of invalidation of the warrant, held that the prosecution failed to carry its "particu-
larly heavy" burden to prove that consent after custody was not coerced. 212 Va. at 509, 184
S.E.2d at 775-76 (quoting Gorman v. United States, 380 F.2d 158, 163 (1st Cir. 1967)).
While the surrender of the package would remain illegal after United States v. Watson, 423
U.S. 411 (1975), the court would have held the surrender of paraphernalia valid despite the
custodial setting, but nevertheless reversed on the basis that it was within the scope of a
search incident to a lawful arrest or that the taint of the invalid warrant had not been
dissipated. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (scope of search incident to lawful
arrest); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) ("fruit of the poisonous tree"
doctrine).
75. Subsequent to the murder of three persons at a restaurant, police stopped employees
to interrogate them. Stamper, a cook at the restaurant, and his wife, consensualiy drove to
the police station for questioning. Knowing they were free to go and after having discussed
the matter with Stamper's father on the telephone, they executed consent forms and per-
mitted a search of their car. This search turned up evidence (glass fragments) critical to the
conviction. Stamper v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. at 264-66, 257 S.E.2d at 812-15.
76. 211 Va. 48, 51, 175 S.E.2d 416, 418 (1970). For a discussion of Henry, see The Fif-
teenth Annual Survey of Virginia Law: 1969-1970, 56 VA. L. REV. 1500 (1970).
77. 214 Va. 609, 611-12, 202 S.E.2d 894, 897 (1974). For a discussion of Lugar, see Nine-
teenth Annual Survey of Developments in Virginia Law: 1973-1974, 60 VA. L. Rxv. 1443,
1505 (1974).
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was to search for accomplices, but the resulting search was a general
search intruding into many areas incapable of hiding felons. The convic-
tion was reversed.
D. Vehicle Searches
Fourth amendment protection traditionally was thought of as protec-
tion from unwarranted "invasions of the home."78 However, as vehicles
are "effects" in fourth amendment terms,79 theoretically then persons are
to be accorded the benefit of the warrant requirement with its prior show-
ing of probable cause to a neutral, detached magistrate before their vehi-
cles can be searched. This broadening of fourth amendment protection
reflects the rule in Katz v. United States which states that the fourth
amendment protects "people, not places;"80 it further assumes people
have a valid Katz "expectation of privacy"81 in their vehicles.
A variety of exceptions to the warrant requirement have emerged
82
based on the vehicle's inherent mobility" and the diminished expectation
of privacy in a vehicle." From admittedly sound beginnings, the decisions
may be emasculating fourth amendment protection for vehicles.
During the seventies, Virginia approached certain vehicle search issues
non-controversially, both in applying precedent and in fashioning new
Virginia rules. This was true of the court's application of the Chambers v.
Maroney" exception to the warrant requirement when police stop a vehi-
cle with probable cause to believe it contains contraband or fruits, instru-
mentalities, or evidence of a crime.86 The Virginia court also considered
78. "[T]he searches and seizures which deeply concerned the colonists, and which were
foremost in the minds of the FRAMERS, were those involving invasions of the home..."
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 8 (1977).
79. Id. at 12.
80. 389 U.S. at 351.
81. Id. at 360.
82. These include exigencies of hot pursuit, plain view, emergencies, consent, stop and
frisk, and incident to arrest, as incidentally applicable to cases involving vehicles and more
narrowly tailored vehicle exceptions relating to inspection statutes and inventories.
83. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
84. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 379 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is
transportation and it seldom serves as one's residence or as the repository of personal
effects. A car has little capacity for escaping public scrutiny. It travels public thor-
oughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in plain view.
Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974). See also United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. 543 (1976).
85. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
86. Id. at 51. Chambers held controlling in Westcott v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 123, 216
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the absence of a warrantless search privilege incident to a non-custodial
traffic arrest when the search bears no relation to the traffic offense87 and
adopted the "furtive gesture" rule to determine when the probable cause
threshold for a Chambers search may be attained.88
Many Virginia decisions, however, reflect the view that the fourth
amendment gives vehicles only nominal protection. This is suggested in
cases that question whether a vehicle search is a fourth amendment
"search" at all,89 in cases that apply the plain view doctrine to vehicle
searches,90 and in those that ignore the question of whether a warrant
should be obtained when time permits.91 The cases considering the con-
stitutional status of "inventory" searches of vehicles9 2 are particularly in-
teresting, as are those concerning the scope of an otherwise valid Cham-
bers search,93 and those permitting intrusions during administrative or
S.E.2d 60 (1975); Schaum v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 498, 211 S.E.2d 73 (1975); Vass v.
Commonwealth, 214 Va. 740, 204 S.E.2d 280 (1974); Fox v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 97, 189
S.E.2d 367 (1972); Smith v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 606, 186 S.E.2d 65 (1972).
87. Matthews v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 1, 235 S.E.2d 306 (1977). In Matthews, a trooper
stopped a driver for speeding and, observing a pack of cigarette papers on the floorboard in
plain view, picked them up. After examining them, he searched inside the car and found a
bag of marijuana. He arrested the driver. The court held mere observation of the cigarette
papers gave no probable cause to search for contraband; conviction reversed. For a discus-
sion of searches incident to noncustodial arrests in routine traffic violations, see Annot., 10
A.L.R.3d 314 (1966).
88. The Rule was adopted in Hollis v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 874, 223 S.E.2d 887 (1976)
and held controlling in Lawson v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 354, 228 S.E.2d 685 (1976); see
notes 95-103, infra and accompanying text.
89. Thims v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 85, 235 S.E.2d 443 (1977); Shirley v. Common-
wealth, 218 Va. 49, 235 S.E.2d 432 (1977); Cook v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 71, 216 S.E.2d 48
(1975); Fox v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 97, 189 S.E.2d 367 (1972).
90. Thims v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 85, 235 S.E.2d 443 (1977); Cook v. Commonwealth,
216 Va. 71, 216 S.E.2d 48 (1975); Fox v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 97, 189 S.E.2d 367 (1972).
91. Fore v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 991, 265 S.E.2d 729 (1980); Patty v. Commonwealth,
218 Va. 150, 235 S.E.2d 437 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1010 (1978); Vass v. Common-
wealth, 214 Va. 740, 204 S.E.2d 280 (1974).
92. Reese v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1022, 265 S.E.2d 746 (1980); Thims v. Common-
wealth, 218 Va. 85, 235 S.E.2d 443 (1977); Schaum v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 498, 211
S.E.2d 73 (1975); Cabbler v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 520, 184 S.E.2d 781 (1971), cert. de-
nied, 405 U.S. 1073 (1972).
93. Westcott v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 123, 216 S.E.2d 60 (1975); Cook v. Common-
wealth, 216 Va. 71, 216 S.E.2d 48 (1975). In these decisions, the scope of a Chambers search
was described in broad terms by Justice Poff in the majority opinion in Westcott and the
concurring opinion in Cook. The thrust of Justice Poffs view, that even closed and locked
containers within a vehicle may be searched in a Chambers situation, seems to have been
blunted by later Supreme Court decisions. "[I]n the absence of exigent circumstances, police
are required to obtain a warrant before searching luggage taken from an automobile prop-
erly stopped and searched for contraband." Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 754 (1979).
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inspection searches.Y These decisions suggest that the privacy rights of
citizens in their vehicles have often been subordinated to the law enforce-
ment objectives of the Commonwealth.
1. Adoption of the "Furtive Gesture" Rule"
In Hollis v. Commonwealth," an informer's tip, conceded to be insuffi-
cient to constitute probable cause, led police to stop a vehicle at 1:40 a.m.
to determine if drugs were inside. When the officer shined a light in the
car, he saw the defendant "remove what appeared to be a hand-rolled
cigarette from his mouth and throw it to the floor of the car." The officer
looked closely at the object and believed it to be marijuana.9 The court
held that, given the tip, the details of which were corroborated by the
officer's first hand observation, "[t]he appearance of the cigarette and
[defendant's] furtive gesture in attempting to hide it combined to provide
the necessary probable cause to search the car without obtaining a war-
rant,"98 pursuant to Chambers." This furtive gesture rule was held con-
trolling on similar facts in Lawson v. Commonwealth.10 0
"[S]eizure of the [defendants'] locker [from their car] did not diminish their legitimate ex-
pectation that its contents would remain private, for purposes of determining reasonable-
ness of search without a warrant." United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13-14 n.8 (1976).
While the Virginia court has not adverted to the issue recently, presumably it will alter its
view to correspond to the Supreme Court decisions.
94. Shirley v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 49, 235 S.E.2d 432 (1977).
95. For a discussion of "the furtive gesture" rule in a variety of circumstances, see Annot.,
45 A.L.R.3d 581 (1972).
96. 216 Va. 874, 223 S.E.2d 887 (1976).
97. Id. at 875, 223 S.E.2d at 888.
98. Id. at 877, 223 S.E.2d at 889.
99. Id. at 878, 223 S.E.2d at 890.
100. 217 Va. 354, 228 S.E.2d 685 (1976). An informant told the police that the occupants
of a certain vehicle were selling heroin. Although the tip did not give rise to probable cause,
the officers stopped the vehicle. When they identified themselves, the driver locked the door
and he and a passenger exchanged a small bag the officer believed to be a "nickel bag" of
marijuana. A tip sufficient to justify investigation and corroborated by first hand observa-
tion, combined with the furtive actions of the occupants, was probable cause for a Chambers
search. Id. at 355-58, 228 S.E.2d at 685-87. Lawson expressly overruled Oglesby v. Common-
wealth, 213 Va. 247, 191 S.E.2d 216 (1972). In Oglesby the court could well have announced
the "furtive gesture" rule but instead reversed for lack of probable cause. An unidentified
informant telephoned the police with a tip that a described individual was at a certain loca-
tion with drugs. The police by first hand observation verified the data. As they approached
defendant, he crossed the street and, as he saw them coming, he "picked up his pace and
walked into ... a restaurant." He was observed with a "small brown envelope ... of the
type commonly used for the distribution of marijuana and drugs," and was "trying maybe to
get rid of it." Id. at 248, 191 S.E.2d at 217. The same elements in Hollis v. Commonwealth,
216 Va. 874, 223 S.E.2d 887 (1976) and Lawson v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 354, 228 S.E.2d
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There is no uniform "furtive gesture rule." In other jurisdictions, the
search has been upheld when the gesture was coupled with additional
evasive action, such as locking the door,101 or when the police knew that
the neighborhood was a high crime area, or when the police had an in-
formant's tip.102 The "furtive gesture" rule has been used in Virginia even
in the absence of additional evasive action or additional information, for
example, in nighttime searches.103 The United States Supreme Court has
not yet dealt with the question of standards in this area.
2. Application of Plain View: When is a Search a "Search"?
In Cook v. Commonwealth,'04 Thims v. Commonwealth,205 Fox v. Com-
monwealth,108 and Shirley v. Commonwealth,10 7 the court suggested
under various facts that it doubted whether observation of and intrusion
into a vehicle is a constitutionally protected search and seizure at all. It
supported this approach by applying the plain view and administrative
search doctrines.
In Shirley, which challenged Virginia's vehicle inspection statute,"' the
court approved the view that there is no Katz expectation of privacy in a
vehicle identification number.109 The statute allows intrusion into a vehi-
cle at a public garage or repair shop without any articulable basis, let
alone probable cause. In addition, officers may inspect any place where
the vehicle identification number might be found (e.g., the locked glove
compartment). Neither knowledge and consent of the owner or bailee nor
a warrant are necessary.
685, were present in Oglesby, perhaps to an even greater degree.
101. Lawson v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 354, 228 S.E.2d 685.
102. Id.; Hollis v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 874, 223 S.E.2d 887 (1976).
103. Id. For collection of cases see Annot., 45 A.L.R.3d 581 (1972).
104. 216 Va. 71, 216 S.E.2d 48 (1975).
105. 218 Va. 85, 235 S.E.2d 443 (1977).
106. 213 Va. 97, 189 S.E.2d 367 (1972).
107. 218 Va. 49, 235 S.E.2d 432 (1977).
108. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-9 (1980 Repl. Vol.) reads:
Any peace officer or Division officer or employee who shall be in uniform or shall
exhibit a badge or other sign of authority shall have the right to inspect any motor
vehicle, trailer or semitrailer in any public garage or repair shop, for the purpose of
locating stolen motor vehicles, trailers and semitrailers and for investigating the title
and registration of motor vehicles, trailers and semitrailers. For such purpose the
owner of any such garage or repair shop shall permit any such peace officer or Divi-
sion officer or employee without let or hindrance to make investigation as herein
authorized.
109. 218 Va. at 53, 235 S.E.2d at 434 (quoting United States v. Polk, 433 F.2d 644, 647-48
(5th Cir. 1970)).
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Many vehicle searches rely upon the plain view justification.11 0 The
United States Supreme Court decision in Coolidge v. New Hampshire"',
established that to validate such a search the police officer must have "a
prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he inadvertently
[comes] across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused.' 1 1 2 While
the exact meaning of inadvertence is unclear, at a minimum the observa-
tion should not occur in the context of anticipating the finding of the
specific object eventually discovered.
The Virginia court has been slow to adopt the Coolidge doctrine. In
Fox v. Commonwealth,11 3 upon finding an unattended vehicle parked in a
remote area, an officer entered the car to find its registration card and
noticed marijuana seeds on the floor.""' The court held that "if this was a
search, it was a reasonable one." 1 5 The officer's observation was "of that
which was open to view,"11 6 subsequent to a valid intrusion whose object
was not discovery of marijuana. This satisfied Coolidge. But while the
officer had ample grounds for curiosity,117 he did not have justifiable
grounds to enter the car. He could have determined the registration de-
tails by a license plate check with no intrusion,1 8 or by determining the
vehicle identification number by external inspection.11 ' Arguably, there-
fore, though he may have seen the marijuana inadvertently, he did not do
so with a legitimate "prior justification for an intrusion.11 1
In Cook v. Commonwealth,121 the court narrowed the issue to whether a
search occurs when a police officer looks into a parked vehicle from a
public sidewalk. It held Coolidge "not relevant.1 1 22 The court held that
110. See Comment, Warrantless Searches of Automobiles in Virginia, 12 U. RICH. L.
REv. 563 (1978).
111. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
112. Id. at 466.
113. 213 Va. 97, 189 S.E.2d 367 (1972).
114. Id. at 98, 189 S.E.2d at 368.
115. Id. at 99, 189 S.E.2d at 369 (emphasis added).
116. Id. at 100, 189 S.E.2d at 370.
117. The officer observed an unattended vehicle pulled partly off the road on a rural high-
way, and found a wallet outside the car. The interior of the car was in disarray, as though a
struggle had taken place. Id. at 98, 189 S.E.2d at 368.
118. "It would be wholly unrealistic to say that there is no reasonable and actual expecta-
tion in maintaining the privacy of closed compartments of a locked automobile, when it is
customary for people. . . to carry their most personal and private papers and effects in
their automobiles from time to time." South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 388 n.6
(1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
119. See notes 172-82 infra and accompanying text.
120. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971).
121. 216 Va. 71, 216 S.E.2d 48 (1975).
122. Id. at 73, 216 S.E.2d at 49.
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there is no expectation of privacy when a vehicle is parked on a public
street with "items of contraband or other evidence of crime" exposed to
view. An officer's observation "either deliberately or inadvertently" does
not "constitute a search in the constitutional sense. '123 It noted a "search
'implies a prying into hidden places';"' 2 4 thus "there was not an illegal
search." 125
Few would challenge a police officer's right to look into vehicles parked
along the public way and seize contraband exposed therein to plain view.
It is not clear, however, that this situation existed in Cook. The officer
went to the vehicle as an extension of a search, pursuant to a valid war-
rant, of the defendant's apartment. He anticipated finding contraband.
His observation was deliberate, not inadvertent. He saw "a brown paper
bag" with a plastic face mask sticking out. He did not observe "contra-
band or other evidence of crime" in plain view. After entering the car to
seize the bag and mask, he discovered hashish in the bag. This was a
"prying into hidden places" and thus a search.
Justice Poff, in his concurring opinion in Cook, recognized that there
was a search which had to be justified and that the court could not avoid
the broader issues raised. He then justified the search and seizure on Car-
roll and Chambers exigent circumstance grounds."1
In Thims v. Commonwealth 27 the court again held the inadvertency
requirement of Coolidge inapplicable, by analogy to Cook." 8 The officer's
advertent observation of a car from the public way was not a search. Even
though the car was parked on private property "there was no reasonable
expectation of privacy as to it,"'' 29 and its seizure as evidence after a plain
view observation was legitimate.130 However, under plain view doctrine
the seizure must be pursuant to a valid prior intrusion. In Thims the
officer had no legitimate basis for entering the private property. The
court held alternatively that either (1) no search occurred; the officer
merely seized evidence of a crime in plain view, or (2) a search and
seizure occurred, but it was justified by Poff's dissenting argument in
123. Id., 216 S.E.2d at 50.
124. Id.
125. Id. (quoting Carter v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 317, 320, 163 S.E.2d 589, 592 (1968)).
126. 216 Va. at 76, 216 S.E.2d at 51-52. Cf. Leake v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 918, 265
S.E.2d 701 (1980) (seizure and shaking of a brown bag held by a defendant stopped on the
public way was held to be an illegal search).
127. 218 Va. 85, 235 S.E.2d 443 (1977).
128. Id. at 89-90, 235 S.E.2d at 445-46.
129. Id. at 93, 235 S.E.2d at 447.
130. Id. at 92, 235 S.E.2d at 447.
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Cook, or (3) a legitimate inventory search occurred." 1
Justice Poff again differed and this time dissented from the position
taken by the majority. He argued that the police knew all along where the
vehicle was and went there intending to seize it. Neither inadvertent
plain view nor the Carroll-Chambers exigent circumstances theory war-
ranted the seizure. The police had abundant cause for obtaining and op-
portunity to obtain a warrant. Under Coolidge they were obligated to do
so, and thus the conviction ought to have been reversed.13 2
3. Did the Police Have Time to Obtain a Warrant?
Coolidge held that where there was probable cause for a vehicle search,
but none of the defined exigencies for warrantless entry pertained, the
police were not "justified ... in proceeding without a warrant."13' This
holding was weakened by Cardwell v. Lewis,134 which established that the
exigency justifying prompt action may arise at any time. As noted above,
the Virginia court was unresponsive to the issue in Thims.1 3 5 It later,
however, considered it in Vass v. Commonwealth"3 6 and Fore v. Common-
wealth,137 but dismissed it in Patty v. Commonwealth. 13
131. Id. at 92-93, 235 S.E.2d at 447 (Poff, J., dissenting). See notes 142-77 infra and ac-
companying text for discussion of inventory search rationale.
132. Id. at 94-96, 235 S.E.2d at 448-50. "But where the discovery is anticipated, where the
police know in advance the location of the evidence and intend to seize it, the situation is
altogether different. The requirement of a warrant to seize imposes no inconvenience
whatever... in the absence of 'exigent circumstances."' Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443, 470 (1971).
133. 403 U.S. at 464.
134. 417 U.S. 583 (1974). "[W]e know of no case or principle that suggests that the right
to search on probable cause and the reasonableness of seizing a car under exigent circum-
stances are foreclosed if a warrant was not obtained at the first practicable moment."
135. 218 Va. at 91, 235 S.E.2d at 446-47. See notes 127-32 supra and accompanying text.
136. 214 Va. 740, 204 S.E.2d 280 (1974). In Vass, police were attempting to verify that
defendant was selling stolen state documents, and arranged for a third party to return them
to defendant's wife, a school teacher. When she left school, apparently with the package,
and drove away, they made a stop and warrantless search which was upheld because they
had probable cause, but not enough certitude that she would actually leave school with the
papers to support a warrant. The cause arose only as they saw her depart and drive away.
Id. at 743-44, 204 S.E.2d at 283-84.
137. 220 Va. 991, 265 S.E.2d 729 (1980). In Fore, the defendant left a car at a repair shop
for brake repair in mid-November. His wife was cooperating with police to implicate him in
various burglaries, and caused them to believe stolen property was in the trunk of the car.
In December, when he was in custody on another charge, but his wife and an accomplice
were free and their whereabouts unknown, and the car sitting on a public commercial lot, an
officer searched the vehicle without a warrant. The court held his probable cause was not
fully formed until he verified where the car was and that it had been left by the defendant.
He had a legitimate concern that someone might remove it during the time it would take
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In Patty v. Commonwealth,"'9 tips from named citizen informants led
seven officers to stake out a car at a gas station. Probable cause existed
that the trunk contained marijuana, and the officers were waiting for the
owner(s) of the vehicle to return. The ignition coil had been removed to
insure payment of a repair bill. Defendants were arrested upon their re-
turn, and the trunk was pried open and searched. 40 The defendant
claimed that no exigency existed justifying warrantless seizure. The court
ignored the strength of the police force on the scene, the ease with which
one of them could have obtained a warrant without risk to the stake out
or to his fellow officers, the testimony of officers that there was "no way"
anyone would be allowed to "drive off in the car," the passage of five
hours between the beginning of the stake out and the arrest, and the fact
that the car could not be driven because the ignition coil was missing.
Seizing on the flexibility provided by Cardwell, the court gave the police
the benefit of the doubt in this situation.1 4 1
4. Constitutionality of Inventory Searches
Until South Dakota v. Opperman,42 decided in 1976, the Supreme
Court had not ruled on the constitutionality of inventory searches of
property taken into custody by the police. 4s Such searches require bal-
ancing individual expectations of privacy and freedom from general
searches,144 with the rationale that warrantless non-investigatory invento-
ries are necessary to protect the same individual's property, to prevent
spurious claims for losses from being filed against the police, and to avoid
harm to citizens and officers in the event dangerous articles are stored in
vehicles.145 The majority opinion in Opperman resolved the issue in favor
him to obtain a warrant; his warrantless search was therefore valid under the circumstances.
138. 218 Va. 150, 235 S.E.2d 437 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1010 (1978).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 151-53, 235 S.E.2d at 438-39.
141. The court argued:
While we agree the wiser course for the police would have been to acquire a search
warrant, it does not necessarily follow that under these circumstances the failure to
obtain one requires suppression of the evidence seized. The important factor here is
that the police were dealing with contraband goods concealed and about to be ille-
gally transported again in an automobile, and they knew it.
Id. at 154, 235 S.E.2d at 440.
142. 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
143. For a thorough discussion of the "distinct split" on this issue prior to Opperman, see
Annot., 48 A.L.R.3d 537 (1973).
144. "The word 'automobile' is not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth Amendment
fades away and disappears." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 461-62 (1971).
145. The rationale is argued even though the individual may not have consented to any-
thing more than custody of his vehicle, may consider his property sufficiently protected by
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of the police, holding certain warrantless inventory searches reasonable. 146
In 1971, the Virginia court had broadly interpreted the scope of permis-
sible inventory searches in Cabbler v. Commonwealth.1 47 Opperman cited
Cabbler as support, but only as to the rationale for inventory searches. 48
In fact, because of the scope of the search in Cabbler, a writ of habeas
corpus had been issued by the United States district court in 1974.149
In Cabbler, the seizure was contemporaneous with the arrest of the de-
fendant for a crime unconnected with his vehicle. The Cabbler court ad-
mitted evidence of unrelated crimes found during the inventory search in
the locked trunk of the vehicle. 50 The court also found the search reason-
able within the fourth amendment and validated the search as one in
"the best interest of the property owner."' 51 It gave particular weight to
the long-standing practice of taking custody of property and the rationale
for inventory searches of such property. 5 2 However, as noted by the fed-
eral district court in issuing the writ of habeas corpus, it gave little weight
to testimony that (1) the purpose of the practice of taking custody of
property was to protect "valuable goods,"'' 53 (2) the police had failed to
ask the owner whether he wanted such protection, and (3) there was only
a "minute" likelihood of false claims in such a situation.'"
glove compartment, trunk and door locks, and may have no claim against the police because
of the low degree of care required of them as involuntary bailees. Arguably the police can as
effectively protect the citizen with no intrusion by merely retaining his locked vehicle in a
secure lot, or contracting with a properly bonded private party for security, with or without
an inventory by the third party solely for its protection. None of the exigencies justifying
warrantless searches seem applicable in many inventory cases.
146. "[Warrantless] inventories pursuant to standard police procedures are reasonable" as
part of the authorities' legitimate care-taking function, where in good faith there is no inves-
tigatory motive. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 372.
147. 212 Va. 520, 184 S.E.2d 781 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1053 (1972). In Cabbler,
police arrested defendant at a hospital on a felony charge (firing into a dwelling). They
informed him that they would remove his vehicle, which was illegally parked blocking an
ambulance entrance, for safekeeping until he was released. He did not complain or protest.
The car was taken to the property room, and an inventory search conducted, during the
course of which unanticipated evidence of unrelated crimes was found in the locked trunk.
Id. at 521-22, 184 S.E.2d at 784. The inventory occurred after the police discovered and
seized a pistol left in plain view in the vehicle, a search which was not challenged. Cabbler v.
Superintendent, 374 F. Supp. 690, 691 (E.D. Va. 1974).
148. 428 U.S. at 369.
149. Cabbler v. Superintendent, 374 F. Supp. at 701.
150. Id. at 692.
151. 212 Va. at 522-23, 184 S.E.2d at 782-83.
152. Id. at 522, 184 S.E.2d at 782.
153. 374 F. Supp. at 692.
154. Id. at 700.
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While Opperman validated inventory searches of apparently aban-
doned vehicles found in no parking zones,515 the search in Opperman did
not extend to a locked glove compartment or locked trunk; the court
there specifically did not reach the issue of searching closed containers or
compartments within the vehicle.1 6 The Cabbler court, however, admit-
ted evidence seized from a locked trunk.15 7 Thus the holdings in the cases
vary with the context in which such searches are legitimatized, the proba-
ble motive of the police, and the scope of the search. Justice Marshall's
stinging dissent in Opperman suggests that law in this area is subject to
reexamination generally,1 5 8 and a view more restrictive than Opperman,
and thus a fortiori than Cabbler, may develop.
Schaum v. Commonwealth,5 9 also decided prior in Opperman, dealt
obliquely with the inventory search issue. Despite the intervening writ of
habeas corpus in Cabbler, the court implied lenient grounds for inventory
searches that would perhaps have gone far beyond Cabbler had not Op-
perman intruded. In Schaum, citing Cabbler, the court stated "the inven-
tory of the contents of the car, after its occupants had been lawfully ar-
rested, has been recognized by this court as a legitimate police practice
under the circumstances."' 6 0 However, the search was valid under Cham-
bers, ' and the court had no apparent need to reach the inventory search
155. 428 U.S. at 376.
156. Id. at 388 n.5 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
157. 374 F. Supp. at 692.
158. On the limits of Opperman, see United States v. Hellman, 556 F.2d 442, 443-44 (9th
Cir. 1977); People v. Rutovic, 566 P.2d 705 (Colo. 1977); People v. Clark, 65 Ill. 2d 169, 357
N.E.2d 798 (1976) (Goldenhersh, J., dissenting).
159. 215 Va. 498, 211 S.E.2d 73 (1975).
160. Id. at 501, 211 S.E.2d at 75. A burglary was reported. A citizen reported that a dark
blue Valiant with North Carolina plates had been driving suspiciously in the area. An officer
knew a particular person suspected of burglaries who drove such a car. He went to the home
of a "fence" and waited. Soon, the car came and its occupants went to the door. They then
drove away. A cooperating officer stopped the vehicle and arrested the occupants. The car
was impounded and the "contents of the locked trunk of the car were inventoried ...
Stolen property was found. Id. at 499-500, 211 S.E.2d at 74-75.
161. Id. at 501, 211 S.E.2d at 75. Cabbler and Schaum are distinguishable. While both
cases involved vehicles taken into police custody after arrest for a felony, in Cabbler argua-
bly the search was unrelated to the reason for the arrest, undertaken pursuant to long-
standing policies of the specific police department, bereft of any investigatory motive and
undertaken with no anticipation of finding illegal items. The search represented a good faith
effort to protect the defendant's property, avoid claims against the police, and avoid risk of
harm to the custodians. 212 Va. at 521-23, 184 S.E.2d at 782. On the contrary, the search in
Schaum was directly related to the reason for the arrest, no underlying police department
policies were apparent, there was an overt investigatory motive, and the police anticipated
finding stolen property. They had no concern with protecting defendant's property rights,
with reducing their liability as involuntary bailees, or with eliminating risk of harm to them-
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issue.
Two Virginia cases after Opperman continue to suggest a view of per-
missible inventory searches at variance with the Supreme Court. In
Thims v. Commonwealth,"6 2 after justifying a search as a plain view
seizure of evidence of a crime based on probable cause, the court went
further and held the search valid as an inventory search. The court re-
jected the defendant's claim that the inventory search was a pretext.1 63
Reese v. Commonwealth1 4 presented the court with a complex inven-
tory search challenge in light of Opperman. The defendant was arrested
for speeding, and was jailed. His car was impounded at a nearby wrecker
yard, locked, and guarded by dogs. A department policy requiring inven-
tory searches was ignored. Later, officers learned defendant matched the
description of a burglary suspect. They then searched his car, seizing
cameras and other fruits of the crime. After being confronted, the defen-
dant confessed.1 15 The court easily held this search illegal, as "a pretext
concealing an investigatory police motive."166
Later the same day, however, the same officers inventoried the contents
of the car, including those in its locked trunk. They shared the inventory
schedule with an officer from another jurisdiction who wanted to question
the defendant about another robbery. The officer did so, confronting the
defendant with evidence obtained in the inventory, and the defendant
confessed again.1 6 7 This second search, and thus defendant's conviction
on the second charge, was held to be legal.""
The court reasoned that since the police already had evidence and a
confession to one burglary, and no reason to suspect evidence of others,
they no longer had an investigatory motive. Instead, the second search
selves or the public. 215 Va. at 499-500, 211 S.E.2d at 73-74.
162. 218 Va. 85, 235 S.E.2d 443 (1977). See notes 127-32 supra and accompanying text.
163. Id. at 92, 235 S.E.2d at 447. The contradiction is simply that South Dakota v. Opper-
man, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) upheld benign, non-investigatory inventory searches as an excep-
tion to the warrant requirement. Where, as in Thims, the officer has in the view of the court
"probable cause to believe that the car [is] the fruit of a crime, that it might be stolen and
that it contain[s] stolen property... [and he has] probable cause to seize and search" it, it
is unreasonable to then justify his actions as based implicitly on benign, non-investigatory
motives. 218 Va. at 91, 235 S.E.2d at 447. Far from being an Opperman "caretaking search"
of defendant's car, the search in Thims, if an inventory search, in the words of Opperman
"was a pretext concealing an investigatory police motive." 428 U.S. at 375-76.
164. 220 Va. 1022, 265 S.E.2d 746 (1980).
165. Id. at 1022-23, 265 S.E.2d at 747-48.
166. Id. at 1026, 265 S.E.2d at 749.
167. Id. at 1023-24, 265 S.E.2d at 748.
168. Id. at 1026, 265 S.E.2d at 749.
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was "a good-faith inventory, initiated and conducted for the benign pur-
poses underlying the exception to the warrant requirement. 1 9 Further,
the second confrontation and arrest was not tainted by the first illegal
search, because the causal chain was broken by "intervening circum-
stances,"1 ' presumably the legal inventory search. Nothing taken in the
first search was used to confront the suspect, and no mention of the first
robbery occurred during the interrogation. The interrogation was based
solely on data gleaned from a legitimate inventory search.1 71
Reese raises questions about the entire inventory search policy. The
defendant was under arrest and in custody, his car locked and guarded,
and he had already confessed to a crime when the supposedly benign in-
ventory search occurred. Since the officer originally skipped the inventory
search required by department policy, his motives in the later search are
questionable. Further, the second search was arguably the indirect prod-
uct of the first, thereby tainted by its illegality. Also, if an inventory
search must be non-investigatory to be legal, arguably the police ought
not to be allowed to share the inventory with others whom they know to
have investigatory purposes.
5. Warrantless Inspection Searches
In Shirley v. Commonwealth, 72 the court upheld the constitutionality
of section 46.1-9 of the Virginia Code, which allows investigation of the
title and registration of motor vehicles in garages or repair shops,
17 8
against a challenge that it authorized an unreasonable warrantless
search.17 4 The court held the statute was part of a comprehensive scheme
to protect "lawful owners and the public. '175 It compared inspections in
garages or repair shops to random stops of vehicles. It is "routine" for
officers to randomly stop vehicles to inspect registration papers and li-
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1027, 265 S.E.2d at 750, quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
171. Id. at 1027-28, 265 S.E.2d at 750.
172. 218 Va. 49, 235 S.E.2d 432 (1977); see notes 107-08 supra and accompanying text.
173. Pursuant to VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-9 (Repl. Vol. 1980) (see note 108 supra for full
text) a policeman and an agent of the National Automobile Theft Bureau inspected "a num-
ber of motor vehicles parked" in defendant's "public garage and repair shop," and noticed
several without vehicle identification numbers. Defendant admitted (or claimed) ownership
of one, a Corvette. The title defendant showed used a vehicle identification for an Impala,
and the license plates on the Corvette were assigned to an Impala. An interior search en-
sued, and inspection stickers were seized indicating that the Corvette was the car inspected,
but used the Impala license number. Defendant was arrested and convicted of grand larceny
of the Corvette. 218 Va. at 50-51, 235 S.E.2d at 432-33.
174. Id. at 58, 235 S.E.2d at 437.
175. Id. at 51, 235 S.E.2d at 433.
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censes as "part of the regulatory system.1176 The defendant had actual or
constructive knowledge of the statute and implicitly consented to abide
by its provisions. 177 Because one can have no expectation of privacy con-
cerning a vehicle identification number, a limited investigation to deter-
mine the number is a reasonable warrantless administrative search. 17
Due to its peculiar facts, Shirley may have been properly decided.1 7 9
However, one of its rationales, random stops, has been presumptively in-
validated by Delaware v. Prouse,80 and there is nothing to indicate that
Shirley involved anything other than a random inspection. Further, third
party vehicle owners leaving their cars in bailment with repairmen argu-
ably have not impliedly consented to searches of their vehicles pursuant
to the statute. The consent they give the repairmen regarding their vehi-
cles generally would be limited to access for the agreed upon servicing,
and most reasonably would not contemplate that the repairman will grant
access to the vehicle to third parties.
The broad language of the Virginia statute permits access by the police
to virtually the entire vehicle, locked or unlocked, and to closed contain-
ers within it. No "articulable and reasonable suspicion"""1 of any irregu-
larity need exist so long as the vehicle is in a public garage or repair
shop." 2 Thus, apparently the police have an unlimited right of access to
inspect on a random basis.
E. Sufficiency of Hearsay as Basis for Affidavit Underlying Warrant
Many search warrants are based upon affidavits representing hearsay
received by the affiant from one or more unidentified informants. Su-
preme Court cases have clarified how the sufficiency of such information
is to be evaluated. During the seventies, Virginia adhered to basic re-
quirements, although it did carve out a number of limited exceptions that
relaxed the rules.
176. Id. at 52, 235 S.E.2d at 434.
177. Id. at 57, 235 S.E.2d at 436.
178. Id. at 53, 235 S.E.2d at 434.
179. In Shirley, the purported owner of the vehicles was also the owner of the repair shop
and was present when the inspections took place. Id. at 51, 235 S.E.2d at 433. Absent the
vehicle owner's connection with the repair shop, the charge of constructive knowledge of the
statute may be unreasonable.
180. 440 U.S. 648 (1979). The Court held vehicle stops for the purpose of checking the
driver's license and/or vehicle registration illegal, except where "there is at least articulable
and reasonable suspicion" of lack of registry or violation of law subjecting the driver or
vehicle to seizure or "spot checks." Id. at 663.
181. Id.
182. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-9 (Repl. Vol. 1980); see note 108 supra.
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An affidavit may be based on hearsay information from an unnamed
informant""3 and still establish probable cause.28 For purposes of a mag-
istrate's determination of probable cause, it is not important that the in-
formant be present or identified.8 5 However, the underlying facts and cir-
cumstances upon which the informant's statements are based must be
presented in the affidavit in some detail, not merely by affirmance of be-
lief or suspicion,18 so that "a neutral and detached" magistrate87 may
independently draw reasonable inferences therefrom. The magistrate
must be able to find the informant's data "credible" or "reliable,"' ,
based upon a "commonsense" reading of the affidavit.18 Although it is
not essential that hearsay be corroborated,190 it is preferred. Such corrob-
oration may be in the form of the afflant's first hand verification, 91 other
hearsay,192 affirmation that the informant had first hand knowledge and
on prior occasions had been reliable,"e3 the afflant's "knowledge of a sus-
pect's reputation,"'' an informant's admissions against interest,"95 or the
presence of a wealth of detail in the affidavit.'"
The Virginia court applied these Supreme Court doctrines in Hooper v.
Commonwealth"7 and Warren v. Commonwealth."' Hooper reversed a
conviction because references in the affidavit only to "a reliable source of
information who has given information in the past" provided no state-
ment of underlying facts, but were "merely a statement of a conclu-
sion.""19 Warren upheld a conviction where an informant had firsthand
183. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
184. Probable cause exists when facts and circumstances are within the afflant's own
knowledge and he has reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to justify the conclusion
by a person of reasonable caution that seizable property will be found in a particular place
or on a particular person. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925).
185. "Nor is it especially significant that neither the name nor the person of the inform-
ant was produced before the magistrate." United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 584-85
(1971).
186. Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 47 (1933).
187. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
188. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964).
189. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965).
190. United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. at 584.
191. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313 (1959).
192. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960).
193. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 416 (1969).
194. 403 U.S. at 583.
195. Id.
196. 393 U.S. at 416-17.
197. 212 Va. 49, 181 S.E.2d 816 (1971).
198. 214 Va. 600, 202 S.E.2d 885 (1974).
199. 212 Va. at 52, 181 S.E.2d at 818. A second warrant based on statements against
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knowledge and on prior occasions had given information that had proven
to be correct. 00 Recently, in Fagan v. Commonwealth,0 1 however, the
court rejected a challenge to the sufficiency of a warrant. While the defen-
dant did not challenge the reliability of the informant, he argued that the
mere assertion alone by the affiant that the informant had "personal
knowledge" that marijuana was at a certain place failed to give the requi-
site basis of facts and circumstances necessary for the magistrate to weigh
the informant's statements.202 This decision appears to be at variance
with the Supreme Court requirement in Nathanson that the informant's
statements not be based merely on afflirmance of belief or suspicion2 0 3 and
in Johnson that the information be such that a neutral and detached
magistrate can draw the reasonable inferences independently.20'4
In McKoy v. Commonwealth,2"0 defendant's counsel conceded past reli-
ability, and the facts and circumstances of uncorroborated hearsay were
accepted based primarily on "a wealth of detail." 06 Similarly in Andrews
v. Commonwealth,207 defendant conceded that the "informant was credi-
ble and that his information was reliable."208 His challenge was based on
the failure to indicate how the informant got his information. The court
looked to the presence of sufficient detail to allow the magistrate to infer
that the informant gained his information reliably, thereby invoking the
holding in McKoy.209
interest by a suspect in a burglary was held sufficient. Id. at 51, 181 S.E.2d at 817-18. See
also Manley v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 146, 176 S.E.2d 309 (1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S.
936 (1971).
200. 214 Va. at 604-05, 202 S.E.2d at 888-89. The pertinent part of the affidavit reads:
On June 6, 1972 a reliable informer advised the affiant that during the past 24 hours
the informer had observed a quantity of heroin and a large supply of hypodermic
syringes in the premises to be searched .... This informer's credibility or the relia-
bility of the information may be adjudged by the following facts: The informer on
numerous occasions has supplied the affiant... with drug information which has
proven to be correct. Informer is also self-admitted drug abuser.
Id. at 601, 202 S.E.2d at 886.
201. 220 Va. 692, 261 S.E.2d 320 (1980).
202. Id. at 694, 261 S.E.2d at 322.
203. 290 U.S. 41 (1933).
204. 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
205. 212 Va. 224, 183 S.E.2d 153 (1971).
206. Id. at 226, 183 S.E.2d at 156. The affidavit "described with specificity" a car, driver,
occupant and their exact location. The informant had been "so detailed as to raise the infer-
ence either of personal observation or of acquisition of the information in a reliable way."
This was actually a warrantless arrest situation, but the court applied the standards for
validating the action of a magistrate in issuing a warrant.
207. 216 Va. 179, 217 S.E.2d 812 (1975).
208. Id. at 182, 217 S.E.2d at 814.
209. Id. at 183, 217 S.E.2d at 815. In pertinent part the affidavit reads:
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Huff v. Commonwealth210 affirmed that where multiple informants un-
known to each other in effect corroborated each other's tips ("hearsay on
hearsay") "the enhanced reliability of the information [lent] credibility to
the informants." 211 Wheeler v. Commonwealth12 rejected a challenge to
the reliability of an informant who had observed LSD in the defendants'
possession on the basis of the Ventresca "common sense reading" rule.218
The more interesting informant cases developed the "statement against
interest" premise of reliability and a relaxed "citizen informant" pre-
sumption. Seizing on dictum in a concurrence to Spinelli v. United
States,214 the court in Manley v. Commonwealth2 5 held sufficient an in-
formant's affidavit based on his firsthand knowledge as a participant in
the crime,218 predating the support given this premise in United States v.
I have received information from a reliable informer who has given me information in
the past that has led to the arrest of other persons for possession of a controlled drug,
stated to me that [defendant], a black male, was coming from New York City with a
large quantity of heroin, on an airline at the Norfolk Regional Airport .... [Defen-
dant] arrived in Norfolk... on Piedmont Flight 79.
Id. at 181, 217 S.E.2d at 813. Defendant and a female companion were arrested, strip
searched, and released. The warrant was obtained subsequently to search three unclaimed
pieces of luggage; a surveillance team saw defendant observe but not touch the bags in the
baggage room. Id. at 180-81, 217 S.E.2d at 813. The court did not reach the issue of legality
of the original arrest which was warrantless; all the police knew was that defendant had
arrived, as they had been told he would, from New York City.
210. 213 Va. 710, 194 S.E.2d 690 (1973).
211. Id. at 714-15, 194 S.E.2d at 694. The pertinent part of the affidavit reads:
That from as many as three different reliable sources, the Winchester Police Depart-
ment has received information that the [defendant] is dealing in and with the unlaw-
ful distribution of Controlled Drugs; that these informants are not known to each
other as informers and each has a different connection with the [defendant]; and that
their individual reliability is established by reason of their position in connection
with the [defendant], affording each of them the opportunity to learn of his activities,
and by reason that much of the information given by one is corroborated by the in-
formation given by one or both of the others.
Id. at 713, 194 S.E.2d at 693.
212. 217 Va. 95, 225 S.E.2d 400 (1976).
213. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965).
214.. "[I]f. . .the informer's hearsay comes . . . in the nature of an admission against
interest, the affidavit giving this information should be held sufficient." Spinelli v. United
States, 393 U.S. 410, 425 (1969) (White, J., concurring).
215. 211 Va. 146, 176 S.E.2d 309 (1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 936 (1971).
216. Id. at 151, 176 S.E.2d at 313. In pertinent part the affidavit reads:
I have received information from a reliable informant who states that he was at the
apartment... this past week and he saw a large quantity of marijuana (a narcotic
drug) .... My informer also states that in the past month he has smoked marijuana
in the apartment ... and in the past month he has made two purchases of marijuana
from [defendant].
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Harris.217 Later the court in Guzewicz v. Commonwealth1 8 went a step
further; it implied that statements against interest by third party declar-
ants to informants providing information for an affidavit were reliable
sources per se.219
Guzewicz also adopted the citizen informant presumption that "we will
not apply to citizen informers the same standard of reliability as is appli-
cable when police act on tips from professional informers or those who
seek immunity for themselves, whether such citizens are named . . . or,
as here, unnamed. '220 In Guzewicz the information which bolstered this
presumption of reliability was that the informant "has been known...
and [her] family has been known... [to] this affiant [a policeman] for
many years."'221
The Guzewicz rule controlled Brown v. Commonwealth, an opinion is-
sued the same day.222 In Brown the citizen was a first-time informer,
"steadily employed," a "registered voter," with a "good reputation in his
neighborhood," who had "expressed concern for young people involved
with narcotics. '223 In McNeill v. Commonwealth2 2 4 the Guzewicz rule was
again invoked where the informant was a former fireman who walked into
the police station to report an attempted drug sale.225 It was significant to
Id. at 147-48, 176 S.E.2d at 311.
217. "Admissions of crime ... carry their own indicia of credibility - sufficient at least to
support a finding of probable cause to search." United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 583
(1971).
218. 212 Va. 730, 187 S.E.2d 144 (1972). Defendants were charged with possession of con-
trolled drugs after a search pursuant to a warrant. An unnamed informant told an officer
about drug activity, and the warrant issued. Id. at 730-31, 187 S.E.2d at 145-46.
219. In Guzewicz, the court considered multiple affidavits, rejecting two but upholding
one. The first failed for want of facts upon which to base a conclusion of reliability; the
second, because it contained a "mere affirmation of suspicion and belief." Id. at 733, 187
S.E.2d at 146-47. The relevant part'of the third affidavit reads:
[A]n information [sic], who has been known and whose family has been known by
this affiant [policeman] for many years, and is known by this affiant to be reliable,
informed this affiant that persons known by her to frequent the premises to be
searched have stated in her presence that they frequent said premises for the purpose
of securing and using controlled drugs which are there unlawfully possessed ....
This affiant further states that he has personal knowledge that said premises are fre-
quented by persons known to him to be unlawful users of controlled drugs.
Id. at 731-32, 187 S.E.2d at 145.
220. Id. at 735-36, 187 S.E.2d at 148.
221. Id. at 731, 187 S.E.2d at 145.
222. 212 Va. 672, 674, 187 S.E.2d 160, 161-62 (1972).
223. Id. at 674, 187 S.E.2d at 161.
224. 213 Va. 200, 191 S.E.2d 1 (1972).
225. Id. at 201-02, 191 S.E.2d at 2-3.
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the court that the informant was willing to testify in court.22
Despite some assertions to the contrary,227 the court appears to have
avoided a per se presumption of citizen reliability, and applied the doc-
trine only where by a "common sense" reading228 the affidavit gave suffi-
cient basis to rely on the citizen's information. This does not seem an
unreasonable relaxation, as applied.2 9
In finding an affidavit sufficient in Tamburino v. Commonwealth,2 30 the
court combined statement against interest, the citizen reliability pre-
sumption, and the "wealth of detail" premise with corroboration by an
officer, and participation by the informant in a "controlled buy. '23 1 The
court did not deal, however, with the apparent contradiction that an in-
formant, an admitted user of illegal drugs, who made a statement against
interest was accorded citizen reliability. Further, the court did not indi-
cate on what factual basis it applied the citizen reliability presumption in
226. The pertinent part of the affidavit reads:
[An] individual came to me at the police department and advised that [defendant]
had just tried to sell him and three (3) others some dope, he gave the description of
automobile and licence [sic] number and said it was at the Pizzarena. I went to the
Pizzarena and the individual was there and in talking with him he stated that he was
a retired fireman from Washington, D.C. My informer has proven to be reliable and is
willing to testify in court.
Id. at 201, 191 S.E.2d at 2.
227. See Eighteenth Annual Survey of Developments in Virginia Law: 1972-1973, 59 VA.
L. Rav. 1400, 1485 (1973) arguing that "McNeil represents a further significant deteriora-
tion [of fourth amendment protection]. An informer's ability to establish credibility through
his own statement negates any need for an objective manifestation of reliability."
228. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965).
229. The Guzewicz citizen informer presumption played an important part in a warrant-
less search, seizure, and arrest situation in Patty v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 150, 235 S.E.2d
437 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1010 (1978), discussed at notes 139-41 supra and accom-
panying text relative to warrantless vehicle searches. In Patty, three named citizens in a
position to report firsthand knowledge were involved. Id. at 154-55, 235 S.E.2d at 439.
230. 218 Va. 821, 241 S.E.2d 762 (1978).
231. Id. at 824-25, 241 S.E.2d at 764-65. The pertinent part of the affidavit reads:
A concerned citizen ... advised the affiant. . . that he was in a position to furnish
the [police] with information concerning the illegal possession and distribution of
contribant [sic] drugs in the Richmond metro area.
This citizen's reliability may be adjudged by the following facts:
He had been associated with the drug culture in the Richmond Metro area for the
past three years.
He is an admitted user of Marijuana and chemical drugs. He possesses the knowledge
of how, when and where to purchase contriband [sic] drugs.
He has demonstrated his knowledge and ability to purchase same. [Controlled buy
then described].
Id. at 822-23, 241 S.E.2d at 763.
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this case. In addition, it backed away from sufficiency of the statement
against interest concept standing alone.2 2 These facts might suggest al-
ternatively that there was such a variety of bases noted for the affidavit
that the court was avoiding a definitive statement, or that there is a reex-
amination of the doctrine under way.2 3
F. Stop and Frisk Doctrine
Howard v. Commonwealth2" presented a difficult investigative stop
question in terms of the basis for such a stop. In Howard, a motel had
been robbed and the suspect, after abandoning his car, escaped on foot.
More than an hour later, an officer in the area of the motel stopped the
taxi in which the defendant was riding to determine the passenger's iden-
tity."' Although the court affirmed the conviction, the incident amounted
to a random vehicle stop, which the Supreme Court subsequently held
illegal in Delaware v. Prouse s
While the court ascribed the basis for the stop as a Terry v. Ohio237
investigative stop, the officer in Howard had neither observed the defen-
dant, nor seen him acting suspiciously. He merely "spotted a taxicab in
the area with its roof light out, indicating it had a fare," and stopped it to
ask the driver where he picked up his passenger and to determine the
232. "While the admission by the informant that he was associated with the drug culture,
and was a user of marijuana, would not alone be sufficient to establish his credibility, it is a
factor to be considered." Id. at 825, 241 S.E.2d at 765.
233. For comparative views of citizen informant presumption see Etchieson v. State, 372
S.W.2d 690 (Tex. 1963), vacated on other grounds, 378 U.S. 589 (1964) ("reliable, credible
and trustworthy citizen" language sufficient). Contra Kemp v. State, 464 S.W.2d 141 (Tex.
Crim. 1971). For case in accord with "community standing" test, see Yantis v. State, 476
S.W.2d 24 (Tex. Crim. 1972) ("excellent reputation in the neighborhood. . . , the lack of a
criminal record and his continuous gainful employment" sufficient statement of bases for
conclusion of reliability. 476 S.W.2d at 27). See also Annot., 10 A.L.R.3d 359 (1966) (propri-
ety of considering hearsay in establishing probable cause); Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 605 (1950)
(sufficiency of affidavit based on unnamed informant). See 7 U. RICH. L. Rlv. 367 (1972)
which criticizes Guzewicz, arguing that the traditional citizen informer rule applies only
where the informant provides information observed at first hand and not double hearsay, as
in Guzewicz, where declarants told informer, who told police. Guzewicz is therefore a pro-
nounced relaxation of the rule. Id. at 370. The court applied the citizen informant presump-
tion in Tamburino v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 821, 241 S.E.2d 762 (1978); Patty v. Common-
wealth, 218 Va. 150, 235 S.E.2d 437 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1010 (1978); McNeill v.
Commonwealth, 213 Va. 200, 191 S.E.2d 1 (1972); and Brown v. Commonwealth, 212 Va.
672, 187 S.E.2d 60 (1972).
234. 210 Va. 674, 173 S.E.2d 829 (1970).
235. Id. at 675, 173 S.E.2d at 830-31.
236. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
237. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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passenger's identity.23 8 The facts do not seem to support the court's dic-
tum that "[w]hen a person is observed .. . under suspicious circum-
stances he is not clothed with the right of privacy which prevents a police
officer from inquiring into his identity and actions."2 9 It is not inherently
suspicious to be an unseen passenger in an operating taxi.
The holding in Howard seems open to question under the "specific ob-
jective facts" test of Brown v. Texas.24 0 Lacking specific, objective facts,
the officer in Howard had no basis to stop the cab. Having illegally
stopped the cab, all discoveries during detention of the defendant were
properly inadmissible. Subsequent to Howard, the Virginia General As-
sembly codified its stop and frisk procedures. 41 Under the present stat-
ute, it is doubtful that the outcome in Howard would be the same today.
The court also applied the Terry doctrine in Simmons v. Common-
wealth24 2 which validated a stop, and in Bryson v. Commonwealth,s
238. 210 Va. at 675, 173 S.E.2d at 831.
239. Id. at 677, 173 S.E.2d at 832.
240. 443 U.S. 47 (1979). In Brown the Court unanimously clarified and limited Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) as it dealt with the issue of police stops of pedestrians (i.e., taxi cab
passengers), holding such stops unconstitutional absent any reasonable suspicion that the
person is or was engaged in criminal conduct. 443 U.S. at 51. The fact that the neighbor-
hood was frequented by drug users was not a specific, objective fact on which an officer
could base a reasonable suspicion about a person walking there. Id. Using the Brown ratio-
nale, therefore, the mere presence of a taxi with a passenger in the vicinity of a motel
robbed 70 minutes earlier is not a basis for a legal stop unlike Howard. For discussion of
Brown, see 7 AM. J. CriM. LAW 385 (1979).
241. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-83 (Repl. Vol. 1975) reads:
Any police officer may detain a person in a public place whom he reasonably suspects
is committing, has committed or is about to commit a felony or possesses a concealed
weapon in violation of § 18.2-308, and may require of such person his name and ad-
dress. Provided further, that such police officer may, if he reasonably believes that
such person intends to do him bodily harm, search his person for a dangerous
weapon, and if such person is found illegally to possess a dangerous weapon, the po-
lice officer shall take possession of the same and dispose of it as is provided by law.
242. 217 Va. 552, 231 S.E.2d 218 (1977). Subsequent to a complaint of the burglary of a
Xerox office building, an officer encountered nearby a man "matching the description of the
prowler," whose jacket "was sagging in the front." Something "was in the pocket" which he
believed "to be a weapon." Id. at 553, 231 S.E.2d at 219. He conducted an outer clothes pat
down, and removed a hard object that turned out to be a pocket tape recorder. The officer's
experience met the Terry test. Id. at 555-56, 231 S.E.2d at 220-21. The court held the proce-
dure valid pursuant to VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-83 (Repl. Vol. 1975). See note 241 supra.
243. 211 Va. 85, 175 S.E.2d 248 (1970). An officer stopped a man on the street merely
because he had a rubberband around his finger securing a paper. A search turned up lottery
paraphernalia. The court reversed the conviction, holding Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)
inapplicable and Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949) controlling in its require-
ment that at the moment of a warrantless arrest the officer must have probable cause. 211
Va. at 85-87, 175 S.E.2d at 250. See also Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960).
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which invalidated a stop. In an interesting case in light of Cook v. Com-
monwealth244 and the Terry doctrine, the court in the recent opinion of
Leake v. Commonwealth,245 held that since a Terry patdown is a search,
to grab and shake a bag held by a defendant is also a search. As such it
was without probable cause and therefore illegal, invalidating the discov-
ery of marijuana in the bag as well as defendant's confession.24 6
G. Administrative Searches - Arson
Bennett v. Commonwealth24 7 dealt with the issue of the reasonableness
of warrantless searches pursuant to arson investigations, both at the scene
of the fire prior to extinguishment and at a later time. The court upheld
the validity of the searches in Bennett on grounds that may have been
subsequently invalidated.
In Bennett, an officer assigned to direct traffic at the scene of a fire
smelled a "petroleum like odor. '248 Before the fire was out, he and a fel-
low officer "walked around and inspected the house and yard," finding
and seizing a jug "in plain view" containing a kerosene-like product.24'
The next day, an "expert fire investigator"2 50 searched the premises with-
out consent or a warrant, seizing additional evidence of arson.
As to the first search and seizure, the court ignored both the limited
scope of the officer's presence, which was "to handle traffic congestion"
and that the officer was not a firefighter or an arson investigator. The fact
that the jug was not in plain view from the street and the investigatory
nature of the search 251 were also given little weight. The court invoked
Camara v. Municipal Court252 as its basis and held that no warrant is
required in an emergency. But Camara dealt directly with routine annual
building inspections that were not "personal in nature nor aimed at the
discovery of evidence of a crime," 258 and referred only tangentially to
emergency searches without warrants. 5
As to the second search, the court refused to engraft a Camara warrant
244. 216 Va. 71, 216 S.E.2d 48 (1975). See notes 121-26 supra and accompanying text.
245. 220 Va. 918, 265 S.E.2d 701 (1980).
246. Id. at 922-23, 265 S.E.2d at 704.
247. 212 Va. 863, 188 S.E.2d 215 (1972).
248. Id. at 864, 188 S.E.2d at 216.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 865, 188 S.E.2d at 217.
251. Id. at 864, 188 S.E.2d at 216.
252. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
253. Id. at 537.
254. Id. at 539.
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requirement.255 It relied upon section 27-58 of the Virginia Code which
authorizes fire investigations.25 The court presumed that had the defen-
dant known, he would have consented to the search. This is improbable,
given the circumstances of arson.257 The court invoked the emergency exi-
gency despite the lack of supporting evidence.
The United States Supreme Court in See v. City of Seattle25 s held that
a warrant must be obtained for a non-investigatory fire inspection of com-
mercial premises where consent was withheld.259 More recently, in Michi-
gan v. Tyler,210 it was recognized that a warrantless fire investigation may
be conducted under the emergency exigency at the scene by someone
such as a fire chief, pursuant to his duty, although not by a policeman.2"'
However, subsequent entries at the fire scene which are "clearly detached
from the initial exigency ... must be made pursuant to ... warrant pro-
cedures. ' '26 2 The nature of the individual fire determines whether entry
the day after flames are doused is valid as a mere continuation of an ini-
tially valid warrantless entry or invalid because "clearly detached from
the initial entry. '26 3 It is possible, therefore, that both searches in Ben-
nett situations would be resolved differently now.2
255. 212 Va. at 865, 188 S.E.2d at 218.
256. VA. CODE ANN. § 27-58 (Repl. Vol. 1964) reads in part: "The [State Corporation]
Commission, and such person or persons as it may appoint, shall have the authority at all
times of the day, in the performance of the duties imposed by the provisions of § 27-56, to
enter upon and examine any building or premises where any fire has occurred ... ." At
present VA. CODE ANN. § 27-58 (Repl. Vol. 1979) reads identically with the exception that
vests the power of entry in the Department of State Police.
257. 212 Va. at 865, 188 S.E.2d at 217.
258. 387 U.S. 541 (1967); companion case to Camara, supra note 252.
259. Id. at 545.
260. 436 U.S. 499 (1978).
261. Id. at 509.
262. Id. at 511.
263. Id. at 509-12. Entry to determine cause is more benign than entry to investigate
arson. The Court imposes a warrant requirement with the traditional showing of probable
cause applicable to searches for evidence when investigating officers find probable cause to
believe that arson has occurred and they require further access to gather evidence. Id. at
512.
264. The holding in Bennett, arguing application of the Camara administrative search
exception was inapt because the Bennett searches were in reality criminal investigations. As
subsequently was done in Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978), a warrant requirement
should have been engrafted on state fire inspection laws to insure that authorization of
searches continue a judicial inquiry, not one "left to the legislature or the police." Comment,
Arson, supra at 142-43.
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H. Other Issues in Search and Seizure
During the decade the court faced many less significant search and
seizure issues in isolated cases. While these cases are interesting for a
sense of the overall work-product of the court, lengthy explication is
unwarranted.
Many of the cases involved the validity of searches incident to arrest.
The court invoked Beck v. Ohio26 5 to find a search incident to an illegal
arrest invalid in Upton v. Commonwealth.2 66 In Cosby v. Common-
wealth267 and Fierst v. Commonwealth268 the court considered and re-
jected allegations that arrests were mere pretexts for searches incident to
arrest, finding the issue moot in Cosby and finding probable cause to ar-
rest in Fierst. In the recent case of Hart v. Commonwealth,269 however,
the court reversed a conviction because the arrest, though legitimate, was
made solely to obtain evidence to convict the defendant of a crime unre-
lated to the stated purpose of the arrest. The court in Italiano v. Com-
monwealth70 applied the rule that so long as a search incident to arrest
occurs contemporaneously with the arrest, it may precede it if the arrest
is not based upon fruits of the search; this is, of course, the requirement
of pre-existing probable cause.2 7 1 In Greenfield v. Commonwealth,27 2 the
court applied the doctrine of United States v. Edwards7 s to justify under
certain circumstances, a remote search and seizure of clothing from a de-
265. 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). An arrest without probable cause is illegal.
266. 211 Va. 445, 447, 177 S.E.2d 528, 530 (1970).
267. 211 Va. 573, 179 S.E.2d 460 (1971).
268. 210 Va. 757, 173 S.E.2d 807 (1970).
269. 221 Va. 283, 269 S.E.2d 806 (1980).
270. 214 Va. 334, 200 S.E.2d 526 (1973). See discussion in Nineteenth Annual Survey of
Developments in Virginia Law: 1973-1974, supra note 77, at 1510.
271. Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694, 700 (1931).
272. 214 Va. 710, 204 S.E.2d 414 (1974). Greenfield was arrested at a Richmond hospital
where he was being treated for a cut hand. He earlier had slain a twenty-one year old coed
in Charlottesville. He was given a change of clothes after arrival at the Charlottesville jail.
Laboratory analysis of his clothes "revealed bloodstains of deceased's blood type." Id. at
711-12, 204 S.E.2d at 416-17.
273. 415 U.S. 800 (1974). "The question here is whether the Fourth Amendment should
be extended to exclude from evidence certain clothing taken from [defendant] while he was
in custody, at the city jail approximately 10 hours after his arrest." Id. at 801. By a five to
four majority, the Court held that while the fourth amendment is not generally applicable
"to post-arrest seizures of the effects of an arrestee," id. at 808, it was nevertheless legiti-
mate for the police to wait overnight to take from defendant his clothes as "effects in his
immediate possession that constituted evidence of crime." Id. at 805. "[R]easonable delay in
effectuating" a search incident to arrest is legitimate as creating no greater an imposition
than a contemporaneous search would. Id.
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fendant incident to arrest. Finally, in Kirkpatrick v. Commonwealth2 7 4
the court held that Chimel v. California,27 5 which established the "grab-
bing distance" scope for a search incident to arrest, mandated only pro-
spective application.
Other cases dealt with the validity of warrants and affidavits. The court
recognized the invalidity of an arrest pursuant to an expired warrant in
Leatherwood v. Commonwealth,2 7 8 and reversed convictions because data
in affidavits was insufficient to enable a magistrate to independently con-
clude probable cause existed in Stallworth v. Commonwealth,7 7 Berger v.
Commonwealth,2 7 8 and Moore v. Commonwealth.7 9 In an interesting re-
cent case, Gilluly v. Commonwealth,280 the court reversed a conviction
not because the affidavit was faulty, but because in preparing the warrant
the name of the offense was deleted. The warrant thus became a general
warrant. 281 In Stovall v. Commonwealth,8 2 a conviction was reversed be-
cause it was the product of a stale warrant, one based on seventy-two day
old data.2 83 However, a Stovall challenge to a warrant because much of
the information in the affidavit was stale was rebuffed in Pierceall v.
Commonwealth.2" The court held that demonstration of probable cause
of a continuing nature along with receipt of a reliable informant's tip
within twenty-four hours of execution negated the challenge.2 85 Clodfelter
v. Commonwealth2 86 rejected a claim that the magistrate could not fulfill
his duties in good faith when a warrant was executed two minutes before
the magistrate signed it. The warrant consisted of a one page standard
form, and the two minute review was "neither unreasonable nor un-
274. 211 Va. 269, 176 S.E.2d 802 (1970).
275. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). This view was validated in Williams v. United States, 401 U.S.
646 (1971).
276. 215 Va. 161, 163, 207 S.E.2d 845, 847 (1974).
277. 213 Va. 313, 314-15, 191 S.E.2d 738, 739 (1972). See discussion in Eighteenth Annual
Survey of Developments in Virginia Law: 1972-1973, supra note 227, at 1483.
278. 213 Va. 54, 55-56, 189 S.E.2d 360, 361 (1972). See discussion in Eighteenth Annual
Survey of Developments in Virginia Law: 1972-1973, supra note 227, at 1482.
279. 211 Va. 569, 570, 179 S.E.2d 458, 459-60 (1971). See discussion in Survey of Develop-
ments in Virginia Law: 1970-1971, 57 VA. L. REv. 1436, 1444 (1971).
280. 221 Va. 39, 267 S.E.2d 105 (1980).
281. Id. at 42, 267 S.E.2d at 107.
282. 213 Va. 67, 189 S.E.2d 353 (1972). See discussion in Eighteenth Annual Survey of
Developments in Virginia Law: 1972-1973, supra note 227, at 1486.
283. Id. at 70-71, 189 S.E.2d at 356. The magistrate must determine that probable cause
exists at the time the warrant issues. Segro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206, 210-11 (1932).
284. 218 Va. 1016, 243 S.E.2d 222 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1067 (1979).
285. Id. at 1025, 243 S.E.2d at 227.
286. 218 Va. 98, 235 S.E.2d 340 (1977).
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usual. '2 7 Finally, in Crowder v. Commonwealth28s the court held that an
officer's personal knowledge that two felony warrants for a defendant
were outstanding in another jurisdiction validated a warrantless arrest in
Virginia.
289
During the decade, the court made several rulings on the fruit of the
poisonous tree doctrine. In Garris v. Commonwealth29 0 the court held
that where police held a valid warrant to search a car involved in an acci-
dent and achieved entry with keys possibly illegally removed from the
defendant, the entry was nevertheless valid under the inevitable discov-
ery exception to the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine.29 1 The court
invoked the dissipation of the taint exception to the doctrine in Warlick
v. Commonwealth.2  In Warlick, drugs were illegally seized in one room;
after a Christian charity speech, the defendant voluntarily led officers to
other drugs.2 3 The court also applied a fruit of the poisonous tree excep-
tion, the "intervening circumstances" argument, in Reese v.
Commonwealth.29
Other challenges to fourth amendment searches and seizures also
failed. In Patler v. Commonwealth,9 a defendant challenged a search of
a field adjacent to his father-in-law's home, and the seizure of some bul-
lets found there. The court applied "open fields" to reject the challenge,
as the area was outside the curtilage.2" The court also held that a defen-
dant must establish, not merely allege, a possessory or proprietory inter-
287. Id. at 100, 235 S.E.2d at 341.
288. 213 Va. 151, 191 S.E.2d 239 (1972).
289. Id. at 153, 191 S.E.2d at 240. Insufficient facts are given to determine whether the
recent case of Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), holding a warrant required for
arrest in the residence of a defendant, would apply in Crowder.
290. 212 Va. 26, 27, 181 S.E.2d 631, 632 (1971).
291. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) ("fruit of the poisonous tree" doc-
trine enunciated); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) (inde-
pendent source rule and inevitable discovery exception declared).
292. 215 Va. 263, 208 S.E.2d 746 (1974).
293. Id. at 267, 208 S.E.2d at 749. The "independent source" and "inevitable discovery"
exceptions also justified admissibility in this case. Id.
294. 220 Va. 1022, 265 S.E.2d 746 (1980).
295. 211 Va. 448, 177 S.E.2d 618 (1970), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 909 (1972); discussed in
Survey of Developments in Virginia Law: 1970-1971, supra note 279, at 1438 (1971). See
Air Pollution Variance Board v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861, 865 (1974), holding
police violate fourth amendment only if they enter the curtilage. Interestingly, the court did
not reach standing of the defendant, which at the time was probably not in question as he
was "legitimately on premises," Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 267 (1960). Under
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), however, standing would have been denied on the
theory that the holding in Jones was overly broad. Id. at 142.
296. 211 Va. at 451, 177 S.E.2d at 621.
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est in the premises searched in Chesson v. Commonwealth297 and that the
burden of proof lies with the defendant.2 98 In Townes v. Common-
wealth299 the court held that no fourth amendment violation occurred
when officers tried in the defendant's door a key found on the ground at
the scene of a crime. The key would be admissible as validly found at the
scene of a crime3 °°
I. Conclusion
Since 1970, the Virginia Supreme Court was extremely involved with
search and seizure cases. Particularly in the areas consent searches, in-
ventory and administrative searches and the scope of otherwise valid ve-
hicle searches, it has read narrowly Supreme Court doctrine. However, in
areas of no-knock entry, the "furtive gesture" rule, and presumptions as
to the sufficiency of affidavits based on data from unnamed informants it
has followed an approach wholly in keeping with the trend line of the
Court's opinions. The years ahead should continue to provide evidence of
a court challenged by the dynamic tension inherent in the problem of
safeguarding the public welfare without excessive intrusion into areas of
protected individual freedom.
III. PRE-TRIAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURES
A. Confessions
To be admissible a confession must have been made voluntarily and
not in violation of the confessor's privilege against self-incrimination or
right to counsel. A series of decisions by the United States Supreme
Court has developed standards for determining the admissibility of the
confession which reflect a concern for protecting individual constitutional
rights, deterring unacceptable police conduct in obtaining confessions and
insuring the reliability of confessions.30' The voluntariness requirement
297. 216 Va. 827, 223 S.E.2d 923 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 927 (1976).
298. Defendant was denied automatic standing under Jones v. United States, 362 U.S.
257 (1960), because he was charged with a non-possessory offense. 216 Va. at 830, 223 S.E.2d
at 925.
299. 214 Va. 683, 204 S.E.2d 269 (1974).
300. Id. at 684-85, 204 S.E.2d at 271.
301. There is conflict among jurisdictions and among the Supreme Court decisions them-
selves as to which of these factors is most important to the criminal process. The conserva-
tive or law and order approach focuses on achieving factual truth in the most efficient (in-
formal) way and is more concerned with protecting societal rights than individual rights.
The liberal or due process focus is upon preservation of individual rights through formalized
procedures. See Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1964).
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was the earliest standard for judging the admissibility of confessions.3 0 2
However, this standard was too flexible and lower courts applied a very
broad definition of "voluntary". The Supreme Court recognized the need
for more explicit standards in order to limit discretionary practices by
lower courts. The sixth amdndment right to counsel approach in Massiah
v. United States3 0 3 and Escobedo v. Illinois3s 4 served as a transition from
the de facto voluntariness approach to the fairly rigid requirements of
Miranda v. Arizona.s0 5 In Miranda the Court focused on the fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination. To secure this constitutional
privilege, Miranda required that certain procedural safeguards be fol-
lowed before a confession obtained during a custodial investigation could
be admissible in state or federal courtse6
Critical to any analysis of a Miranda problem is a determination of
whether there was custody and an interrogation, and if so, whether there
was a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver by the defendant of his
rights under Miranda.307 Miranda defined custody as "taken into custody
or otherwise deprived of... freedom by the authorities in any significant
way."308 After Miranda, there was confusion among lower courts in recon-
302. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) made voluntariness a due process require-
ment applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment.
303. 377 U.S. 201 (1964). In Massiah, the Court held that there could be no deliberate
interrogation, no matter how indirect or surreptitious, of an accused after indictment with-
out the consent and presence of counsel unless there has been a knowing, intelligent and
voluntary waiver of the right.
304. 378 U.S. 478 (1964). The Escobedo decision expanded the right to counsel and held
that the right commenced when an investigation began to "focus" on the accused, i.e., when
an investigation changed from investigatory to accusatory.
305. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
306. Id. at 444. Before a suspect in police custody is questioned, he must be warned that
he has the right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence
against him, that he has a right to the presence of an attorney at the interrogation and that
if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for him. Id. at 444, 467-72.
307. Because the validity of the waiver relates to the voluntariness of the confession,
Akers v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 40, 46, 216 S.E.2d 28, 32 (1975), this phase of analysis will
be discussed under the voluntariness requirement. See notes 330-55 infra and accompanying
text.
308. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966), quoted in Smith v. Commonwealth,
219 Va. 455, 470, 248 S.E.2d 135, 140 (1978). The Virginia Supreme Court has not limited
the protections of Miranda to custody for certain types of offenses, but the Fourth Circuit
recently held that the warnings were not required when a suspect was in custody for a traffic
offense. Clay v. Riddle, 541 F.2d 956 (4th Cir. 1976). Generally, when a person is a witness
before a grand jury, he is not considered to be under custodial interrogation. I. CooK, CON-
sTruIONAL RIGHTS OF THE AccusED: TRIAL RIGHTS § 83 (1974 & Supp. 1979). However, in
Virginia, an individual called to testify before a grand jury will be given Miranda warnings.
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-203 (Rep. Vol. 1977). For a general discussion of factors considered by
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ciling the idea of "focus" from Escobedo and that of "custody" in Mi-
randa. The Court had said that "custodial interrogation" was what Esco-
bedo meant by an investigation focused on the accused.309 Later decisions
indicated that "focus" began to exist at the time of custody and not
before. 10 The Virginia Supreme Court has adopted this latter approach.
In Smith v. Commonwealths" the court held that the fact that "the in-
vestigation had focused upon the suspect and had become accusatory was
not determinative of the question of custody." 12 Thus it would seem that
Escobedo is no longer accepted in Virginia. In determining the existence
of custody, the Virginia court has adopted the objective test used by the
majority of lower courts.3 23 Under this test, the subjective beliefs of the
officer and suspect are not dispositive. The "fact that the defendant may
have felt he was deprived of his right to leave does not require the [Mi-
randa] warnings to be given."3 24 Factors which the court does consider
include whether or not the defendant was: 1) free to move away;"" 2)
under arrest;316 3) in coercive or familiar surroundings;311 and 4) actually
did leave afterwards.318
The second critical aspect of the Miranda problem is determining if an
interrogation has taken place. "Interrogation" was defined in Miranda as
"questioning initiated by law enforcement officers. 31 9 The Virginia court
courts in determining the existence of custody, see I. COOK, supra, at § 83; B. GEORGE, 1
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SOURCEBOOK 360-65 (1976); Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 565 (1970 & Supp.
1980).
309. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 n.4 (1966).
310. See Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1969).
311. 219 Va. 455, 248 S.E.2d 135 (1978).
312. Id. at 470, 248 S.E.2d at 144. See also Jordan v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 768, 222
S.E.2d 573 (1976) (court rejected defense argument that process shifted from investigatory
to accusatory and therefore required Miranda warnings).
313. B. GEORGE, supra note 308, at 361; Annot., supra note 308, at 581.
314. Adkins v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 945, 948, 243 S.E.2d 205, 207 (1979) (citing Ore-
gon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977)).
315. Id.; Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 248 S.E.2d 135 (1978) (no physical re-
straints); Jordan v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 768, 772, 222 S.E.2d 573, 577 (1976) (police
even asked him to move away).
316. Waye v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 683, 251 S.E.2d 202 (1979) (defendant accompanied
officers voluntarily at his own suggestion); Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 248 S.E.2d
135 (1978); Adkins v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 945, 243 S.E.2d 215 (1978).
317. Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 248 S.E.2d 135 (1978) (his own home which he
entered of his own accord); Jordan v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 768, 222 S.E.2d 573 (1976).
Interrogations in the home of the accused are often found to be non-custodial. See L COOK,
supra note 308, at § 83; Annot., supra note 308, at 576.
318. Adkins v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 945, 243 S.E.2d 205 (1978).
319. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966), quoted in Smith v. Commonwealth,
219 Va. 455, 470, 248 S.E.2d 135, 140 (1978). Under Massiah and Brewer v. Williams, 430
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has applied this definition extremely narrowly and if the conversation was
in any way initiated by the defendant, it is unlikely that a Virginia court
would find that an interrogation occured.320 However, the Virginia Su-
preme Court does indicate that police intent is a factor to be considered
in determining whether an interrogation took place.321 The Virginia court
is in accord with the majority of jurisdictions supporting the view that
"general on-the-scene" questioning, or questioning designed to elicit neu-
tral background information or information dealing with the safety of
others, is not custodial interrogation under Miranda.22 In Waye v. Com-
monwealth32 3 and Jordan v. Commonwealth3 24 the factors which were
considered in concluding that the situation was general "on-the-scene"
U.S. 387 (1977), interrogation has been more broadly defined as any purposeful or deliberate
elicitation of a statement by the police. This definition includes very skillful and subtle
forms of interrogation. United States v. Henry, 48 U.S.L.W. 4703 (June 17, 1980), estab-
lished a "likely to induce" test.
320. See, e.g., Clodfelter v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 98, 235 S.E.2d 340 (1977) (even
though defendant was arrested and had previously refused to talk, if he later initiates con-
versation by asking police if his knife had been found and thereby incriminates himself in
the ensuing conversation, it is admissible); Owens v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 69, 235 S.E.2d
331 (1977) (defendant asked officer what he wanted).
321. See id. at 74, 235 S.E.2d at 334 (1977) (where defendant initiated conversation and
officer did not intend to elicit a confession but to advise as a friend); Jordan v. Common-
wealth, 216 Va. 768, 222 S.E.2d 573 (1976) (were not attempting to elicit a confession but to
find out what happened at a reported accidental shooting). The detective's intention had
been determinative in Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
322. "[G]eneral on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding the crime or other gen-
eral questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process is not affected by our holding." Mi-
randa v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 477, quoted in Jordan v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 768, 772, 222
S.E.2d 573, 577 (1976). See generally I. COOK, supra note 308 at § 84; Annot., supra note
308, at 579. All states, including Virginia, have adopted the rule that spontaneous or volun-
teered statements are also not the product of a custodial interrogation. "There is no require-
ment that police stop a person who ... states that he wishes to confess to a crime....
Volunteered statements . . . are not barred by the fifth amendment." 384 U.S. at 478,
quoted in Clodfelter v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 98, 104, 235 S.E.2d 340, 344 (1977). See
Waye v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 683, 251 S.E.2d 202 (1979); Massie v. Commonwealth, 211
Va. 429, 177 S.E.2d 615 (1970) (when defendant, although already in jail, asked to see officer
because he wanted to confess, officer had no duty to stop him from talking). See generally I.
COOK, supra note 308, at § 84; B. GEORGE, supra note 308, at 367-70; Annot., supra note
308, at 581. Miranda also does not apply to questioning by private individuals. In these
cases, the confession is to be considered under the voluntariness standard. See, e.g., Jones v.
Commonwealth, 214 Va. 723, 264 S.E.2d 247 (1974) (polygraph expert employed by
defendant).
323. 219 Va. 683, 693, 251 S.E.2d 202, 208 (1979) ("Here the statements . . . were in
response to general investigatory questions posed at a time when police were not even cer-
tain a crime had been committed.").
324. 216 Va. 768, 772, 222 S.E.2d 573, 577 (1976) (questions were of a fact finding nature
and were asked to determine if a crime had been committed).
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questioning included the fact that the police were more interested in re-
viving the victim, had no cause to believe a crime had been committed
and intended merely to determine the circumstances of the incident.
Whether the defendant was under arrest was also considered in Waye.32 5
A surreptitious interrogation by an informant, the type of situation
dealt with in Massiah and United States v. Henry,325 confronted the Vir-
ginia court in Hummel v. Commonwealth.32 7 In Hummel the defendant
contacted a key witness at his upcoming grand larceny trial and offered
him money to change his testimony. The witness contacted the police
who arranged for him to keep in touch with the defendant and record any
conversations. At the larceny trial these tapes were admitted into evi-
dence on the issue of guilt. The defendant argued that Massiah man-
dated a reversal of his conviction because the government had utilized an
informant to deliberately elicit inculpatory statements from him in ab-
sence of counsel. The court distinguished Massiah on the fact that this
information was obtained during the investigation of a new and different
offense-bribery-and the conviction was upheld. This holding is in ac-
cord with the very narrow reading generally given by lower courts to Mas-
siah25 and with the general rule that even under Massiah the govern-
ment may question a defendant without presence of counsel about an
offense unrelated to the one for which he has been indicted.s 9
While the Miranda requirements may have been complied with, ° a
325. Waye v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. at 693, 251 S.E.2d at 208. The fact of arrest could
bear not only on whether the investigation had gone beyond the general investigatory phase
but also on whether there was any deliberate elicitation.
326. 447 U.S. 264 (1980). As with Escobedo the validity of Massiah was uncertain after
Miranda. However, the Supreme Court expressly reaffirmed it in Henry. Therefore, it is
clear that Massiah at least means that it is a violation of the sixth amendment right to
counsel to admit a confession deliberately elicited by the police by surreptitious methods in
the absence of retained counsel after the defendant has been indicted regardless of whether
the defendant is in custody or not.
327. 219 Va. 252, 247 S.E.2d 385 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 935 (1979).
328. I. COOK, supra note 308, at § 77.
329. B. GEORGE, supra note 308, at 466. It is doubtful that Henry would change the result
in a subsequent similar case. The Court in Henry was primarily concerned with the fact that
the government had intentionally created the situation which elicited the statements. In
Hummel the defendant created the situation before the police were even contacted by the
witness. Also, the Hummel court relied in part on Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293
(1966), a case which Henry held was not affected by the decision in Henry. There is also a
sound policy behind the Hummel decision. To require the police to forewarn defendants or
their counsel of current investigations on any post-indictment criminal activity would
thwart such investigations and encourage such behavior.
330. Whether the warnings were given and given properly is a question to be determined
by the court upon all of the evidence. Wilson v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 26, 255 S.E.2d 464
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confession is nevertheless inadmissible if the court determines that it was
not voluntary, either because a waiver was not knowing, intelligent or vol-
untary or because coercive measures were used by the police.331 By focus-
ing on voluntariness, the courts indicate their concern for the loss of relia-
bility or credibility that can result from coercion.332 Whether a confession
is voluntary depends on the totality of the circumstances. Factors consid-
ered by the Virginia courts include: 1) influence of drugs or alcohol ;38  2)
inteligence;3" 3) education;33 5 4) prior experience with police;338 5) emo-
tional or mental disability;837 6) physical deprivation and abuse;338 7) inef-
fective representation by counsel;33 9 and 8) psychological pressures.3o°
Generally a showing of just one factor will not preclude a finding of
voluntariness.4
(1979).
331. The orthodox rule is that the judge solely and finally determines the admissibility of
a confession based on compliance with Miranda or a finding of voluntariness. The only
question for the jury is the weight to be accorded to the confession once it is admitted.
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964); Wilson v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 26, 255 S.E.2d 464
(1979); Witt v. Commonwealth" 215 Va. 670, 212 S.E.2d 293 (1975). The prosecution must
show by a preponderance of the evidence that the statements and/or waiver were made
voluntarily. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972); Witt v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 670, 212
S.E.2d 293 (1975). The accused does not have to admit that he made the alleged incriminat-
ing statements before he has standing to contest admissibility. Jones v. United States, 362
U.S. 257 (1960); Wilson v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 26, 32, 255 S.E.2d 464, 468 (1979).
332. Admissibility of a confession depends upon an application of a rule of evidence, i.e.,
whether it is, under the circumstances, trustworthy. Jones v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 723,
726, 204 S.E.2d 247, 249 (1974).
333. Yarborough v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 971, 234 S.E.2d 286 (1977) (statements made
while intoxicated are not per se involuntary); Akers v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 40, 216
S.E.2d 28 (1975).
334. Lamb v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 307, 227 S.E.2d 737 (1976); Akers v. Common-
wealth, 216 Va. 40, 216 S.E.2d 28 (1975). For a collection of cases dealing with intelligence
as a factor to be considered, see Annot., 69 A.L.R.2d 348 (1960, Later Case Service 1978 &
Supp. 1980).
335. Akers v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 40, 216 S.E.2d 28 (1975); Penn v. Commonwealth,
210 Va. 229, 169 S.E.2d 419 (1969).
336. Lamb v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 307, 227 S.E.2d 737 (1976).
337. Griggs v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 46, 255 S.E.2d 475 (1979) (severe form of dyslexia
made accused very susceptible to suggestion in a stressful situation).
338. Penn v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 229, 169 S.E.2d 419 (1969) (rest, food, drink, ciga-
rettes provided).
339. Davis v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 816, 213 S.E.2d 785 (1975).
340. Lamb v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 307, 227 S.E.2d 737 (1976) (duration of interroga-
tion); Akers v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 40, 216 S.E.2d 28 (1975) (threats, promises); Penn v.
Commonwealth, 210 Va. 229, 169 S.E.2d 419 (1969) (threats, promises, isolation from family,
duration of interrogation).
341. See generally I. COOK, supra note 308, at §§ 71-74; B. GEORGE, supra note 308, at
313-22, 417-22.
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Psychological influences such as trickery, 4 2 cajolery, persuasion, ap-
peals to conscience, decency and honor,343 and appeals to leniency for self
or a friend,344 are usually not found to be sufficiently coercive to mandate
a finding of involuntariness, 45 especially if the means used would not rea-
sonably be expected to elicit an untrue statement. This represents the law
and order' 8 approach and indicates that the Virginia court feels that the
public interest in placing probative evidence before the jury in order to
find the truth is not outweighed by the individual's rights or the interest
in deterring such police conduct.
Miranda provided that an individual may knowingly, intelligently and
voluntarily waive his rights after the warnings have been given, but the
government would have a heavy burden to demonstrate this waiver.M" In
Lamb v. Commonwealth s the Virginia court rejected the New York rule
that waiver must be in the presence of defendant's attorney once retained
and held that the police may question an accused who has counsel
whether the attorney is present or not, if there has been an affirmative
waiver. The interrogation must cease if at any time before or during ques-
tioning the defendant indicates in any manner that he wishes to remain
silent.' 9 The Virginia court has read the emphasized language very nar-
rowly and has refused to require the police to accept as conclusive any
statement, no matter how ambiguous, as a sign that the defendant wishes
to assert his rights.350 In both Land v. Commonwealth51 and Taylor v.
Commonwealths52 the court refused to accept as an assertion of the right
342. Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 470, 248 S.E.2d 135, 144 (1978) (officers sug-
gested they found defendant's fingerprints and footprints at scene of crime). Generally
where the police lead the suspect to believe they have more evidence against him than they
actually do, voluntariness is still found. I. COOK, supra note 308, at § 74 nn. 72 & 75.
343. Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 248 S.E.2d 135 (1978) (appeals to conscience);
Owens v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 69, 71, 235 S.E.2d 331, 332 (1977) ("takes a man to tell
the truth").
344. Clark v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 201, 257 S.E.2d 784 (1979) (not per se inadmissible
because confessed in effort to secure leniency for a friend).
345. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) (appeals to decency and honor did not
invalidate the confession). See generally L COOK, supra note 308, at § 74 and notes.
346. See note 301 supra.
347. 384 U.S. 436, 444, 474-75; Johnson v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 146, 255 S.E.2d 525
(1979); Lamb v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 307, 227 S.E.2d 737 (1976).
348. 217 Va. 307, 227 S.E.2d 737 (1976). The court based its decision upon federal prece-
dent and the fact that the Supreme Court had not gone as far as New York.
349. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45, 473 (1966).
350. Lamb v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 307, 312, 227 S.E.2d 737, 741 (1976).
351. 211 Va. 223, 176 S.E.2d 586 (1970).
352. 212 Va. 725, 187 S.E.2d 180 (1972). See also Akers v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 40, 45,
216 S.E.2d 28, 31 (1975) (defendant asked, "Do I have to talk about it now?").
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to remain silent a statement to the effect that the defendant would give
information, but not a statement. The court based its decision on the
statement in Miranda which said an individual could waive his rights and
agree to make a statement or to answer questions.353 These cases raise the
possibility that the defendants did not fully appreciate their rights or re-
alize the full import of their comments. The statements could have been
interpreted as an assertion, albeit unclear, of the right to remain silent
and many courts would have agreed with such an interpretation.3 " In the
alternative, police could have tried to ascertain the extent of the suspects'
appreciation of their rights. However, in these cases, the defendants were
informed of their rights and chose to speak despite this awareness. The
court's decisions are consistent with the minimum constitutional safe-
guards of Miranda and emphasize the Virginia court's narrow reading of
that case.
The court's decisions may seem questionable as to a finding of volunta-
riness, waiver, custody or interrogation; however, the fact findings by the
trial court, upon which the decision of admissibility is based, are accorded
the same deference as a jury finding of fact and are not to be set aside
unless there is no credible evidence supporting them.3 55 In all of the cases
discussed there would have been sufficient evidence to support the deci-
sion.356 Thus, the law and order approach of the lower courts is reflected
353. 384 U.S. at 479.
354. Many courts will accept any statement which arguably could be an assertion of the
right. I. CooK, supra note 308, at § 80 nn.37, 38 & 50.
355. Witt v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 670, 674, 212 S.E.2d 293, 297 (1975).
356. Two cases decided by the Virginia Supreme Court during the survey period indicate
that the court draws a very fine line in this area. In Gibson v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 412,
219 S.E.2d 845 (1975), the court held that an accused ordered by the court to undergo a
psychiatric exam was not in custody for purposes of Miranda and that any statement made
during the exam could be admissible on the question of the defendant's guilt. Even though
the defendant had been ordered to be examined, during the examination he was not com-
pelied to answer any questions, therefore, the court concluded, there was no violation of the
fifth amendment. The Fourth Circuit reached an opposite decision when the case came to
them on a writ of habeas corpus. Gibson v. Zahradnick, 581 F.2d 75 (1978). The court held
that the confession could be admitted only on the question of sanity, not on the question of
guilt. Most courts are in accord with this holding. See In re Beverly, 342 So. 2d 481 (Fla.
1977); Note, Protecting the Confidentiality of Pretrial Psychiatric Disclosures: A Survey of
Standards, 51 N.Y. L. Iav. 409, 422 (1976); Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 565, 669 (1970 & Supp.
1980). This would seem to be the better approach. The most reliable testimony by a psychi-
atrist would be unobtainable in most cases if he were not free to inquire into all aberrant
conduct of a patient. The defendant's right to a hearing on the issue of insanity should not
be conditioned upon a waiver of his privilege against self-incrimination.
Penn v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 229, 169 S.E.2d 419 (1969), presented the problem of
multiple interrogations under Miranda, but the supreme court did not even consider the
issue. Four times within 12 hours the police returned to see if the defendant had reconsid-
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in the decisions of the supreme court.
The admission of an involuntary confession into evidence is never
harmless error in a Virginia court even if there is sufficient other evidence
to support the conviction.357 In Hall v. Commonwealth,35 s the supreme
court held that a confession in violation of Miranda could be harmless
error where other evidence overwhelmingly established the defendant's
guilt and the judge issued a prompt cautionary instruction to the jury.
This reasoning is supported by Milton v. Wainwrights59 wherein the
United States Supreme Court ruled that admission of a confession ob-
tained in violation of the right to counsel was harmless error where there
was sufficient other evidence to support a verdict beyond a reasonable
doubt.
B. Identification Proceedings
Police conduct which violates individual constitutional rights is a con-
cern in the area of identification procedures as well as confessions. The
danger of mistaken identification of a defendant is increased when inher-
ently suggestive identification procedures are used by the police prior to
trial.360 To minimize the danger of such conduct, the Supreme Court has
established two constitutional safeguards-a right to counsel and a due
process standard.
In United States v. Wade 61 and its companion case Gilbert v. Califor-
nia36 2 the Court established a right to counsel at a post-indictment line-
ered his assertion of his rights. The defendant confessed and the confession was found to be
voluntary. Courts have split on the issue of multiple interrogations after the initial assertion
of rights. Some allow a confession if an examination of the totality of the circumstances
shows it was voluntary. See, e.g., Jennings v. United States, 391 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1968).
This is the approach Virginia took in Penn, because it merely examined the voluntariness of
the confession. Michigan v. Moseley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975), would seem to allow such subse-
quent interrogations only when there has been a change in circumstances, e.g. a different
crime. Mere lapse of time should be insufficient. If police are allowed to ask a defendant
repeatedly to reconsider his waiver, he is coerced in a manner inconsistent with the spirit, if
not the explicit holding, of Miranda.
357. Washington v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 737, 739, 204 S.E.2d 266, 267 (1974). See
Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963).
358. 213 Va. 736, 195 S.E.2d 882 (1973). The Virginia Supreme Court has found a viola-
tion not harmless error where the confession was crucial to the prosecution's case. Cardwell
v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 412, 164 S.E.2d 699 (1968).
359. 407 U.S. 71 (1972).
360. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 235 (1967).
361. Id. at 218.
362. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
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up identification."' 3 In the first cases to come before the Virginia Supreme
Court after Wade, that court refused to extend the right to counsel to a
pre-indictment lineup.3 ' Although the court recognized that the risk of
suggestiveness and need for reconstruction at trial was just as great in
pre-indictment as in post-indictment proceedings, it was concerned that
to hold otherwise would impede effective law enforcement.36 5 Subse-
quently, the United States Supreme Court also refused to extend the
Wade-Gilbert right to counsel to any identification proceeding that oc-
curs prior to indictment or other formal charges.3 66 Once again the two
courts have adopted a more conservative law and order approach to the
criminal process with emphasis on effective police procedures and factual
accuracy.
The Virginia court also has refused to extend Wade to any identifica-
tion proceeding at which the defendant was not present, such as a photo
array.36 7 One year later the Supreme Court affirmed this view of Wade in
the case of United States v. Ash.3 '8 Both courts held that counsel could
not perform any function to minimize the risk of prejudice to the defen-
dant at trial. They also expressed concern that a different holding could
363. The Court stated that this was a critical stage of the criminal prosecution and be-
cause misidentification could reduce the trial to a mere formality, counsel should be present
to preserve the defendant's right to a fair trial. A critical stage was defined as one in which
there is a grave potential for prejudice which may not be capable of reconstruction at trial.
Id. In Law v. City of Danville, 212 Va. 702, 187 S.E.2d 197 (1972), the Virginia Supreme
Court held that a blood test was not a critical stage within the Wade definition because
there was no indispensable function that counsel could perform. The rationale of Wade was
not applicable because the scientific techniques involved in a blood test were well enough
established that they could easily be reconstructed to provide for meaningful cross-examina-
tion at trial. The court cited Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), in support of its
decision. In Schmerber the Court had held that no right to counsel extended to a blood test.
Since there was no right to presence of counsel during the exam, Law held there was also no
right to consult with counsel before deciding whether to take a blood test.
364. Zeigler v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 632, 186 S.E.2d 38 (1972); Buchanan v. Common-
wealth, 210 Va. 664, 173 S.E.2d 792 (1970).
365. Zeigler v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 632, 637, 186 S.E.2d 38, 42 (1972). A liberal read-
ing of this decision would indicate that the presence of counsel is not critical in line-up
proceedings prior to arrest or being charged with a crime.
366. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972). The Court stated that a "critical stage" did not
extend to any period before indictment, arraignment or preliminary hearing. The Court re-
jected the basic rationale of Wade that the right to counsel was a means of protecting other
constitutional rights. Instead, they viewed it as an independent right which attached at a
definite time.
367. Drewry v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 186, 191 S.E.2d 178 (1972).
368. 413 U.S. 300 (1973). The majority of federal and state courts had already adopted
this view of Wade. See Drewry v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 186, 191 S.E.2d 178 (1972) and
cases cited therein.
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lead to the presence of defense counsel at the prosecution's pretrial inter-
views with the victim or witness, creating situations which afford as much
opportunity for undue suggestiveness as a photo array. 69 Both courts rely
on the ethical responsibilities of the prosecuting attorney through his su-
pervision of the case and the application of the due process standard to
insure a fair trial.
The Wade-Gilbert exclusionary rule declares an out-of-court identifica-
tion obtained in violation of right to counsel per se inadmissible;370 how-
ever, any in-court identification is admissible if the prosecution can show
by clear and convincing evidence that it had a basis for identification in-
dependent of the lineup confrontation.37 1 Wade established six factors to
be considered in determining this independent basis.372 The Virginia Su-
preme Court, applying these factors in Stanley v. Commonwealth,373 de-
termined that the lineup identifications were a mere confirmation of a
previous positive identification and the in-court identifications were ad-
missible.37 4 The improper admission of either an in-court or lineup identi-
fication can be harmless error if the conviction is supported by sufficient
other evidence.375
The second, or the due process standard, was announced in Stovall v.
Denno 7 as a safeguard against police misconduct in identification proce-
dures. The Supreme Court recognized a due process right to exclude un-
reliable identification testimony that resulted from unnecessarily sugges-
tive procedures conducive to irreparable mistaken identification. The
Supreme Court has not articulated any identifiable tests defining sugges-
tiveness in the conduct of a lineup, but it appears that physical differ-
369. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 317 (1973); Drewry v. Commonwealth, 213 Va.
186, 189, 191 S.E.2d 178, 181 (1972). Both courts also mentioned that defense interviews,
especially of alibi witnesses, can also be suggestive and could influence the trial in defen-
dant's favor. They suggested that accurate reconstruction at trial, by introduction of the
photo array itself, could cure any defects that did exist.
370. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 273-74 (1967).
371. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 242 (1967); Williamson v. Commonwealth, 211
Va. 57, 175 S.E.2d 285 (1970).
372. Prior opportunity to observe the alleged criminal act, existence of any discrepancies
between any pre-lineup description, any identification prior to lineup of another person,
failure to identify defendant on a prior occasion, lapse of time between crime and lineup
and the conduct of the lineup are all factors to be considered. 388 U.S. at 241; see Stanley v.
Commonwealth, 210 Va. 490, 493, 171 S.E.2d 846, 849 (1970).
373. 210 Va. 490, 171 S.E.2d 846 (1970).
374. Id. at 494-95, 171 S.E.2d at 849-51.
375. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 274 (1967); Nero v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 154,
191 S.E.2d 206 (1972).
376. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
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ences among participants in a lineup do not alone render it unduly sug-
gestive. 37 7 In Williamson v. Commonwealth37 8 the Virginia court stated
that the mere fact that some participants were taller or older was not a
sufficient showing of suggestiveness. It found no requirement that all par-
ticipants be alike in appearance as long as nothing was affirmatively done
to single out the defendant.3 7 9 In Zeigler v. Commonwealth," the court
gave great weight to the facts that: 1) the witnesses had not discussed
their line-up observations with each other or the police, and 2) the photo
of the line-up showed that nothing had been done to single out the defen-
dant.8 ' The court concluded therefore that due process had not been vio-
lated and the identifications were admissible.
Single suspect confrontations present a greater opportunity for sugges-
tiveness than line-ups but are upheld by most courts if they occur shortly
after the crime.38 2 The Virginia court was confronted with such an issue
in Martin v. Commonwealth.ss8 The court rejected a reading of Wade-
Gilbert which would prohibit single suspect identifications. Central to its
decision was a concern for the desirable objectives of quick, accurate
identification which could lead to the immediate release of innocent sus-
pects' " and allow the police to continue the search while the trail was
still fresh.3 85 The court also considered the circumstances in their entirety
and found the identification reliable and therefore admissible.386
In summary, it appears that in identification proceedings and confes-
sions the Virginia Supreme Court is more likely to protect society's inter-
est in swift, effective and sure punishment of crime than to deter or pro-
hibit certain police practice and vindicate the defendant's constitutional
rights.
377. Project, Ninth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme
Court and Courts of Appeals 1978-1979, 68 G.o. L. J. 279, 353 (1980).
378. 211 Va. 57, 59, 175 S.E.2d 285, 287 (1970).
379. See also Zeigler v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 632, 186 S.E.2d 38 (1972) (age discrep-
ancy does not violate due process).
380. 212 Va. 632, 186 S.E.2d 38 (1972).
381. The defendant had not been required to speak, wear distinctive clothing or perform
any act. Id. This due process exclusionary rule has not been applied by the Supreme Court
to require per se exclusion of an identification resulting from suggestive procedures. If an
examination of the circumstances shows that it is reliable, it will be admissible. Manson v.
Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
382. I. COOK, supra note 308 at § 52 n.67 and accompanying text.
383. 210 Va. 686, 173 S.E.2d 794 (1970).
384. In Martin three suspects were freed on the basis of victim identification. Id.
385. Id. at 691, 173 S.E.2d at 798.
386. The identifications occurred within 15-20 minutes of the assault, only six blocks from
the scene, and the identification was made spontaneously by the victim. Id.
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C. Entrapment
A concern with the deterrence of police misconduct led to the develop-
ment of the entrapment defense which was first articulated and applied
by the United States Supreme Court in Sorrells v. United States.s7 En-
trapment as defined by Sorrells is "the conception and planning of an
offense by an officer, and his procurement of its commission by one who
would not have perpetuated it except for the trickery, persuasion or fraud
of the officer."3 8 Under this definition, if a defendant was predisposed to
commit the crime or if the crime was originally conceived by the defen-
dant, he cannot avail himself of the defense.
Since Sorrells, members of the Supreme Court have been sharply di-
vided on the proper focus of, and test for the application of the de-
fense.38 9 In Sorrells the Court established what has been called the "sub-
jective" test. Under this approach the focus is on the intent or
predisposition of the criminal to commit the crime. This test would dis-
tinguish between police conduct "that merely affords an opportunity for
the commission of the offense and 'creative activity' that implants in the
mind of an otherwise innocent person the disposition to commit an of-
fense and induces its commission in order to prosecute."390 In two subse-
quent decisions, Sherman v. United Statess 91 and United States v. Rus-
sell3 9 2 the Supreme Court was urged to reconsider Sorrells and adopt an
"objective" approach to entrapment.39 3 The focus of this test is on
"'whether the police conduct . . . falls below standards . . . for the
proper use of governmental power."*" Supporters of the objective ap-
proach consider it more consistent with the rationale and purpose of the
387. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
388. Id. at 454, quoted in Wood v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 363, 367, 192 S.E.2d 762, 765
(1972).
389. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 439-40 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
This debate also extends to the function of judge and jury on the issue of entrapment.
Advocates of the objective approach agree that entrapment is a question for the judge to
decide. See, e.g., Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 453 (1932) (Roberts, J., concurring).
Supporters of Sorrells would allow the question to go to the jury. The Virginia Supreme
Court continues to assert that the existence of entrapment is often a question for the jury
unless the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law. See Codgill v. Commonwealth, 219 Va.
272, 279, 247 S.E.2d 392, 396-99 (1978).
390. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 815, 817-18, 180 S.E.2d 661, 663 (1971).
391. 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
392. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
393. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 441 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Sherman
v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 384 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
394. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 441 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (quoting
Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 382 (1958)).
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defense, which is not to protect persons who are "otherwise innocent,"
but to prohibit unlawful government activity and protect the integrity of
the government and courts. 95 However, in both Sherman and Russell the
Court reaffirmed the approach taken by the majority in Sorrells.
The test laid out by the Supreme Court is based upon interpretation of
federal statutes"'8 and, therefore, not binding on state courts. The Russell
Court expressly rejected the contention that entrapment involves any
constitutional rights.3 9 7 However, the Court did recognize, as the Virginia
court had two years earlier,39 8 that police misconduct could be so outra-
geous as to violate due process.3 99 Because it is not binding, some state
and federal courts have rejected Sorrells and have adopted the objective
approach.40 0 The Virginia Supreme Court, however, has continued to as-
sert its support of Sorrells.40 1
In every entrapment case before the Virginia court during the past dec-
ade, the defense of entrapment was disallowed because the court con-
cluded the evidence clearly showed that police merely afforded "an op-
portunity for the commission of the offense" and the defendant willingly
accepted that opportunity.40 2 However, in several of these cases the court
did consider the police conduct and the predisposition of the defendant
in making its determination. The court expressly recognized that entrap-
ment was a rule of fairness barring conviction as a result of police miscon-
duct contrary to public policy. 403
Some jurisdictions tend to reverse convictions where an underworld
agent is used to bait the trap because the incentive to entrap a normally
law-abiding person increases when release on bail or a reduced sentence is
395. Id. at 442-43.
396. Id. at 440.
397. Id.
398. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 815, 817 n.2, 180 S.E.2d 661, 662 n.2 (1971).
399. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 430-32 (1973).
400. See, e.g., State v. Mullen, 21 N.W.2d 375 (Iowa 1974).
401. "We have repeatedly held that, when the criminal design originates in the mind of
the accused and thereafter the Commonwealth does no more than afford an opportunity for
the commission of a crime, the defense of entrapment does not lie." Codgill v. Common-
wealth, 219 Va. at 272, 247 S.E.2d at 396. See Johnson v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 815, 180
S.E.2d 661 (1971); Falden v. Commonwealth, 167 Va. 549, 189 S.E. 329 (1937).
402. Codgill v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 272, 279, 247 S.E.2d 392, 396 (1978); accord,
Neighbors v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 18, 197 S.E.2d 207 (1973); Wood v. Commonwealth,
213 Va. 363, 192 S.E.2d 762 (1972); Johnson v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 815, 180 S.E.2d 661
(1971).
403. Wood v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 363, 367, 192 S.E.2d 762, 765 (1972); Johnson v.
Commonwealth, 211 Va. 815, 817, 180 S.E.2d 661, 662 (1971).
1981] 635
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
involved.4 0 ' The Virginia Supreme Court was faced with such a situation
in Neighbors v. Commonwealth.4° The "bait" had been in jail on a her-
oin possession charge and was released on reduced bail to aid the police
in apprehending drug pushers. The defendant resisted the first several
attempts to get him to sell, but the agent finally "begged" him to do so.
The court refused to take this opportunity to apply the defense to pro-
hibit such police practice; thereby negating any advantages of the prac-
tice. Apparently this was a policy decision which the court felt belonged
more properly to the legislative and executive branches of government.40
Although unwilling to judicially prohibit this type of conduct, the fact
that the court will consider conduct a factor in determining whether en-
trapment existed demonstrates movement toward adoption of the objec-
tive test.
D. Plea Bargaining
Many courts and legal scholars have recognized that the criminal jus-
tice system could not function effectively unless the majority of cases
were disposed of through guilty pleas.40 7 The plea bargain is one means of
arriving at a plea of guilty. The constitutionality of the plea bargain has
been upheld by the United States Supreme Court,408 and its value to the
administration of criminal justice has been affirmed in the United States
and Virginia Supreme Court decisions. 409
Disposition of charges after plea discussions is not only an essential part of
the process but a highly desirable part .... It leads to prompt and largely
404. See Williamson v. United States, 311 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1962); United States v.
Curry, 284 F. Supp. 458 (E.D. IlM. 1968).
405. 214 Va. 18, 197 S.E.2d 207 (1973).
406. The majority in Russell was also unwilling to prohibit certain types of law enforce-
ment practices and indicated that the defense of entrapment "was not intended to give the
federal judiciary a 'chancellor's foot' veto over law enforcement practices of which it did not
approve." 411 U.S. at 435.
407. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971); Jordan v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 57,
62, 225 S.E.2d 661, 664 (1976). Guilty pleas account for the great majority of criminal con-
victions in the United States and it is estimated that 90% of these result from plea bargains
or agreements. Davidson & Kraus, Plea Bargaining: Limits on Prosecutorial Discretion,
1979 ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMWzcAN LAW 27.
408. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). "But we cannot hold that it is unconsti-
tutional for the State to extend a benefit to a defendant who in turn extends a substantial
benefit to the State." Id. at 753.
409. See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971) (The plea bargain "is an
essential component of the administration of justice. Properly administered, it is to be en-
couraged."); Jordan v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 57, 225 S.E.2d 661 (1976); Johnson v. Com-
monwealth, 214 Va. 515, 201 S.E.2d 594 (1974).
[Vol. 15:585636
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND CRIMINAL LAW
final disposition of most criminal cases; it avoids much of the corrosive im-
pact of enforced idleness during pretrial confinement. .. ; it protects the
public from those accused persons who are prone to continue criminal con-
duct . . . while on pretrial release; and, by shortening the time between
charge and disposition, it enhances. . the rehabilitative prospects of the
guilty when they are ultimately imprisoned. 10
Thus not only does the plea bargain expedite the judicial process, but it
serves the ends of deterrence and rehabilitation-concerns which are cen-
tral to our theory of criminal law.411
These important advantages of the plea bargain agreement were recog-
nized by the Virginia Supreme Court in a decision validating and enforc-
ing such agreements'12 while simultaneously stressing the importance of
upholding the honor and integrity of the state and preserving public con-
fidence in the fair administration of justice.413 To achieve these ends and
to assure that the system remains useful and productive, the court has
sought to protect the plea bargain system from abuse.'1 In Santobello v.
New York' 15 the Supreme Court held that the government has a legal
obligation to fulfill any promise which induced the defendant to plead
guilty.41 6 The prosecutor's failure to perform his part of the agreement is
considered a material breach and the defendant is entitled to recission
(withdrawal of the guilty plea) or specific performance (indictment and
conviction only on the agreed upon lesser charge).417 The Virginia Su-
preme Court has adopted this contractual approach to the plea bargain.
It is viewed as a formal contract under which both parties have a legal
obligation. The court analyzes the cases in contractual language 18 and
grants contractual remedies.
410. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971), quoted in Jordan v. Common-
wealth, 217 Va. 57, 62, 225 S.E.2d 661, 664-65 (1976).
411. B. GEORGE, supra n3te 308, at 675.
412. Jordan v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 57, 61, 225 S.E.2d 661, 664 (1976).
413. Id. at 59, 225 S.E.2d at 663.
414. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 515, 518, 201 S.E.2d 594, 596 (1974).
415. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
416. Id. at 262. The Court seems to raise the agreement to the level of a formal contract.
Language of promissory estoppel and detrimental reliance is also used by the Court. For a
discussion of the trend toward viewing plea bargains as enforceable contracts, see Jones,
Negotiation, Ratification, and Recission of the Guilty Plea Agreement: A Contractual
Analysis and Typology, 17 DuQ. L. Rav. 591 (1978-1979).
417. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
418. Jones v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 248, 257, 227 S.E.2d 701, 707 (1976) ("defendant
fully performed his part of the agreement"; "ends of justice require specific performance");
Jordan v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 57, 61, 225 S.E.2d 661, 664 (1976) ("restore parties to the
position they occupied" before the bargain).
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In Johnson v. Commonwealth419 the Virginia court granted recission of
the agreement and remanded to the trial court with instructions that the
defendant be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea. All actions and pro-
ceedings were vacated and the indictment restored to its original form.
The defendant was allowed to plead not guilty to the original charge and
was entitled to a new trial. Specific performance, on the other hand, was
the remedy granted in both Jordan v. Commonwealth42 and Jones v.
Commonwealth421 because the court was unable to restore the parties to
their pre-bargaining positions.
The Virginia Supreme Court considers the inadvertent failure of the
prosecutor to comply immaterial. 2 In addition, if the defendant does notimmediately call the non-compliance to the attention of the court and
request withdrawal of his guilty plea, he is deemed to have waived the
right to do so.4
23
It is doubtful that the Virginia Supreme Court will change its approach
to such cases in the future because in Jordan it directed that any appre-
hensions about the legitimacy of the system be directed to the General
Assembly.424 Thus, in 1978, Rule 3A:11 of the Virginia Rules of Court was
amended to add a subsection entitled "Plea Agreement Procedure"425
which was modeled after Rule 11(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure.428 This section provides that any plea agreement in a felony case
be in writing, signed and entered in the record.427 This provision is an-
other of the safeguards established by many states to protect the plea
bargaining system from abuse.428 The Virginia court may accept or reject
the plea. Should the court reject it, the defendant must be offered an
opportunity to withdraw his plea.42 9 The Virginia Supreme Court, relying
on federal precedent, has construed this provision to confer only a pre-
sentence right to withdrawal.430 In construing federal rule 11(e)(4), fed-
eral courts have held that "where a defendant plea bargains only for a
419. 214 Va. 515, 201 S.E.2d 594 (1974).
420. 217 Va. 57, 225 S.E.2d 661 (1976).
421. 217 Va. 248, 227 S.E.2d 701 (1976) (defendant had already served time for the lesser
charge, therefore the court dismissed the conviction on the greater charge).
422. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 515, 518, 201 S.E.2d 594, 596 (1974).
423. Id. at 518-19, 201 S.E.2d at 597.
424. 217 Va. at 63, 225 S.E.2d at 665.
425. VA. Sup. CT. R. 3A:11(d).
426. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e).
427. VA. Sup. CT. R. 3A:11(d)(2).
428. For a list of safeguards, see Davidson & Kraus, supra note 407, at 30-31.
429. VA. Sup. CT. R. 3A:11(d)(2), (4).
430. Holler v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 961, 265 S.E.2d 715 (1980); Lilly v. Common-
wealth, 218 Va. 960, 963, 243 S.E.2d 208, 210 (1978).
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recommendation by the government, which the defendant knows is not
binding on the trial court, and the government complies with the agree-
ment...., nonacceptance of the recommendation by the trial court is not
a rejection ... under Rule 11(e)(4) .' s1 Therefore, the Virginia court held
that Rule 3A:25(d), rather than Rule 3A:11(d)(4), was applicable to a post
sentence motion for withdrawal of a guilty plea. The former provides that
"to correct manifest injustice, the court. . . may set aside the judgment
... and permit the defendant to withdraw his [guilty] plea.'3 2 The Vir-
ginia Supreme Court again relied on federal precedent in determining the
post-sentence standard to be applied under Rule 3A:25(d). In applying
the comparable federal rule, federal courts applied a stricter standard to
avoid motions based on disappointment in the outcome.43 3 Under the fed-
eral standard used by the Virginia court for determining "manifest injus-
tice" the court must look to the total record, from acceptance of the plea
to sentencing. If upon this record it appears that the defendant has been
fully apprised that the court was not bound to accept the agreement or
recommendation, there can be no showing of injustice to the defendant.'3
The record in Holler v. Commonwealth33 revealed that the defendant
had full knowledge that the recommendation was not binding and that
the maximum penalty involved was life. The court found no abuse of dis-
cretion under Rule 3A:25(d) in the trial court's denial of the post-sen-
tence motion to withdraw the guilty plea.
E. Discovery
Two developments, the adoption of the Virginia Rules of Court on
Criminal Practice and Procedure'3 6 and holdings in two United States
Supreme Court decisions, have influenced the Virginia Supreme Court
decisions in the area of discovery during the past decade. 3 7
Virginia Rule 3A:14 provides for limited pretrial discovery by the de-
fendant in a felony case and represents a liberalization of the' rules of
discovery established in earlier cases. 4 8 Given a showing that the items
sought are relevant to the preparation of the defense, Rule 3A.14(b) com-
431. Holler v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 961, 265 S.E.2d 715, 719 (1980) (quoting United
States v. Savage, 561 F.2d 554, 556 (4th Cir. 1977) (emphasis added)).
432. VA. Sup. CT. R. 3A:25(d).
433. Lilly v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 960, 965, 243 S.E.2d 208, 211 (1978).
434. Id. at 963-64, 243 S.E.2d at 211.
435. 220 Va. 961, 265 S.E.2d 715 (1980).
436. VA. Sup. CT. R. 3A.1-:36. These rules became effective on January 1, 1972.
437. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
438. For earlier case law, see Bellfield v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 303, 208 S.E.2d 771
(1974).
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pels the court to order pretrial discovery of statements of the accused,
scientific reports relating to the accused or the victim, books, documents,
tangible objects and buildings in possession, custody or control of the
Commonwealth. 3 9 The rule does not authorize discovery or inspection of
statements made by prosecution witnesses or prospective witnesses to
agents of the Commonwealth or reports, memorandum or other internal
documents made by agents of the Commonwealth in connection with the
investigation of the case.440
The Virginia Supreme Court has also refused to extend Rule 3A:14(b)
to allow discovery of statements of witnesses for purposes of cross-exami-
nation and impeachment.441 In support of this decision the court cited
recent construction of the comparable federal rule442 and the practice in
other state courts. Federal courts have denied such discovery under the
federal rules443 and states are fairly evenly divided on this issue.4 44 In
Bellfield v. Commonwealth445 the Virginia Supreme Court denied discov-
ery of police notes containing the victim-witness' description of her at-
tacker which had been made shortly after the attack. The defendant, in
support of his motion, stated that he hoped to find inconsistencies be-
tween the description and the testimony; he made no other showing of
relevancy. The court denied the discovery. This denial is consistent with
the rule in most jurisdictions requiring the defendant to demonstrate the
439. VA. Sup. CT. R. 3A:14(b). In 1978 this rule was amended to require trial judges to
order discovery upon a proper showing of relevancy. Prior to amendment the rule had pro-
vided that the court "may order" it, but they were not required to do so. VA. SuP. CT. R.
3A:14(b); reprinted in 2 VA. CODE ANN. (Rep. Vol. 1977). The amendment also provided
that the only proper sanction for failure to comply is compulsion. A continuance or "any
other order ... just under the circumstances" is no longer adequate. Compare VA. SuP. CT.
R. 3A:14(g) with prior VA. Sup. CT. R. 3A:14(g), reprinted in 2 VA. CODE ANN. (Repl. VoL
1977).
440. VA.' SuP. CT. R. 3A:14(b)(2).
441. Hackman v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 710, 261 S.E.2d 555 (1980); Bellfield v. Com-
monwealth, 215 Va. 303, 208 S.E.2d 771 (1974). The Bellfield holding must be read in con-
junction with constitutional due process requirements. See notes 455-72 infra, and accompa-
nying text.
442. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a).
443. For an overview of federal case law, see Hackman v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 710,
714, 261 S.E.2d 555, 558 (1980).
444. Annot., 7 A.L.R.3d 181 (1966 & Supp. 1980). The court in Beilfield v. Common-
wealth, 215 Va. 303, 307, 208 S.E.2d 771, 774 (1974) also cited this annotation in support of
its holding.
445. 215 Va. 303, 208 S.E.2d 771 (1974). The Virginia court refused to apply the holding
of United States v. Jencks, 353 U.S. 657 (1957) as codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970) to
Virginia criminal proceedings. The court stated that this was a rule of evidence for federal
courts and did not require extension to state courts.
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manner in which the statements are inconsistent with the testimony.44
The motion must be based on facts and conclusions, not mere surmise or
conjecture.447 Thus the court could have decided Bellfield on the basis of
failure to show the requisite relevance, but instead chose a broader hold-
ing to clarify the extent of discovery under the new rules. It based its
denial on the fact that these statements were for purposes of impeach-
ment and were therefore not discoverable under the rules. In refusing to
extend discovery to include witness statements for cross-examination and
impeachment, the court also, expressed concern that a different result
would hamper the prosecution's ability to prosecute by allowing a "fishing
expedition.' 448
Discovery under this rule also does not extend to names and addresses
of eyewitnesses to the crime unless there is a showing that their testi-
mony would be exculpatory." Criminal records of prospective jurors are
not discoverable if they are not within the immediate possession of the
prosecution. 50 Voir dire would provide sufficient opportunity to discover
such information. This holding is in line with the general liberal trend in
a few jurisdictions which would allow limited disclosure of such informa-
tion as long as it is in the prosecution's possession. 431 Construction of this
discovery rule shows that the Virginia court will read a defendant's mo-
tion for discovery very narrowly. Anything not specifically mentioned
therein need not be disclosed. In Payne v. Commonwealth452 the court
held that a request for discovery of tangible objects was not a request for
information concerning these objects.
Virginia construction of Rule 3A:14 notwithstanding, a defendant has a
constitutional right to the discovery of any exculpatory evidence that
meets the requirements of Brady v. Maryland453 and United States v.
446. Annot., supra note 444, at 188.
447. Id. at 8, 49-51. See also Lowe v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 670, 239 S.E.2d 112 (1977)
(the speculation inherent in the contention is fatal to the defendant's position). Generally
courts look at other factors in determining whether there should be a right to discovery.
These include: 1) a person who was present when the statement was made was or could have
been called as a witness and 2) the defendant had a right to interview witness before trial.
Annot., supra note 444, at 189. The Virginia Supreme Court also considered these in
Bellfield v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. at 307, 208 S.E.2d at 774 (policeman was present at
trial).
448. Belfield v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 303, 307, 208 S.E.2d 771, 774 (1974).
449. Lowe v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 670, 239 S.E.2d 112 (1977).
450. Stamper v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 260, 257 S.E.2d 808 (1979).
451. See generally Annot., 86 A.L.R.3d 571, 574, 583 (1978 & Supp. 1980).
452. 216 Va. 265, 217 S.E.2d 870 (1975).
453. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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Agurs.4 1 4 In Brady the Supreme Court held that the government's failure
to disclose evidence specifically requested by the defendant violated the
defendant's right to due process under the fourteenth amendment if the
undisclosed evidence was favorable to the defendant and material to guilt
or punishment.45 5 This obligation to disclose depends on the character of
the evidence involved. The government's good faith is irrelevant. 56 The
decision in Agurs extended the Brady rule to cases in which the defen-
dant makes only a general reference or no reference at all to exculpatory
evidence.4 57 The rationale of the holding was that some evidence is of
such substantial value to the defense that due process requires its disclo-
sure in the absence of any request. 4" The test for materiality in a Brady
situation is whether the evidence might affect the outcome of the trial on
the issue of either guilt or punishment. 59 In an Agurs situation, reversal
is mandated if the evidence is so material to the question of guilt that it
creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist.460 These decisions
have had the effect of creating a constitutional right to discovery of excul-
patory evidence that meets either materiality test.461
The Virginia Supreme Court had occasion to apply these rules to sev-
eral cases in the past ten years. The Brady test was applied in Stover v.
Commonwealth,'46 2 Dozier v. Commonwealth46s and Robinson v. Common-
wealth.4" The defendant in Stover had specifically requested a statement
made by one of the victims which indicated that he and his companions
had initiated a similar incident a few days before the incident in which
Stover was involved. Because this evidenced the turbulent disposition of
the victim, it would have corroborated Stover's explanation of his use of a
weapon and therefore could have affected the outcome at least as to pun-
454. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
455. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). See also Dozier v. Commonwealth, 219 Va.
1113, 1116, 253 S.E.2d 655, 657 (1979); Stover v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 789, 795, 180
S.E.2d 504, 509 (1971).
456. 373 U.S. at 87. See also Stover v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 789, 795, 180 S.E.2d 504,
509 (1971).
457. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976). See also Dozier v. Commonwealth, 219
Va. 11"13, 1116, 253 S.E.2d 655, 657 (1979).
458. 427 U.S. 97.
459. 373 U.S. 83.
460. 427 U.S. 97.
461. The rule in Brady was incorporated into the Virginia Code of Professional Responsi-
bility, Disciplinary Rule 7-103.
462. 211 Va. 789, 180 S.E.2d 504 (1971).
463. 219 Va. 1113, 253 S.E.2d 655 (1979).
464. 220 Va. 673, 261 S.E.2d 318 (1980).
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ishment. The conviction was reversed.8 5 In Dozier the defendant's con-
viction was reversed because the nondisclosed evidence, which went to
the credibility of the state's key witness, could have affected the verdict
where the jury's estimation of the truthfulness and credibility of a given
witness may have been determinative of guilt or innocence.16 The convic-"
tion was upheld in Robinson.467 The non-disclosed evidence there con-
sisted of the murder victim's police record for assaults. The court admit-
ted that such evidence was crucial to establishing self-defense, but held
that since the victim of the assault in question had testified to it in the
court room, production of the record would have added little to a descrip-
tion of the violent nature of the decedent's conduct. Therefore, it would
not have affected the outcome.
The stricter materiality test of Agurs was applied in Payne v. Common-
wealth 8s because there was only a general, nonspecific request for excul-
patory material. The principal value of the evidence in this case would
have been to discredit a witness. When this omission was evaluated in the
context of the entire record, the court concluded that even without the
discredited witness' testimony, there was sufficient evidence to support
the verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.469 Even Brady and Agurs do not
establish a constitutional right to production of evidence the exculpatory
nature of which is purely speculative.47 0 Similarily, in Lowe v. Common-
wealth47 1 the defendant requested a list of eyewitnesses contending that
if the uncalled witnesses could testify it might be exculpatory. The court
found this conjecture insufficient to bring the case under either Brady or
Agurs.
The court's decisions in all of these cases seem to be correct. The court
was diligent in objectively evaluating the omitted evidence on the basis of
the entire trial record. However, since the factual circumstances in every
case did not fall within "the gray area," it is difficult to say whether the
court is giving these cases a broad or narrow reading and application.
F. Speedy Trial
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the
465. Stover v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 789, 180 S.E.2d 504 (1971).
466. 219 Va. at 1118, 253 S.E.2d at 658.
467. Robinson v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 673, 677, 261 S.E.2d 318, 320 (1980).
468. 220 Va. 601, 260 S.E.2d 247 (1979).
469. Id.
470. Lowe v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 670, 239 S.E.2d 112 (1977).
471. Id.
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right to a speedy trial.47 2 Virginia has a constitutional473 and a statutory
implementation of this guarantee. 47 4 The purposes of this guarantee are
"to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial, to minimize
anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation and to limit the
possibilities that long delay will impair the ability of an accused to defend
himself.,,' 75
During the past decade the cases before the Virginia Supreme Court
claiming denial of a speedy trial fall into two categories: (1) those which
require the court to construe the speedy trial statute and (2) those which
required the court to apply the balancing test in Barker v. Wingo.47 6 Vir-
ginia's speedy trial statute47 7 provides that an accused held continuously
in custody must be brought to trial within five months from the prelimi-
nary hearing or indictment, and an accused not in custody must be
brought to trial within nine months.47 8 The consequence of a violation is
absolute discharge from prosecution 479 and the defendant need not show
prejudice to establish a statutory violation.48 0 Once the defendant has es-
tablished that the time limit has passed without trial, the burden is on
the prosecution to prove excusable delay within the enumerated excep-
tions of the statute.41 The failure of a judge to appear on the trial date
has not been accepted as excusable delay within the meaning of the stat-
ute.482 If this were allowed, a judge could circumvent the defendant's stat-
472. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial. .. ." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. This provision applies to the states through the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
473. VA. CONsT. art. 1, § 8. "In all capital or criminal prosecutions a man hath a right...
to a speedy trial." Id.
474. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-243 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
475. United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966). See also Fowlkes v. Commonwealth,
218 Va. 763, 240 S.E.2d 662 (1978); Miller v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 929, 234 S.E.2d 269
(1977).
476. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
477. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-243 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
478. Id. Before 1974 the statute provided that all persons, whether in custody or not, be
brought to trial within three regular terms of court from indictment. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-
191 (Repl. Vol. 1960) (amended 1974).
479. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-243 (Cum. Supp. 1980). See Knott v. Commonwealth, 215 Va.
537, 211 S.E.2d 86 (1975).
480. Fowlkes v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 763, 769, 240 S.E.2d 662, 666 (1978).
481. Woodward v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 495, 201 S.E.2d 785 (1974); Heflin v. Com-
monwealth, 211 Va. 407, 177 S.E.2d 644 (1970). These excusable delays are: 1) defendant's
insanity or confinement in hospital, 2) prosecution witness enticed away, sick or injured, 3)
granting of a separate trial at request of person indicted jointly with others, 4) continuance
granted on motion of defendant or by his concurrence, 5) inability of jury to agree on a
verdict. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-243 (Repl. Vol. 1975).
482. Woodward v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 495, 499, 201 S.E.2d 785, 788-89 (1974).
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utory right to a speedy trial either inadvertently or deliberately.483 The
defendant's incarceration in a Virginia prison is also not an excuse en-
compassed by the statute.484 In such a situation he would be subject to
transfer under process issued by the trial court and would, therefore, be
available for trial. The court will not exclude all excuses not specifically
enumerated, but it has construed these exceptions very narrowly. For an
excuse to be accepted, it must include circumstances in pari ratione with
those expressly allowed. 485 Failure to invoke the statute until after entry
of final judgment is a waiver of the rights under the statute. 486
If a case does not fall under the statute either because there has been
no indictment or because the time limit was complied with and yet the
defendant feels he was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial,
the court may apply the balancing test of Barker to determine if the right
was denied.48 7 The factors to be assessed are the length of delay, the rea-
sons for delay, defendant's assertion of his right and prejudice to the de-
fendant.488 Prior to Barker the prevailing rule was that if a defendant
failed to demand a speedy trial the right was deemed waived. Virginia
was one of only eight states which had rejected this demand rule.489 The
Supreme Court considered the rule inconsistent with the principle that
fundamental rights must be waived knowingly and intelligently; there-
fore, it rejected the demand rule in Barker and held that failure to de-
mand a trial was only one factor to be considered.
490
The Virginia Supreme Court applied this test in three cases during the
past ten years. Its decisions indicate a trend toward more liberal applica-
tion of the test in favor of the defendant, especially with regard to the
483. Id.
484. Knott v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 531, 211 S.E.2d 86 (1975).
485. Id.
486. Brooks v. Peyton, 210 Va. 318, 171 S.E.2d 243 (1969). The Virginia statute incorpo-
rates all of the elements recommended by the ABA Speedy Trial Standard before those
recommendations were drafted in 1968. Poulas & Coleman, Speedy Trial Slow Implementa-
tion: The ABA Standards in Search of a Statehouse, 28 HASTINGs L. J. 357, 371, 373 (1976-
1977). The ABA had recommended that statutes establish a specific time limit and define
the point at which the time began to run, limit the situations in which delay would be
excused, eliminate any requirement that the defendant show prejudice, limit waiver only to
failure to declare denial prior to trial and provide i remedy of absolute discharge.
487. The arrest of a defendant constitutes the initiation of prosecution for the purposes of
the Barker test. Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64 (1975); Fowlkes v. Commonwealth,
218 Va. 763, 766, 240 S.E.2d 662, 664 (1978).
488. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 530.
489. Flanary v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 204, 35 S.E.2d 135 (1945).
490. 407 U.S. at 530.
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factor of prejudice. In Whitlock v. Superintendent49 the court looked at
prejudice only as it affected the defendant's ability to contest on the mer-
its and concluded that since the only witnesses to die were prosecution
witnesses, there was no prejudice to the defendant and no denial of his.
right to a speedy trial. In Miller v. Commonwealth492 the court stated
that prejudice had three different facets to it: 1) oppressive pretrial in-
caceration; 2) anxiety and concern of the accused; and 3) impairment of
defense on the merits. Although it did emphasize that the third concern
was the most important, the court showed a willingness to recognize the
other types of prejudice which a defendant may encounter.43 The court
found that the defendant had established no prejudice since the defen-
dant was not in custody and all hearings were on record. If the court had
taken this view of prejudice in Whitlock,4' the holding would most prob-
ably have been different. Whitlock was imprisoned in Maryland while
pending trial in Virginia. Even though already incarcerated, he could still
suffer from undue and oppressive incaceration because if found guilty, he
might have been allowed to serve his sentences concurrently. Also the
anxiety and concern of public accusation might be intensified if already in
prison.4 1
It is important to note that Miller involved a nolle prosequi and thus
prompted consideration of Klopfer v. North Carolina.4"9 In Klopfer the
Supreme Court held that a nolle prosequi with leave to prosecute at a
later time denied the defendant a right to a speedy trial, as the pendency
of the indictment might subject the defendant to public approbation and
deprive him of employment. The Virginia court pointed out that under
Virginia law a nolle prosequi discharged the accused from liability on the
indictment and, therefore, did not prejudice him through subjection to
public scorn.497
In Fowlkes v. Commonwealth 98 the court went even further than it did
in Miller and held that there were certain forms of prejudice that were
inevitably present in every case.49 In addition to prejudice to the defense
on the merits, the delay could interfere with the defendant's liberty, dis-
rupt his employment, drain his finances, create anxiety and subject him
491. 213 Va. 429, 192 S.E.2d 802 (1972).
492. 217 Va. 929, 234 S.E.2d 269 (1977).
493. Id. at 936, 234 S.E.2d at 274.
494. See note 491 supra and accompanying text.
495. See Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969).
496. 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
497. Miller v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 929, 234 S.E.2d 269 (1977).
498. 218 Va. 763, 240 S.E.2d 662 (1978).
499. Id. at 771, 240 S.E.2d at 667.
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to public scorn. These forms of prejudice required no proof.500 In support
of this proposition the court cited the concurring opinion in Barker.50 1
The majority had held that no affirmative demonstration of prejudice was
necessary to prove denial.50 2 The concurring opinion adopted by the Vir-
ginia court went one subtle step further and declared that certain forms
of prejudice would be assumed to exist in every case. The court then held
that the only proper remedy would be dismissal of the indictment: a rem-
edy not unique where constitutional rights are involved. 03
This liberal approach to the speedy trial right might seem inconsistent
with the law and order approach which the Virginia Supreme Court has
taken where other constitutional rights are involved. However, the Vir-
ginia court, as did the United States Supreme Court in Barker, views this
constitutional guarantee as protecting societal, as well as individual right.
"The public has a substantial stake in the speedy conviction of the guilty
and prompt vindication of the innocent. '504 It serves to preserve the
means of proving the charge, reduces institutional costs and the exposure
to danger and will insure the maximum deterrent effect of the prosecu-
tion and conviction.50 5 This concern with protecting societal rights is con-
sistent with the law and order approach.
G. Conclusion
Virginia Supreme Court decisions in the pre-trial areas of criminal pro-
cedure in the past decade clearly reflect its conservative law and order
approach. In general, it has applied the minimum safeguards for individ-
ual constitutional rights which are consistent with vindicating societal
rights and preserving effective law enforcement practices. The court's em-
phasis has been on obtaining the most reliable information by the most
efficient means and has not taken many opportunities to discourage any
specific questionable police practice. Very often the court's conservative
approach in a certain area has been subsequently affirmed or adopted by
the United States Supreme Court and more often the Virginia court's de-
cisions merely follow those of the Supreme Court. Thus Virginia's deci-
sions have been consistent with the increasingly conservative trend of the
500. Id.
501. See 407 U.S. at 537 (White, J., concurring).
502. Id. at 533.
503. Fowlkes v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 763, 772, 240 S.E.2d 662, 667 (1978). After the
defendant has challenged a delay as being unreasonable, the court will shift the, burden to
the prosecution to show what delay was attributable to the defendant and what delay, at-
tributable to the prosecution, was justifiable. Id. at 766, 240 S.E.2d at 664.
504. Id. at 769, 240 S.E.2d at 667 (1978).
505. Id.
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Supreme Court during the seventies.
IV. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DURING AND FOLLOWING TRIAL
A. Introduction
This section of the note focuses primarily on the decisions of the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court over the past decade in the area of criminal proce-
dure during and immediately following trial. While an attempt has been
made to report on the trend of the decisions, it appears, as mentioned
above, that any changes that have occurred are not the result of a change
in philosophy on the part of the court but rather are the result of: 1)
United States Supreme Court decisions; 2) legislative changes by the Vir-
ginia General Assembly; or 3) a deference to the trial court's discretion.
While a number of states have found matters of criminal procedure an
area futile for successful enlargement of federal constitutional rights,506
utilizing state constitutional provisions in combination with the adequate
state ground doctrine,507 Virginia has not, preferring instead not to depart
from the federal minimum guarantees.
B. Right to Counsel
The sixth amendment 5 8 guarantees the right to counsel in all federal
and state50 1 prosecutions that result in actual imprisonment.5 10 An indi-
506. For an exhaustive listing of cases illustrating the California court's willingness to rely
on its own constitution, see Falk, Foreword: The State Constitution: A More than "Ade-
quate" Nonfederal Ground, 61 CAUF. L. Rxv. 273, 277 nn.16 & 17, 278 n.18 (1973). For a
survey identifying some representative state court departures from the federal minimum
guarantees of the fourth, fifth, and sixth amendments see Note, Stepping Into the Breach:
Basing Defendants' Rights on State Rather than Federal Law, 15 Am. CriM. L. Rv. 339
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Stepping Into the Breach]. See also Comment, The Indepen-
dent Application of State Constitutional Provisions to Questions of Criminal Procedure, 62
MARQ. L. REv. 596 (1979).
507. "The Supreme Court's jurisdiction over state cases is limited to the correction of
errors related solely to questions of federal law .... [I]f a state ground is independent and
adequate to support a judgment, the Court has no jurisdiction at all over the decision de-
spite the presence of federal issues." Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 501 n.80 (1977). See Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296
U.S. 207 (1935); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875).
508. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.").
509. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (sixth amendment right to counsel in a
criminal felony trial applicable to the states via fourteenth amendment); VA. CODE ANN. §
19.2-157 (Cum. Supp. 1980) (duty of court to inform accused of his right to counsel).
510. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (no right to appointed counsel unless indi-
gent defendant is actually deprived of liberty); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972)
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gent, therefore, who cannot afford to retain counsel is entitled to ap-
pointed counsel.5 11 Virginia has codified this right but requires a prior
statement of indigence by all persons charged with a felony512 or a non-
felonious offense5 3 who seek court-appointed counsel. Section 19.2-161 of
the Virginia Code provides a penalty for false swearing to such a state-
ment,51 4 and code section 19.2-163 likewise provides that "[i]f the defen-
dant is convicted, the amount allowed by the court to the attorney ap-
pointed to defend him shall be taxed against the defendant as part of the
costs of prosecution and, if collected, the same shall be paid to the Com-
monwealth, or the county, city, or town, as the case may be."5 15 The con-
stitutionality of such state recoupment laws for counsel fees and expendi-
tures paid for indigent defendants has been an issue debated at the
national level.516 The Virginia Supreme Court upheld Virginia's recoup-
ment statute in Wicks v. City of Charlottesville51 7 stating that "no court
has yet held that every constitutional right or privilege should be avail-
able to all persons without any cost or obligation on their part."518 In
upholding the statutory scheme, the Virginia court compared two deci-
sions by the United States Supreme Court regarding recoupment stat-
(no incarceration permitted unless defendant has been afforded right to counsel).
511. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (sixth amendment guarantees right to ap-
pointed counsel).
512. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-159 (Cum. Supp. 1980) provides:
If the accused shall claim that he is indigent, and the charge against him is a
felony, the court shall ascertain by oral examination of the accused and other compe-
tent evidence whether or not the accused is indigent ... and if the court thereby
determines that such accused is indigent ... the court shall provide the accused with
a statement which shall contain the following.
"I have been advised this - day of , 19-, by the (name of
court) court of my right to representation by counsel in the trial of the charge pend-
ing against me; I certify that I am without means to employ counsel and I hereby
request the court to appoint counsel for me" (signature of accused).
The court shall execute the said statement under oath, and the said court shall
appoint competent counsel to represent the accused in the proceeding against him,
including an appeal, if any, until relieved or replaced by other counsel.
513. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-160 (Cum. Supp. 1980). The language of this section is similar
to § 19.2-159 except it applies when the charge against the accused is a misdemeanor. It
further provides for a waiver of the right to counsel.
514. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-161 (Repl. Vol. 1975).
515. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-163 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
516. See Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40 (1974); James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 132-33
(1972).
517. 215 Va. 274, 208 S.E.2d 752 (1974), appeal denied, 421 U.S. 901 (1975). The statute
at issue in Wicks was former Code § 14.1-184.1 (currently codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-
163 (Cum. Supp. 1980)).
518. Id. at 280, 208 S.E.2d at 757.
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utes. The court noted that in Fuller v. Oregon,519 the Oregon recoupment
statute was approved because "it was designed to insure that only those
who actually become capable of repaying the state will ever be obliged to
do so.''52° On the other hand, the Kansas statute at issue in James v.
Strange521 was disapproved by the Supreme Court because the "statute
deprived an indigent defendant of the protective exceptions available to
other civil judgment debtors. 5 22
The scope of the right to counsel has been expanded by the United
States Supreme Court both in terms of the proceedings to which it ap-
plies and the stages at which the right to counsel attaches. The Supreme
Court has held that counsel must be available at each critical stage of the
criminal proceeding5 2s as well as in the first appeal of right.52' The Vir-
ginia court itself, while recognizing this right, has chosen not to expand
the right beyond the requirements articulated by the Supreme Court 525
and has instead left that decision within the discretion of the trial court.
In Cooper v. Haas,526 the Virginia court stated that it was "within the
sound discretion of the trial court whether to appoint counsel to appeal
the denial of the petition for habeas corpus. ' 527
In Argersinger v. Hamlin,5 28 the United States Supreme Court ex-
tended the right to counsel to all indigent defendants accused of misde-
meanors which result in a jail sentence. In Potts v. Superintendent of
Virginia State Penitentiary5 29 the Virginia court dealt with the applica-
519. 417 U.S. 40 (1974).
520. 215 Va. at 278, 208 S.E.2d at 756.
521. 407 U.S. 128 (1972).
522. 215 Va. at 278, 208 S.E.2d at 756. In the Strange opinion, Mr. Justice Powell distin-
guished the Virginia recoupment statute from the Kansas statute: "In Virginia ... the
amount paid to court-appointed counsel is assessed only against convicted defendants as a
part of costs, although the majority of state recoupment laws apply whether or not the de-
fendant prevails." 407 U.S. at 133. Noting the "wide differences in the features of these
statutes," the Court declined to issue a pronouncement on "their general validity." Id.
523. See, for example, notes 326-29, 347-54, 360-75 supra and accompanying text.
524. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
525. In Smith v. Superintendant State Penitentiary, 214 Va. 359, 200 S.E.2d 523 (1973),
the court held that the right to counsel extended to recidivism proceedings under VA. CODE
ANN. § 53-296 (Repl. Vol. 1978). This holding was required by Chewning v. Cunningham,
368 U.S. 443 (1962), where the Supreme Court held that the rules followed concerning the
appointment of counsel in other types of criminal trials were equally applicable to Virginia's
recidivism proceeding. Section 53-296 has since been repealed by 1979 Va. Acts, ch. 411.
526. 210 Va. 279, 170 S.E.2d 5 (1969).
527. Id. at 281, 170 S.E.2d at 7.
528. 407 U.S. 25 (1972). The rule set out in Argersinger was further clarified in Scott v.
Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
529. 213 Va. 432, 192 S.E.2d 780 (1972).
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tion of the rule set forth in Argersinger and held that it should only be
applied prospectively and did not mandate retroactive application.530
However, Potts was effectively overruled by Berry v. City of Cincin-
nati,531 where the United States Supreme Court in interpreting the effect
of Argersinger announced that those persons convicted prior to that deci-
sion would be "entitled to the constitutional rule enunciated" therein.52
The Virginia Supreme Court faced the issue of retroactive application
of Argersinger for a second time in Whorley v. Commonwealth.533 Al-
though recognizing that Berry overruled their previous decision in
Potts, 53 4 the court held that Argersinger did not apply to the facts of the
current case. In Whorley, the defendant on November 4, 1970, was ad-
judged a habitual offender under Virginia Code section 46.1-387.7535 re-
'sulting in the revocation of his driver's license for a period of ten years.
The determination of his status of habitual offender was based in part on
a conviction on September 26, 1969, for driving under the influence at
which trial he had not been represented by counsel. At the time he was
declared a habitual offender, November of 1970, he was further warned
that any conviction for operating a motor vehicle in Virginia during this
ten year period could result in a sentence of one to five years in the state
penitentiary. Subsequently on January 6, 1973, Whorley operated his car
without a valid license and was involved in a "hit and run accident." The
trial court sentenced Whorley to one year in the penitentiary after it de-
termined that the defendant had been previously adjudicated a habitual
offender. Whorley appealed this decision to the Virginia Supreme Court
arguing that his status as a habitual offender should be declared void be-
cause he had not been afforded representation by counsel during a prior
conviction for drunken driving, which, as previously mentioned, had led
to his being adjudicated a habitual offender.3 8 The Virginia court in af-
firming Whorley's conviction for one year held that Argersinger's retroac-
tive effect was inapplicable here because: 1) a proceeding under Virginia's
Habitual Offender Act, such as the one in which Whorley had been in-
volved and at which he had been adjudicated a habitual offender based in
part on a conviction for driving under the influence at which he was not
530. Id. at 433, 192 S.E.2d at 781. Potts sought to have a 1968 conviction for non-support
declared void because he was denied his sixth amendment right to counsel. He was indigent
at the time of trial and was not represented by counsel. Id.
531. 414 U.S. 29 (1973).
532. Id. at 29-30.
533. 215 Va. 740, 214 S.E.2d 447 (1975).
534. Id. at 741-42, 214 S.E.2d at 448.
535. See VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-387.7 (Repl. Vol. 1980).
536. 215 Va. at 740-41, 214 S.E.2d at 448.
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represented by counsel, is not a criminal proceeding; 2) a previous convic-
tion and a habitual offender adjudication bear only indirectly on the
criminal process that places such an offender in peril of imprisonment; 3)
Whorley's liberty was not jeopardized by a conviction for drunk driving
which led to the habitual offender status-his liberty was jeopardized as a
result of his voluntary involvement in the commission of a criminal act,
i.e., driving an auto after being adjudged a habitual offender; 4) to set
aside his prior conviction would give him a preferred position over any
other "motor vehicle offender who suffered imposition of a fine only ....
[R]eason, logic and the orderly administration of justice ... require that
an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction" be distinguished from a sen-
tence of imprisonment and be invulnerable to an Argersinger challenge.537
In reaching its decision the court approved and adopted the Fourth Cir-
cuit's538 holding that Argersinger "excises from an uncounseled misde-
meanor conviction only direct or collateral consequences which relate to
the loss of liberty and imprisonment. An uncounseled misdemeanor con-
viction, although resulting in imprisonment, is not invalid per se, and
consequential civil disabilities are not invalid."539 Therefore, had Whorley
been incarcerated for his original drunk driving conviction, he would have
been able to challenge the sentence of imprisonment because he had not
been afforded counsel as required by Argersinger. However, he would
have been unable to attack the uncounseled misdemeanor conviction by
itself.540
In Whorley the Virginia court pointed to the language in Argersinger
which stated that "no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether
classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by
counsel at his trial"5' 1 (emphasis added). For the Virginia court this
537. Id. at 746-47, 214 S.E.2d at 450-51.
538. Morgan v. Juvenile & Dom. Rel. Ct. Halifax Co., Va., 491 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1974);
Marston v. Oliver, 485 F.2d 705 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 936 (1974); Ferguson
v. Gathright, 485 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 933 (1974).
539. 215 Va. at 744, 214 S.E.2d at 449.
540. In Whorley, the court noted that "throughout its opinion in Argersinger the Su-
preme Court ... reiterated its intent to abrogate not the uncounseled misdemeanor convic-
tion but the subsequent sentence of imprisonment." 215 Va. at 744-45, 214 S.E.2d at 450.
The Virginia court likewise pointed to the following language in Argersinger: "We hold,
therefore, that absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for
any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented
by counsel at his trial." 215 Va. at 745, 214 S.E.2d at 450, quoting 407 U.S. at 37.
541. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), cited in 215 Va. at 745, 214 S.E.2d at 450
(emphasis supplied). See also Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (plurality opinion holding
actual imprisonment is the line defining the constitutional right to appointment of counsel
and not the potential for imprisonment).
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meant the defining line was actual imprisonment; however, some sister
states have nevertheless adopted the principle of providing counsel in
cases where conviction may result in imprisonment, although apparently
Argersinger does not require such a holding." 2 Some states have also pro-
vided such by statutory law.53
1. Waiver of Right to Counsel
A defendant may waive the right to counsel if made "knowingly and
intelligently" but a "heavy burden" is on the state to prove that an effec-
tive waiver has occurred." The Supreme Court has held that the sixth
amendment guarantees the right of a defendant to represent himself
without counsel but such a defendant must also waive his right to ap-
pointed counsel. 5 " In Green v. Commonwealth,"6 the defendant refused
to discuss the case with his court-appointed attorney and was adjudged in
contempt for impeding "the orderly progress of justice."5 7 Court-ap-
pointed counsel was relieved and the trial was continued for the appoint-
ment of a new attorney. The Virginia Supreme Court reversed and dis-
missed the contempt proceeding, holding that the finding of contempt
was not warranted. Under the circumstances of the case, the trial court
should have "ordered the trial to proceed with Green as his own counsel
... [and directed court-appointed counsel] to sit at counsel table and to
give Green such advice... as the reluctant client requested. Considera-
tions of due process and right to counsel require no more." 8
2. Effective Counsel
"It has long been recognized that the right to counsel is the right to
effective assistance of counsel."" 9 The Supreme Court requires that an
attorney's advice regarding guilty pleas must be "within the range of
542. Potts v. Estelle, 529 F.2d 450 (5th Cir. 1976).
543. McInturf v. Horton, 85 Wash. 2d 704, 538 P.2d 499 (1975) (although the court ap-
plied state law, the court also cited Argersinger as requiring the right to appointment of
counsel in misdemeanor prosecutions).
544. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977); Lemke v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 870, 241
S.E.2d 789 (1978); White v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 559, 203 S.E.2d 443 (1974).
545. Faretta v. California, 442 U.S. 806 (1975).
546. 211 Va. 727, 180 S.E.2d 531 (1971).
547. Id. at 728, 180 S.E.2d at 532. The indigent defendant was fined $50 and sentenced to
10 days in jail.
548. Id. at 728, 180 S.E.2d at 533. The court noted that although the defendant's conduct
was not the type to be encouraged, such conduct did not place "the court in a position of
having to preserve its power or vindicate its dignity." Id. at 728, 180 S.E.2d at 532.
549. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970).
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competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases,"55 but has other-
wise left the determination of effective assistance of counsel to the "good
sense and discretion 551 of trial courts.
Courts vary in the standard articulated. At the federal level, the First,
Fifth and Ninth Circuits have defined the standard as "reasonably effec-
tive assistance. '552 The Fourth and Sixth Circuits have defined the stan-
dard as "assistance within the range of competence" while the Eighth
Circuit has defined the standard as "the exercise of customary skills and
diligence of a reasonably competent attorney under similar circum-
stances." 553 The Seventh Circuit has defined the standard for effective-
ness as "performance that meets a minimum professional standard."s''
"Only the Second and Tenth Circuits still apply the traditional standard
under which only conduct that shocks the court's conscience or makes a
farce and mockery of justice will constitute ineffective assistance. '55
Slayton v. Weinberger,5 6 a 1973 decision, is the most recent case in
which the Virginia Supreme Court expressly articulated the standard for
effective counsel. The defendant in Slayton had been convicted of per-
forming an illegal abortion. This conviction was set aside, however, when
the trial court granted the defendant's petition for a writ of habeas
corpus on the grounds that the defendant had not been represented by
competent counsel.557 In reversing the order and dismissing the writ of
habeas corpus, the court articulated the traditional "farce and mockery"
standard for determining effective assistance of counsel: "Ordinarily one
550. Id. at 771.
551. Id. In the Court's view, "a defendant's plea of guilty based on reasonably competent
advice [was] an intelligent plea not open to attack on the ground that counsel may have
misjudged the admissibility of the defendant's confession." Id. at 770. But, the Court ad-
monished trial courts that "if the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution is to serve
its purpose, defendants cannot be left to the mercies of incompetent counsel, and that
judges should strive to maintain proper standards of performance by attorneys who are rep-
resenting defendants in criminal cases. . . ." Id. at 771.
552. Project, Ninth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme
Court and Courts of Appeals 1978-1979, 68 GEO. L.J. 279, 492 (1979).
553. Id.
554. Id. at 493.
555. Id.
556. 213 Va. 690, 194 S.E.2d 703 (1973).
557. Id. at 691, 194 S.E.2d at 704. The trial court made the following findings of fact as
its basis for finding ineffective representation and awarding the writ- 1) that the attorneys
appointed to represent the defendant did not interview material witnesses; 2) that one at-
torney never appeared at any hearing or trial; 3) that some sort of collusion was manufac-
tured to reflect that defendant was working as an undercover agent; 4) that there was no
basis for this foundation; and 5) that the foundation was manufactured with the consent
and knowledge of the defendant's attorneys. Id.
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is deprived of effective assistance of counsel only in those extreme in-
stances where the representation is so transparently inadequate as to
make a farce of the trial."5 58 The court in Slayton cited Root v. Cunning-
ham,559 a Fourth Circuit decision, as precedent for the traditional farce
and mockery standard. Since that time, however, the Fourth Circuit has
expressly disavowed Root and the farce and mockery test.560 As previ-
ously mentioned, the Fourth Circuit now judges the effectiveness of coun-
sel by the "assistance within range of competence" standard.561 Dicta in
the recent case of Hummel v. Commonwealth 62 indicates that the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court may have likewise departed from the traditional
farce and mockery standard."3
The Virginia Supreme Court has refrained from establishing a pre-
sumption that late appointment of counsel gives rise to insufficient repre-
sentation,5" though it has "criticiz[ed] the practice of appointing counsel
on the day of trial."05" While some courts in other jurisdictions have
adopted such a presumption,56" Virginia's position would seem consistent
with the United States Supreme Court which refused to adopt such a
presumption in Chambers v. Maroney."7
While incompetency of appointed counsel may be a defense to convic-
tion in certain circumstances, where a defendant prevents appointed
counsel from participating in the trial, he waives his right to claim this
defense on appeal.568 Thus in Walker v. Commonwealth,56' counsel was
appointed to represent the defendant, who subsequently asked that new
counsel be appointed on the ground that he and the appointed attorney
558. Id. at 691, 194 S.E.2d at 704. The court held that the trial court's findings were not
supported by the record and that the defendant was not prejudiced when one of his retained
lawyers, as agreed, did not appear in court. Id. at 692-94, 194 S.E.2d at 705-06.
559. 344 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1965).
560. Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 543 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1011
(1978).
561. Id. See note 552 supra and accompanying text.
562. 219 Va. 252, 247 S.E.2d 385 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 935 (1979).
563. "It [the Constitution] does guarantee that [the defendant] will be adequately repre-
sented by a competent attorney." Id. at 258, 247 S.E.2d at 388.
564. See Ford v. Peyton, 209 Va. 203, 163 S.E.2d 314 (1968); Blowe v. Peyton, 208 Va. 68,
155 S.E.2d 351 (1967); Peyton v. Fields, 207 Va. 40, 147 S.E.2d 762 (1966); Whiteley v.
Commonwealth, 205 Va. 251, 135 S.E.2d 823 (1964).
565. Wynn v. Peyton, 211 Va. 515, 518, 178 S.E.2d 676, 678 (1971).
566. Fields v. Peyton, 375 F.2d 624 (4th Cir. 1967); Housden v. Leverette, 241 S.E.2d 810
(W. Va. 1978).
567. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
568. Walker v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 258, 199 S.E.2d 518 (1973).
569. Id.
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were "incompatible." The lower court refused the request to appoint new
counsel based solely on the ground of incompatibility. The defendant re-
fused to cooperate with appointed counsel throughout the trial and was
thereafter convicted and sentenced. On appeal the supreme court held
that: 1) the ground of incompatibility alone was insufficient to require the
appointment of new counsel; and 2) that where counsel had been ap-
pointed and the defendant refused to cooperate with the attorney effec-
tively preventing counsel from participating in the trial, the defendant
"waived his right to claim incompetency on the part of counsel at
trial. 5 70
C. Right to a Jury Trial
The sixth amendment guarantees that in all criminal prosecutions an
accused shall have the right to trial by an impartial jury.571 In Duncan v.
Louisiana57 2 the United States Supreme Court held that the sixth
amendment right of trial by jury extended to trials in a state court under
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. However, prior to
Duncan the Virginia Supreme Court recognized the right of trial by jury
based on Virginia's constitution.573
Regarding the right to trial by jury in a two-tiered system, the Virginia
Supreme Court in Manns v. Commonwealth57 4 held that the sixth amend-
ment guarantee of a jury trial is satisfied "by the appeal of right and trial
de novo procedure" under Virginia law, and that the accused has no right
to a jury trial in the lower tier of Virginia's "two-tier" system. In Manns,
the court reasoned that though Duncan made the sixth amendment right
to jury trial applicable to the states, it did not make all "federal jury trial
standards" applicable to the states. Citing two recent United States Su-
preme Court cases5 7 5 approving state jury standards different from those
required in federal courts, the Manns court concluded that the rule set
down by the Supreme Court in Callan v. Wilson,57 6 providing for a right
570. Id. at 259, 199 S.E.2d at 519.
571. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury.. .
572. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
573. VA. CoNST. of 1902, § 8 (current version at art. I, § 8 (1971)). See Gaskill v. Common-
wealth, 206 Va. 486, 144 S.E.2d 293 (1965).
574. 213 Va. 322, 191 S.E.2d 810 (1972).
575. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (conviction in state court on 10 votes of 12-
member jury satisfies sixth amendment right to jury trial); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78
(1970) (jury of six within state court satisfies requirements of sixth amendment).
576. 127 U.S. 540 (1888) (jury right established at both stages of two-tier court system in
District of Columbia).
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to a jury in the first level of a two-tier court system, was a federal stan-
dard and not applicable to state courts.5 " While the court's holding in
Manns drew criticism, 57 1 the United States Supreme Court has since held
under similar facts that the accused is not deprived of his fourteenth
amendment right to jury trial.57 1
While the availability and form of jury trials vary from state to state, 80
Virginia courts are constitutionally mandated to convict a person only af-
ter the unanimous consent of the jury.581 It is interesting to note that this
is a higher standard than that adopted by the United States Supreme
Court in Apodaca v. Oregon,8 2 which provides that the sixth amendment
does not require a unanimous jury.5 s
1. Waiver of Right to a Jury Trial
The right to jury trial may be waived5 ' but the waiver must be express
and intelligent.58 5 A growing number of jurisdictions provide that the
judge, through discussion with the defendant, must satisfy himself that
the defendant's waiver is made knowingly and voluntarily. 86 Virginia's
Supreme Court has not, yet, set such procedures for the trial courts, but
Virginia's constitution57 and statutes588 do provide that the waiver must
577. Manns v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. at 324, 191 S.E.2d at 811.
578. Note, Criminal Procedure, Eighteenth Annual Survey of Developments in Virginia
Law: 1972-1973, 59 VA. L. REv. 1400, 1509-10 (1973). A division of opinion also existed
among state courts concerning the validity of denying a jury in the initial stage of the two-
tier procedure. Compare State v. Holiday, 109 R.I. 93, 280 A.2d 333 (1971) with Manns v.
Commonwealth, 213 Va. 322, 191 S.E.2d 810 (1972).
579. Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427 U.S. 618 (1976) (Massachusetts' two-tier court system,
under which person accused of certain crime is first tried in the lower tier, where no trial by
jury is available, and is, thereafter, entitled to trial de novo by jury in the second tier, does
not deprive accused of fourteenth amendment right to a jury trial).
580. Note, Stepping into the Breach, supra note 506, at 378.
581. VA. CONST., art. I, § 8 ("That in criminal prosecutions a man hath a right to... an
impartial jury... without whose unanimous consent he cannot be found guilty.").
582. 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
583. Id. at 410-12 (conviction on 10 votes of 12-member jury satisfies sixth amendment
right to jury trial).
584. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157-58 (1968).
585. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312 (1930). Under Rule 23(a) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, waiver of the right to jury trial must be in writing, consented
to by the government, and approved by the court. Fan. R. CRIM. P. 23(a).
586. See Clummei v. Commonwealth, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1838, as cited in Goldsmith &
Ryan, A Survey of Court Approved Procedures Designed to Secure the Accused's Right to
a Fair Trial, 65 Mass. L. REv. 7, 16 (1980).
587. VA. CONST., art. I, § 8 provides:
If the accused plead not guilty, he may, with his consent and the concurrence of the
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be consented to by the judge and the Commonwealth's Attorney. There-
fore, a defendant does not have an unqualified right to a nonjury trial. If
a judge believes that a particular case is especially suited to a jury trial,
he can deny the defendant's request to have the court try the case,
thereby subjecting the defendant to jury sentencing in the event he is
found guilty.
Neither Virginia's constitution nor its statutes state whether the ac-
cused can withdraw his waiver of a jury trial. Generally, in other states
withdrawal of the defendant's waiver of a jury trial is within the discre-
tion of the trial court.589 The rule often followed is that "if an accused's
application for withdrawal of waiver is made in due season so as not to
substantially delay or impede the cause of justice, the trial court should
allow the waiver to be withdrawn."9 0 Despite the lack of constitutional or
statutory authority, the Virginia Supreme Court has likewise applied this
rule and held that the "trial judge abused his judicial discretion in deny-
ing the defendant [who made a motion to withdraw his waiver eleven
days before the trial] the right to withdraw his waiver of a jury trial."59 1
The Virginia Supreme Court during the past decade also had occasion
to deal with the collateral issue of whether a defendant at a new trial on
the issue of punishment alone was entitled to have a jury determine his
sentence where the defendant had waived his right to a jury at the origi-
nal trial. The court held in Fogg v. Commonwealth9 2 that while there was
Commonwealth's Attorney and of the court entered of record, be tried by a smaller
number of jurors, or waive a jury. In the case of such waiver or plea of guilty, the
court shall try the case.
This section vests in the trial court discretion to determine whether to accept a waiver
of jury trial. McClung v. Weatherholtz, 351 F. Supp. 5 (W.D. Va. 1972) (judge imposed jury
trial).
588. VA. CoDE ANN. § 19.2-257 (Repl. Vol. 1975) ("[In a felony case] if the accused plead
not guilty, with his consent after being advised by counsel and the concurrence of the attor-
ney for the Commonwealth and of the court entered of record, the court shall hear and
determine the case without the intervention of a jury."); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-258 (Repl.
Vol. 1975) (The language of this section is identical to the wording above except that it
applies in cases of a misdemeanor).
589. See Wadlington v. State, 164 Ind. App. 255, 328 N.E.2d 458 (1975); State v. Daigle,
220 Kan. 639, 556 P.2d 400 (1976); 47 AM. Ju. 2d Jury § 70 (1969).
590. 47 AM. Jur. 2d Jury, at 687. See also People v. Melton, 125 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 901,
271 P.2d 962 (1954); Butler v. State, 97 Ga. 404, 23 S.E. 822 (1896).
591. Thomas v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 553, 556, 238 S.E.2d 834, 836 (1977) (J. Compton
dissented stating that such discretion should be undisturbed since it is not clearly an abuse
of discretion).
592. 215 Va. 164, 207 S.E.2d 847 (1974). The court cited Williams v. New York, 337 U.S.
241 (1949) which held that nothing in the Constitution of the United States gave the defen-
dant the right to have his punishment fixed by a jury. The court distinguished Huggins v.
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a constitutional right to have a jury determine the guilt or innocence of
the accused, there was no corresponding constitutional right, either under
the Virginia constitution or the federal constitution to a jury trial limited
to the issue of punishment. Thus, where a defendant voluntarily, know-
ingly, and intelligently waives his right to a jury trial at his original trial,
and a higher court subsequently overturns only that portion of the deci-
sion relating to punishment, a new trial on the issue of punishment alone
is in effect a continuation of the original trial, and the defendant is not
entitled to a jury trial on that issue.5 93
D. Jury Selection
Virginia's constitution guarantees to an accused a trial by an impartial
jury of his vicinage, 5 one which is free from prejudice either for or
against him.51 5 The United States Supreme Court has refined this defini-
tion indicating that an impartial jury is "a jury drawn from a fair cross
section of the community;"' 96 the selection system may not systematically
exclude any distinctive groups present therein.8 9 This is not to say, how-
ever, that the "juries actually chosen must mirror the community and re-
flect various distinctive groups in the population." 98 The Supreme Court,
likewise, has held that the sixth amendment (and correspondingly the
fourteenth amendment) provides a defendant with standing to object to
Commonwealth, 213 Va. 327, 191 S.E.2d 734 (1972), Hodges v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 316,
191 S.E.2d 794 (1972) and Snider v. Cox, 212 Va. 13, 181 S.E.2d 617 (1971) where a jury
trial was held on punishment alone. In those cases, however, the defendants did not waive a
jury on the original trial as defendant Fogg had.
593. Id. at 167, 207 S.E.2d at 850.
594. VA. CONST., art. I, § 8. The word "vicinage" as used in the Constitution, "corresponds
with the territorial jurisdiction of the court in which the venue of the crime is laid." Karnes
v. Commonwealth, 125 Va. 758, 762, 99 S.E. 562, 563 (1919).
595. Breeden v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 297, 227 S.E.2d 734 (1976) (The court reiterated
that the "constitutional guarantee is reinforced by legislative mandate and by the rules of
this Court; veniremen must 'stand indifferent in the cause.' ") Id. at 298, 227 S.E.2d at 735.
See also Poindexter v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 314, 237 S.E.2d 139 (1977) (The court held
that the trial court did not err in granting the Commonwealth's motion to change venue
from Louisa County because the affidavits introduced by the Commonwealth concluded that
a fair and impartial trial was not possible in Louisa County. A change of venue is a matter
within the sound discretion of the court).
596. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (system that operates to exclude women
from jury duty does not provide fair cross section of community and hence violates sixth
amendment).
597. Id. at 530-31.
598. Id. at 538 (defendant not entitled to jury of any 13articular composition). Accord,
Brown v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 515, 184 S.E.2d 786 (1971), vacated on other grounds, 408
U.S. 940 (1972) (defendant who is black is not constitutionally entitled to have members of
his race on the jury which tried him); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
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the exclusion of a distinctive group from jury selection even if the defen-
dant is not a member of that group and cannot demonstrate any actual
prejudice resulting from exclusion. 9 9 Peters v. Kiff,8 " the first of several
United States Supreme Court cases concerning standing to object to jury
selection, held that "whatever his race, a criminal defendant has standing
to challenge the system used to select his. . . jury, on the ground that it
arbitrarily excludes from service the members of any race, and thereby
denies him due process of law."801 The Virginia Supreme Court, in dicta,
"construe[d] that decision to be limited to cases involving discriminatory
racial exclusion in the jury selection process.8 0 2 However, this narrow
reading was later refuted in Taylor v. Louisiana'"3 when the Supreme
Court cited Peters v. Kiff as standing for the rule that a defendant has
standing to object to the exclusion of any distinctive group from jury
selection.
The Virginia Supreme Court has strictly and consistently interpreted
the right of an accused to an "impartial jury,'"O" a right guaranteed in the
Virginia constitution605 and reinforced by legislative mandate" as well as
599. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 359 n.1 (1979) (men have standing re exclusion
of women); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 526 (1975) (men have standing to object to
jury selection system excluding women); Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 504 (1972) (any crimi-
nal defendant, regardless of race, may challenge the exclusion of any race in jury selection
system though no prejudice be shown). But cf. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494-95
(1977) (when challenge to jury selection system based on equal protection grounds, defen-
dant must belong to the underrepresented group).
600. 407 U.S. 493 (1972) (plurality opinion).
601. Id. at 504 (The defendant was white. Case was remanded to hear the merits as to
whether blacks were systematically excluded from jury selection.).
. 602. Quick v. Harris, 214 Va. 632, 634, 202 S.E.2d 869, 871 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
907 (1975) (the court held that the rule in Peters v. Kiff should not be retroactively
applied).
603. 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (emphasis added).
604. Salina v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 92, 225 S.E.2d 199 (1976) (A stockholder in a cor-
poration is not only incompetent to act as a juror in a case where the corporation is a party,
he is likewise incompetent to serve where the corporation has a direct pecuniary interest in
the controversy.). The holding by the court in Salina is consistent with the rule generally
recognized. 47 AM. JuR. 2d Jury, § 325 (1969). See also Farrar v. Commonwealth, 201 Va. 5,
109 S.E.2d 112 (1959) (Defendant requested a separate trial and jury from another defen-
dant. The court held it was prejudicial error to overrule the defendant's pre-trial motion to
exclude from the venire eight jurors who were on the venire called in the case against the
other defendant.).
605. VA. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
606. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-357 (Repl. Vol. 1977) assures defendant right to an impartial
jury drawn from "a panel [of twenty] free from exceptions."; VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-358
(Repl. Vol. 1977) "[I]f it shall appear to the court that the juror does not stand indifferent
in the cause, another shall be drawn ... in his stead for the trial."
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rules of court.607 The defendant is assured a right to an impartial trial
drawn from a "panel [of twenty] free from exceptions"608 and it is preju-
dicial error for the trial court to force a defendant to use the preemptory
strike6 9 to exclude a venireman who is not free from exception. 10 Gener-
ally the question of whether or not a venireman should be excluded for
cause 1 is within the sound discretion of the court,612 but where appropri-
ate that discretionary judgment will be reversed. Thus in Breeden v.
Commonwealth,13 the Virginia court held that a prospective juror should
have been struck from the jury panel before the Commonwealth's Attor-
ney and defense counsel were allowed their preemptory strike, because
she stated that the defense counsel would "have to prove to [her] that
[the defendant] was innocent."61' The fact that she was later removed
from the jury panel by preemptory strike did not make the trial judge's
initial failure to remove her harmless error. The court indicated that ju-
rors need not be totally ignorant of the facts,1 5 but any reasonable doubt
that a venireman does not "stand indifferent in the cause" must be re-
solved in favor of the accused.616
Selection of an impartial jury in a trial involving an ethnic or minority
defendant often raises the spectre of racial prejudice and the question of
whether the defendant has the right to ask prospective jurors about their
personal stance on racial differences. In Lewis v. Commonwealth,6  the
Virginia Supreme Court held that a black defendant accused of violent
crimes against a white security guard was not entitled to include specific
questions about racial prejudice during voir dire absent a showing that
607. VA. Sup. CT. R. 3A: 20(b) "The court, on its own motion or following a challenge for
cause, may excuse a prospective juror if it appears he is not qualified, and another shall be
drawn or called and placed in his stead for the trial of that case."
608. See note 91 supra.
609. For law concerning preemptory strike see, VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-262(3), (4) (Cur.
Supp. 1980); VA. Sup. CT. R. 3A:20(c).
610. Breeden v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 297, 227 S.E.2d 734 (1976) as cited in Justus v.
Commonwealth, 220 Va. 971, 266 S.E.2d 87 (1980).
611. VA. Sup. CT. R. 3A:20(b).
612. Slade v. Commonwealth, 155 Va. 1099, 1106, 156 S.E. 388, 391 (1931), cited in
Wayne v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 683, 690, 251 S.E.2d 202, 206 (1979), cert. denied, 442
U.S. 924 (1979) (judge would not eliminate juror because he was poorly educated).
613. 217 Va. 297, 227 S.E.2d 734 (1976).
614. Id. at 300, 227 S.E.2d at 736.
615. Id. The court was not concerned that the venirewoman had read newspaper accounts
on the case to be tried but whether she was able to view the case with an impartial state of
mind.
616. Id. at 298, 227 S.E.2d at 735 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 8-208.28 (Cur. Supp. 1976),
as amended by VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-358 (Repl. Vol. 1977)).
617. 218 Va. 31, 235 S.E.2d 320 (1977).
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there was "any likelihood [that] racial prejudice might affect" the trial."1 8
The court relied on the United States Supreme Court case of Ristaino v.
Ross6 29 which upheld a position similar to that taken by the court in
Lewis. Despite this stance taken by the Supreme Court, many state
courts have held that it is necessary, or at least proper, for the prospec-
tive jurors to be questioned with respect to racial prejudice620 recognizing
among other reasons that the courts should not "sweep under the rug"
the reality that certain persons are prejudiced against blacks.6 21 Other
states, while allowing general inquiries into racial prejudice, have held
that where the prospective juror gives a negative answer to such an in-
quiry it is unnecessary to call further attention to the defendant's race by
asking subsequent questions dealing specifically with racial prejudice. 622
Capital cases present another unique issue involving whether a juror
may be excluded for his personal views on the death penalty. Applying
the rule set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Witherspoon v.
Illinois,s 2- the Virginia Supreme Court has held that "[v]eniremen may
not constitutionally be excluded for cause 'simply because they voiced
general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or reli-
gious scruples against its infliction.' "1624 Irrevocable commitment, how-
ever, to vote against the death penalty is a prerequisite to exclusion.6 25 In
cases where a new trial has been granted for failure of the trial court to
exclude veniremen who "absolutely" objected to the death penalty, the
trial is limited to the question of punishment. Punishment is determined
by a jury if the jury was not waived in the original trial.626
618. Lewis v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 31, 36, 235 S.E.2d 320, 323 (1977) (citing Ristaino
v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (1976)). The Lewis court noted that the defendant was unable to point
to racial factors such as existed in Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973) where the
defendant thought the police were "out to get him" for his civil rights activities.
619. 424 U.S. 589 (1976); see note 618 supra.
620. See Commonwealth v. Core, 370 Mass. 369, 348 N.E.2d 777 (1976) (court stated its
preference that judges conduct a special examination of prospective jurors in any case which
involves inter-racial violence). See also Matthews v. State, 276 A.2d 265 (Del. Sup. 1971);
Mize v. State, 131 Ga. App. 538, 206 S.E.2d 530 (1974); Commonwealth v. Foster, 221 Pa.
Super. 426, 293 A.2d 94 (1972); see generally Annot., 94 A.L.R.3d 15 (1979).
621. Commonwealth v. Foster, 221 Pa. Super. 426, 426, 293 A.2d 94, 95-96 (1972).
622. State v. Young, 238 S.C. 115, 119 S.E.2d 504 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 868
(1961).
623. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
624. Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 463, 248 S.E.2d 135, 140 (1978), cert. denied,
441 U.S. 967 (1979).
625. Stamper v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 260, 257 S.E.2d 808 (1979); Smith v. Common-
wealth, 219 Va. 455, 248 S.E.2d 135 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979); Lewis v. Com-
monwealth, 218 Va. 31, 235 S.E.2d 320 (1977).
626. Snider v. Cox, 212 Va. 13, 181 S.E.2d 617 (1971). But cf. Fogg v. Commonwealth, 215
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The Virginia Supreme Court rejected the contention that a judge must
only ask whether any venireman's scruples to capital punishment were
such that they would refuse to vote for imposition of the death penalty.M2
The defendant in Brown v. Commonwealth628 asserted that in first asking
whether there were any veniremen who had scruples about, or were op-
posed to, the imposition of capital punishment, the trial judge allowed
the Commonwealth's Attorney to identify and then dismiss by peremp-
tory challenge veniremen with only slight objections to the death penalty.
The court focused on defendant's allegation that the prosecution had
used the information uncovered by the preliminary questioning in deter-
mining when to exercise its peremptory challenges. Relying upon lan-
guage in the United States Supreme Court case of Swain v. Alabama,629
the Virginia court held that the burden would fall heavily on the defen-
dant to show prejudicial error before the court would inquire into the
prosecutor's motives for use of its peremptory challenges.630 The Brown
decision is important as an interpretation of the purpose of the peremp-
tory challenge system. Giving each side an equal number of arbitrary
challenges tends to produce a jury acceptable to both; permitting numer-
ous inquiries into the motives behind the challenges would seriously
threaten the practical value of this system.
s3
E. Control of Jury
Although adverse pretrial and trial publicity may deny a defendant his
right to trial by an impartial jury, the jury's exposure to publicity does
not presumptively deprive a defendant of this right.6 32 When the possibil-
ity of prejudicial publicity exists, the trial judge has the affirmative duty
to ascertain its extent and effect and to remedy the situation. To counter-
Va. 164, 207 S.E.2d 847 (1974) (jury trial was denied in trial on punishment only because
defendant had waived the right to jury in the original trial).
627. Brown v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 515, 184 S.E.2d 786 (1972), vacated on other
grounds, 408 U.S. 940 (1972).
628. Id.
629. 380 U.S. 202 (1965) (Constitution does not require examination of prosecutor's rea-
son for exercising peremptory challenges to strike all blacks from jury panel); cf. United
States v. Durham,'587 F.2d 799, 801 (5th Cir. 1979) (although prosecution used peremptory
challenges to strike all blacks from particular jury, conviction affirmed because defendant
made no showing of systematic exclusion of blacks from jury service).
630. 212 Va. at 518, 184 S.E.2d at 788.
631. Note, Criminal Procedure, Seventeenth Annual Survey of Developments in Vir-
ginia Law: 1971-1972, 58 VA. L. REV. 1158, 1233 (1972).
632. Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799 (1975) (determination that defendant's trial
fundamentally unfair based on totality of circumstances rather than presumption that jury's
exposure to publicity denies due process).
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act any adverse publicity the trial judge, within his discretion, may grant
a change of venue in order to ensure a fair and impartial trial. 33 Only
where the record clearly shows an abuse of discretion will the court's rul-
ing on the motion for change of venue be reversed. 3 '
"[J]urors... may not, during the trial, properly read newspaper sto-
ries or listen to media reports discussing the proceedings. 0 3 5 However,
"[w]here there is no substantial reason to fear prejudice, a trial court is
not required to question jurors concerning their possible exposure to in-
formation outside the courtroom.183 "In the absence of some showing of
juror exposure to prejudicial information, it will be presumed that the
jury followed instructions to avoid such exposure. 0 63 7 However, "upon a
showing that such jurors have read or heard news accounts of the pro-
ceedings, the test to be used by the trial court in determining if a mistrial
or a new trial should be ordered is whether under the circumstances there
has been interference with a fair trial." 38 "[Wihether such media infor-
mation brought to the jury's attention results in prejudice to the defen-
dant rests in the sound discretion of the trial court."3 9 Thus, in Thomp-
son v. Commonwealth,40 the Virginia Supreme Court upheld the trial
court's finding of no prejudice where jurors had read a newspaper article
during the trial. The court felt the "jury learned no material new facts on
the subject from the newspaper article."" 1 By making such a finding, the
court found it "unnecessary. . .to set forth a procedure to be followed in
a situation where prejudicial publicity is involved.""' 2 Before stating its
conclusion, the court did note that the Fourth Circuit required private
questioning of each juror exposed to the prejudicial publicity." 3 It should
633. Newcomer v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 64, 255 S.E.2d 485 (1979); Poindexter v. Com-
monwealth, 218 Va. 314, 237 S.E.2d 139 (1977); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-251 (Repl. Vol. 1975).
634. Newcomer v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 64, 255 S.E.2d 487 (1979).
635. Thompson v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 498, 500, 247 S.E.2d 707, 708 (1978).
636. Waye v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 683, 701, 251 S.E.2d 202, 213 (1979) citing United
States v. Hankish, 502 F.2d 71, 77 (4th Cir. 1974).
637. Id. at 701, 251 S.E.2d at 213 citing United States v. Pomponio, 517 F.2d 460, 463
(4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1015 (1975).
638. 219 Va. at 500, 247 S.E.2d at 708; see Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 417, 420-21 (1953).
639. 219 Va. at 500, 247 S.E.2d at 708 citing Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 312
(1959); see Asbury v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 101, 106, 175 S.E.2d 239, 242 (1970).
640. 219 Va. 498, 247 S.E.2d 707 (1978).
641. Id. at 505-06, 247 S.E.2d at 710-11. The additional information obtained by the jury
from the newspaper article included (1) the punishment imposed on defendant for an earlier
felony, (2) the fact that he was on unsupervised probation at the time of the crime, and, (3)
disclosure that the defendant and the victim were engaged in an argument. Id. at 506, 247
S.E.2d at 711.
642. Id. at 505, 247 S.E.2d at 710.
643. United States v. Hankish, 502 F.2d 71 (1974), cited in Thompson v. Commonwealth,
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also be noted that the court in Thompson has been criticized for judging
the information non-prejudicial without engaging in the approved proce-
dure for determining prejudice." By skipping this procedural step, the
court may have overlooked the actual impact of the article."5
Many courts have adopted procedures for questioning jurors where
prejudicial publicity is involved. "' There is general agreement, however,
that inquiry of any sort need only be undertaken where the court finds
that the outside publicity read or seen by the jurors is in fact prejudi-
cial. 6 7 Virginia, while following this view," s has failed to establish a stan-
dard for determining what is prejudicial, instead leaving such a decision
to the discretion of the trial court on a case-by-case basis.6 9 Other states,
however, have adopted a standard for determining prejudicial material by
distinguishing between publicity which reports fairly and accurately on
what took place in the courtroom in front of the jury as opposed to pub-
licity which deals with matters not brought to the jury's attention in open
court.
65 0
219 Va. at 504, 247 S.E.2d at 710. It should be noted that the ABA's Standards Relating to
Fair Trial and Free Press go even further and require "a juror who has seen or heard re-
ports of potentially prejudicial material [to] be excused if the material in question would
furnish grounds for a mistrial if referred to in the trial itself." ABA STAmDARDS RELATING TO
FAr TRAL AND FREE PREsS § 3.5(f) (1968).
644. Note, Criminal Procedure, Twenty-Fourth Annual Survey of Developments in Vir-
ginia Law, 1978-1979, 66 VA. L. Rav. 167, 267 (1980).
645. Id.
646. See United States v. Perrotta, 553 F.2d 249-50 (1st Cir. 1977); Commonwealth v.
Jackson, - Mass. ., 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3076.
647. United States v. Hankish, 502 F.2d 71, 77 (1974) (The court cited the following cases
which recognized that the trial judges did not have to question jurors unless there was sub-
stantial reason to fear prejudice: Gordon v. United States, 438 F.2d 858 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 828 (1971); United States v. Edwards, 366 F.2d 853, 873 (2d Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 919 (1967)).
648. See note 637 supra and accompanying text.
649. See note 639 supra and accompanying text.
650. Compare Martin v. United States, 528 F.2d 1157 (4th Cir. 1975) (newspaper article
not prejudicial where information contained in it was already brought to the attention of the
jury at trial) and United States v. Calvert, 523 F.2d 895 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 911 (1976) with Silverthorne v. United States, 400 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1968). See also
Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 312 (1959).
Closely akin to the issue of jury contamination is the right to a public trial guaranteed
under the U.S. CONST. amend. V and the VA. CONST. art. I, § 8. For various views as to who
holds this right compare Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980) (right to
attend criminal trial is implicit in guarantees of first amendment) with Gannett Co. v.
DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979) (members of the public do not have an enforceable right to
a public trial that can be asserted independently of the parties). See also Cumbee v. Com-
monwealth, 219 Va. 1132, 254 S.E.2d 112 (1979) (act of clearing the courtroom violated
defendant's constitutional right to a public trial).
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F. Self-Incrimination
The Constitution of Virginia states that a person shall not be "com-
pelled in any criminal proceeding to give evidence against himself." 51
The privilege is applicable in criminal proceedings as well as civil pro-
ceedings which might expose that person to a criminal prosecution.652 The
accused in a criminal case cannot be compelled to take the stand. If the
accused does not take the stand, no comment may be made by the prose-
cution which will call attention to this fact.6 53 Indirect references, how-
ever, such as a prosecutor's comment that there is "no explanation" of
certain aspects of the case, may be permissible. 6" The circumstances of
the particular case and the language used will determine the objection-
ability of such a statement to be determined on the basis of whether the
jury would naturally take it to be a comment on the failure of the accused
to testify. 55
Related to the issue of commenting on the defendant's failure to take
the stand in a criminal proceeding is the collateral issue of what steps
may or should be taken to correct the situation where such a statement
has been made. The steps needed to rectify such a situation appear to
depend on who made the statements. If the judge comments improperly
on the defendant's failure to testify, the Virginia Supreme Court has held
that immediately advising the jury that the defendant has the right not
to testify may be sufficient to overcome any prejudicial effect of the state-
ment. 5 ' If, however, the prosecution makes remarks in violation of the
defendant's right to remain silent, the question is whether a mere instruc-
tion to the jury will correct the prejudicial nature and effect of such a
comment and whether such an instruction should be given over the de-
fendant's objection to its being given. In Hines v. Commonwealth657 the
651. VA. CONST. art. I, § 8. The Virginia provision parallels a similar provision of U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
652. Despite the apparent limitation to criminal trials, the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation has long been construed to apply to any proceeding, civil or criminal, which might
expose that person to a criminal prosecution. Cullen v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. (24 Gratt.)
624, 628 (1873).
653. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-268 (Repl. Vol. 1975) ("[Flailure to testify shall create no pre-
sumption against him [defendant], nor be the subject of any comment before the court or
jury by the prosecuting attorney."). See also Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) which
held that "the Fifth Amendment ... [and] its bearing on the States by reason of the Four-
teenth Amendment, forbids either comment by the prosecution on the accused's silence or
instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt." Id. at 615.
654. Hines v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 905, 907, 234 S.E.2d 262, 263-64 (1977).
655. Id.
656. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 579, 186 S.E.2d 53 (1972).
657. 217 Va. 905, 234 S.E.2d 262 (1977).
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Virginia Supreme Court held that a trial court did not commit reversible
error by instructing the jury, over the defendant's objection, that the de-
fendant's failure to testify at trial could not be used as a basis for
presuming guilt.6e 8 The defendant argued "that when the court voluntar-
ily gave such an instruction, it magnified appellant's [Hines'] failure to
testify and raised certain adverse inferences in the minds of the jurors
which would not otherwise have occurred."6 59 Recognizing the division of
authority660 which exists on whether such an instruction should be given
over the defendant's objection, the Virginia Supreme Court, consistent
with its philosophy of deferring to the discretion of the trial court, stated
that "[w]hile the better practice is that it not be given over defendant's
objection, there will be cases in which a cautionary instruction may be
given by a court in the exercise of its sound discretion ... where no
prejudice will result." ''  Such a holding leaves open the questions of (1)
what are the proper occasions for giving such an instruction over the de-
fendant's objections, and (2) what constitutes prejudice to the defendant
resulting from the instruction. It would seem to be the better alternative
to leave the decision to the defendant, since failure to give a cautionary
instruction can harm only him.
A comment on the failure to testify may, however, be proper under the
"invited error" doctrine, where the accused or the accused's counsel has
first called the jury's attention to the matter.662 In Lincoln v. Common-
wealth,663 defendant's counsel, in his summation, represented to the jury
that the defendant did not testify because "we don't feel that you gen-
tleman of the jury are going to convict this man based on the evidence of
two convicted felons" and because "we didn't think it was necessary in
658. Because the defendant objected to a statement made by the prosecutor, and because
the jury might possibly have construed the argument of the prosecuting attorney as a refer-
ence to the failure of the accused to testify, the court gave the cautionary instruction. Id. at
907, 234 S.E.2d at 264.
659. Id. at 908, 234 S.E.2d at 264.
660. 217 Va. at 909-10, 234 S.E.2d at 264-65. The court cited the following cases which
held that in a joint trial, a court must give the instruction to a jury upon request of one
codefendant, even where other codefendants may object. United States v. Epperson, 485
F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Schroeder, 433 F.2d 846 (8th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 943 (1971); United States v. Kelly, 349 F.2d 720 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. de-
nied, 384 U.S. 947 (1966). Cases holding that it is not erroneous to give the instruction over
the defendant's objections, even when there are no codefendants requesting it, include
United States v. Williams, 172 U.S. App. D.C. 290, 521 F.2d 950 (1975); United States v.
Bailey, 526 F.2d 139 (7th Cir. 1975).
661. 271 Va. at 911, 234 S.E.2d at 266.
662. Lincoln v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 370, 228 S.E.2d 688 (1976).
663. Id.
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this case." 6" By so doing, the defense invited the prosecution's response,
which did not go beyond meeting the argument advanced by the defense.
While the accused who knowingly and willingly66 5 takes the stand
waives the right against self-incrimination,666 one who takes the stand in
the absence of the jury to testify as to such collateral matters as venue or
the admissibility of a confession does not waive the privilege.6 However,
where a witness has waived the privilege by testifying at a trial, that testi-
mony may be introduced at a second trial involving the same issuee 6
By voluntarily taking the stand the accused opens himself up to at-
tempts by the prosecutor to impeach his testimony.6 9 The prosecutor
may ask a defendant who testifies in a criminal proceeding the number of
times he has been convicted of a felony but not the names of the felonies
other than perjury, nor the nature or details thereof6 70 In this situation, a
defendant in a criminal trial who has been convicted of one or more felo-
nies is not subject to as comprehensive cross-examination as non-defen-
dant witnesses since witnesses other than the accused may be questioned
on the number and nature, but not the details, of any felony convic-
tions.671 This is an exception to the statutory language which states that
an accused who testifies "shall be subject to cross-examination as any
other witness.'67 2
Unlike criminal defendants, other witnesses cannot avoid taking the
664. Id. at 371-72, 228 S.E.2d at 690 (court's emphasis).
665. Powell v. Commonwealth, 167 Va. 558, 189 S.E. 433 (1937).
666. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-268 (Repl. Vol. 1975). See Reid v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 790,
195 S.E.2d 866 (1973).
667. Washington v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 737, 204 S.E.2d 266 (1974). See also C.
FRIEND, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN VIRGINIA § 69 at 147 (1977).
668. C. FRIEND, supra note 667, § 69 at 147.
669. "The right to cross-examine implies the right to impeach the credibility of the ac-
cused under the same rules applicable to any other witness." Carson v. Commonwealth, 188
Va. 398, 407, 49 S.E.2d 704, 708 (1948). But see note 671 infra and accompanying text.
670. Sadoski v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 1069, 1071, 254 S.E.2d 100, 101 (1979). The hold-
ing in Sadoski is consistent with Harmon v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 442, 185 S.E.2d 48
(1971). Harmon, however, overruled Hicks v. Commonwealth, 157 Va. 939, 161 S.E. 919
(1932) insofar as Hicks permitted the Commonwealth to identify the felony of which the
accused previously had been convicted.
Courts in other jurisdictions have also permitted a defendant who is testifying to be asked
the number of his felony convictions. See State v. Hall, 233 Iowa 1268, 11 N.W.2d 481
(1943); State v. Midell, 39 Wis. 2d 733, 159 N.W.2d 614 (1968).
671. Hummel v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 548, 550, 231 S.E.2d 216, 217 (1977), cert. de-
nied, 440 U.S. 935 (1979).
672. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-268 (Repl. Vol. 1975).
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stand by asserting the privilege.6 7 3 However, having taken the stand, wit-
nesses have a right to refuse to answer particular questions that call for
incriminating statements.61 ' If the witness does elect to answer the ques-
tion, the privilege is waived as to the details of the events he relates but
the privilege is not waived as to collateral criminal activity.67 5
Generally, "where the witness can be offered complete immunity from
prosecution for a crime, that witness cannot assert the privilege against
self-incrimination in order to avoid testifying about that crime." 67 6 How-
ever, "the restrictions on the application of this principle are exceedingly
stringent and rigidly enforced because of the great value placed by our
law upon the privilege against self-incrimination.
6 77
G. Sentencing, Probation and Parole
. Virginia has traditionally been considered a jury sentencing state.
67 8
While the General Assembly restructured the sentencing provisions in
1975679 expanding the judge's responsibilities in the sentencing processss °
673. Worrells v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 270, 183 S.E.2d 723 (1971). A material witness
was excused from testifying on the ground of self-incrimination. The court recognized as a
general proposition that the defendant is usually permitted to pose individual questions to
the witness and if the witness asserted this fifth amendment privilege against answering, the
court would then determine whether the answers would have been incriminating. However,
since the accused did not proffer individual questions, the court would not reverse for fail-
ure of the trial court to follow the above course. In the absence of a proposed relevant
question calling for a nonincriminating answer, the court would not reverse for the alleged
error of excusing the witness upon the general assertion of his fifth amendment privilege.
674. Id. 8 J. WIGBIORE, EVIDENCE § 2268 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). Usually a witness
must assert his fifth amendment privilege to each question posed. Any answer which would
provide even a "single remote link" in a chain which would ultimately expose the witness to
criminal prosecution is incriminating for this purpose. Langhorne v. Commonwealth, 76 Va.
1012, 1022 (1882).
675. Woody v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 296, 199 S.E.2d 529 (1973).
676. C. FitmND, supra note 667, § 69 at 147-48 (1977).
677. Id.
678. For the history of Virginia's jury sentencing statutes as they existed prior to the
passage of the 1975 amendments, see Comment, Jury Sentencing in Virginia, 53 VA. L.
REv. 968, 970-76 (1967).
679. The General Assembly overhauled the Criminal Procedure Title of the Virginia Code
which resulted in Title 19.1 being replaced by Title 19.2.
680. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-298 (Cum. Supp. 1980) (which makes it the judge's func-
tion to "pronounce" the sentence); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-299 (RepL Vol. 1975) (provides for
a presentencing investigation and hearing upon the court's own motion or upon the motion
of the defendant). But cf. J. Gilbreath, The Constitutionality of Harsher Sentences on Re-
trial in Virginia, 62 VA. L. Rv. 1337, 1339 (1976) (proposes that the 1975 revisions makes
Virginia more appropriately considered as a judge-sentencing rather than a jury-sentencing
state).
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the present Code still provides that the sentence "[w]ithin the limits pre-
scribed by law ...shall be ascertained by the jury, or by the court in
cases tried without a jury."""s The method of having one trial for guilt
and punishment, both determined by the jury has been held to be consti-
tutional; 82 Virginia is one of only a few states which provides for jury
sentencing in non-capital cases.6 83 There has been much discussion as to
whether Virginia should remain a jury sentencing state"8' but a departure
from this would be the perogative of the General Assembly and not Vir-
ginia's Supreme Court.
The jury must set the punishment within limits prescribed by the law
as instructed by the judge and the instructions covering the range of pun-
ishment must follow the indictment.185 It is established judicial precedent
in Virginia that where the sentence imposed is in excess of that pre-
scribed by law, that part of the sentence which is excessive is invalid.66
The entire sentence is not void ab initio because of the excess, but is good
as far as the power of the court extends.6
17
681. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-295 (Repl. Vol. 1975).
682. Bloodgood v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 253, 183 S.E.2d 737 (1971) (court relied on
McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971) in holding a jury's determination of guilt and
punishment in a single trial does not impair the right of an accused to an impartial jury in
contravention of the sixth amendment); Johnson v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 481, 158 S.E.2d
725 (1968) (with facts similar to McGautha, unitary jury trial does not violate the fifth and
fourteenth amendments).
683. Other states allowing juries to sentence include: Alabama, ALA. CODE § 18-22 (1975);
Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2306 (Repl. Vol. 1977); Kentucky, Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §
9.84 (Baldwin 1978); Mississippi, MIss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-53 (Cum. Supp. 1980); Missouri,
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 557.036 (Vernon 1979); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 926 (West
1958); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2707 (Repl. Vol. 1975); Texas, Tsx. CrM. PRO.
CODE ANN. art. 37.07 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978).
684. Giorno, Sentencing in Criminal Cases: How Great the Need for Reform?, 13 U.
RICH. L. REv. 899, 908 (1979); Comment, Jury Sentencing in Virginia, 53 VA. L. REV. 968
(1967).
685. Whaley v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 353, 200 S.E.2d 556 (1973). The indictment in the
case charged the defendant with breaking and entering with intent to commit larceny or a
felony. It did not charge that the burglary was committed with the intent to commit rape.
Therefore the applicable punishment was prescribed under Code § 18.1-89 and not § 18.1-
88. The court's instruction, however, was erroneous because it permitted the punishment
prescribed under § 18.1-88.
686. Crutchfield v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 291, 46 S.E.2d 340 (1948). In a prosecution
under the maiming act, the accused was allowed to plead guilty to unlawful assault and was
sentenced to three years confinement in the penitentiary. The sentence was in excess of that
prescribed by law but only the excess was held invalid. It was recognized that a court may
impose a valid sentence in substitution for one that is void, even though the execution of the
void sentence has begun.
687. Royster v. Smith, 195 Va. 228, 77 S.E.2d 855 (1953).
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Thus, in Deagle v. Commonwealth,6" where the jury had imposed a
sentence of ten years in the penitentiary and a one thousand dollar fine,
either of which were valid but not both, the Virginia Supreme Court de-
ferred to the discretion of the trial court which upheld the ten year con-
finement and deleted the fine. In contrast to this decision are the previ-
ously decided cases of Hodges v. Commonwealth"" and Huggins v.
Commonwealth.690 In both of these cases the defendants were found
guilty and sentenced to death. Subsequently, the United States Supreme
Court declared the death penalty unconstitutional' 1 which rendered the
sentences in the aforementioned cases void. Instead of taking it upon it-
self to interpret what the jury in its sentencing had intended, the Virginia
court declined to summarily reduce the death sentences to life imprison-
ment, the highest penalty then available under the Supreme Court's deci-
sion.e 92 In distinguishing between the results reached in Hodges and Hug-
gins with those reached in Deagle, the court noted that with respect to
reducing the death penalty to life imprisonment, it "would be sheer spec-
ulation" to conclude that the jury would fixed the punishment at life had
the death penalty not been permissible;693 whereas in Deagle, "common
sense and reason dictate[d] that the jury would have imposed the greater
sentence had it been required to choose between the two punishments. ' "6
The distinction is perhaps more clear if one points to the fact that the
cases appear to have turned on the Virginia Supreme Court's deference to
the trial courts' discretion.
Present Virginia law establishes six classes of felonies and four classes
of misdemeanors and prescribes maximum and minimum punishments
for each category. 69 5 Punishment imposed in each case is to be deter-
mined in light of its own particular facts.6t Therefore, evidence of the
result of another defendant's trial for the same crime is irrelevant to the
determination by the jury of the appropriate punishment for the defen-
dant whose sentence is being weighed.6" While the eighth amendment
prohibits the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment on those con-
688. Deagle v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 304, 199 S.E.2d 509 (1973).
689. Hodges y. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 316, 191 S.E.2d 794 (1972).
690. Huggins v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 327, 191 S.E.2d 734 (1972).
691. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
692. 213 Va. 316, 191 S.E.2d 794; 213 Va. 327, 191 S.E.2d 734. The court noted in Hodges
that the "jury might well have agreed upon 99 years as it did in the Ferguson murder." 213
Va. at 321, 191 S.E.2d at 797.
693. Id.
694. 214 Va. at 306, 199 S.E.2d at 511.
695. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-11 (Repl. Vol 1975 & Cur. Supp. 1980).
696. Fogg v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 164, 207 S.E.2d 847 (1974).
697. Coppola v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 243, 257 S.E.2d 797 (1979).
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victed of a crime, 98 the standard for analyzing the constitutionality of a
statutory scheme of punishment for noncapital offenses varies, but all re-
sult in deference being given to the legislature. 99 With respect to capital
offenses, the United States Supreme Court now holds that the death pen-
alty is not cruel and unusual punishment per se; °0  however, it may not
be imposed under procedures that create a substantial risk of its arbitrary
and capricious application.7 0 1 The Virginia Supreme Court took a long
hard look at Virginia's statutory law702 for sentencing procedures in capi-
tal cases, including the imposition of the death penalty, in Smith v. Com-
monwealth.7 0 5 The court felt that changes enacted by the General Assem-
bly in the statutory scheme of sentencing process "insure[d] that the
death penalty would not be imposed in an arbitrary or capricious man-
ner.' '704 Furthermore the court, citing several United States Supreme
Court decisions, held the 1977 laws and changes thereunder in the sen-
tencing process to be constitutional under both the fourteenth and the
eighth amendments.70 5
In addition to the various positions regarding sentencing and procedure
taken by the Virginia court outlined above, a 1975 amendment by the
General Assembly70 6 expanded the role of pre-sentencing reports in the
sentencing process. The prior statute required the court to order a pre-
sentence report only if requested by a defendant after a guilty plea or a
conviction in a non-jury trial on a charge involving a death sentence or at
698. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.").
699. Compare Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 938
(1974) (in which the Fourth Circuit used a proportionality analysis considering the punish-
ment excessive only if the legislative purpose can be achieved by using a less severe penalty.
The court also considered punishments imposed for other offenses and punishments in
other jurisdictions for the same crime) with Davis v. Davis, 585 F.2d 1226 (4th Cir. 1978)
(where the court said the proportionality test should only be applied to life sentences; other-
wise the court would defer to the legislature unless the punishment was so disproportionate
to the crime that it shocked human sensibilities). See also Rummel v. Estelle, 587 F.2d 651
(5th Cir. 1978) (en banc), aff'd, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) (in considering the life sentence of an
appellant, the court said the legislative scheme should be upheld if it has any.rational
basis).
700. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
701. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
702. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 to 264.5 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
703. 219 Va. 455, 248 S.E.2d 135 (1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 932 (1979).
704. Id. at 475, 248 S.E.2d at 147.
705. Id. at 476-79, 248 S.E.2d at 148.
706. 1975 VA. AcTs, ch. 371, amending VA. CODE ANN. § 59-278.1 (Repl Vol. 1974), codi-
fied at VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-299 (Cum. Supp. 1980). See also VA. Sup. CT. R. 3A:25(c).
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least ten years imprisonment.7 0 7 The new statute provides the option of a
pre-sentence report for all who are convicted of a felony.708 The Virginia
Supreme Court has held that denial of a pre-sentence report where re-
quested is reversible error and the case will be remanded for re-
sentencing. 70 9
1. Harsher Sentencing in Trial De Novo
In Virginia, a person convicted of a misdemeanor in a court not of rec-
ord has a statutory privilege to a trial de novo in a court of record.7 10 In
Johnson v. Commonwealth,7 1 1 the Virginia Supreme Court held that an
increased sentence imposed in a court of record over the sentence im-
posed in the court not of record does not violate due process. The issue
was raised by the defendants because of the holding by the United States
Supreme Court in North Carolina v. Pearce71 2 that due process forbids
the imposition of a harsher sentence upon retrial where there is a "realis-
tic likelihood" that the increased punishment is the result of "vindictive-
ness" on the part of the sentencing authority. The Virginia court held in
Johnson that Pearce was not applicable because there was no vindictive-
ness in the imposition of the sentence.7113 In the Pearce case the judge was
the sentencing authority in both trials. In Johnson, a jury fixed the sen-
tence in the second trial and "[t]o assume that the jurors even knew of
the sentences imposed [at the first trial] would assume they had informa-
tion not rightfully theirs. 7 1 1 The Virginia court noted that the defen-
dant's appeal to the court of record is not an appeal in the usual sense of
the word but was an exercise of the unqualified right to a trial de novo,
which gave them a second full opportunity for acquittal.71 5 The reasoning
used by the Virginia court was upheld in Colten v. Kentucky. 16 In that
707. 1974 VA. ACTs, ch. 121, codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 53-278.1 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
708. See note 706 supra.
709. Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 104, 255 S.E.2d 504 (1979) (citing Smith v. Com-
monwealth, 217 Va. 329, 228 S.E.2d 557 (1976)).
710. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-132, -136 (Repl. Vol. 1975).
711. 212 Va. 579, 186 S.E.2d 53 (1972).
712. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
713. 212 Va. at 585, 186 S.E.2d at 57-58.
714. Id.
715. Id. at 585-86, 186 S.E.2d at 57-58. Addressing the appellant's contention that the
harsher sentence imposed an unconstitutional "chilling effect" on the right to a trial de
novo, the court noted that appellants had begged the question: the trial de novo is a privi-
lege granted by the legislature and not a constitutional right. Thus any "chilling effect" on
the exercise of that privilege fails to transgress the constitutional guarantee of due process.
Id.
716. 407 U.S. 104 (1972).
1981]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
case the United States Supreme Court held that the standards of Pearce
did not apply to a two-tier system.7 1  The Court further clarified the
Pearce decision in Chaffin v. Stynchcombe 71 where it held that the prin-
ciples enunciated in Pearce do not apply when the sentence in a second
trial following an appeal is imposed by the jury.
2. Probation and Suspension of Sentence
The jury is not empowered by statute to grant suspension of its sen-
tence or probation but only to assess punishment "[w]ithin the limits pre-
scribed by law."7 19 Furthermore, a jury is prohibited from adding to its
verdict a recommendation that the judge suspend or probate the sen-
tence.7 20 The judge, however, has long had statutory authority to grant
probation or suspension "if there are circumstances in mitigation of the
offense, or it appears compatible with the public interest. 72 1 As a result
of the 1975 amendments, an entirely new provision in Title 19.2 gives
discretionary authority to the judge "whether [sitting] with or without
jury, [to] suspend imposition of sentence or suspend the sentence in
whole or part and in addition [to] place the accused on probation."7'
While the Virginia Supreme Court has had little cause to review the stat-
utory authority given judges concerning suspension of sentences and pro-
bation, some changes have evolved as the result of the trial court's use of
this discretionary power.723 For example, a unique sentencing alternative
for misdemeanants has been developed by one general district court in
Richmond, Virginia. The court has requested Offender Aid and Restora-
tion (OAR) of Richmond, a private, non-profit, community-based correc-
tional agency, to create a service offering a greater range of sentencing
alternatives.724
The Virginia Supreme Court has extended its principle of requiring a
717. Id. at 112-19.
718. 412 U.S. 17 (1973).
719. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-295 (Repl. Vol. 1975).
720. See McCann v. Commonwealth, 174 Va. 429, 4 S.E.2d 768 (1939).
721. VA. CODE ANN. § 53-272 (Repl. Vol. 1978). However, it appears that this section is
not often invoked by trial judges who, in light of the evident legislative preference for jury
sentencing existent at the time of its enactment, are hesitant to substitute their views for
those of the jury. Comment, Jury Sentencing in Virginia, 53 VA. L. Rhv. 968, 974 (1967).
See Abdo v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 473, 237 S.E.2d 900 (1977) (affirming the power under
this section as discretionary with the court).
722. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-303 (Repl. Vol. 1975).
723. Davila & Mordhorst, Sentencing Alternatives for Virginia General District Courts,
11 U. RICH. L. REv. 769 (1977).
724. Id. at 770.
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summary judicial hearing before revocation of a parole 25 to hold that
"fundamental fairness" dictates that a summary judicial hearing be con-
ducted before extending a probation period.7 2 6 At the time of this hold-
ing, the statute providing for an increase of probation did not proscribe
such a procedure but the court read this statute7 2 7 in conjunction with the
section providing for revocation of probation728 and concluded that the
same rationale that led to a judicial requirement of a summary hearing
prior to revocation should apply in the case of an extension. The Virginia
General Assembly has since provided statutory changes to this effect.7 29
3. Parole
Just as the jury is not empowered to grant suspension or probation,7 3 0
neither can it take the effect of parole into consideration when it imposes
its sentence. When asked by the foreman what part of a sentence a per-
son would have to serve before being paroled, the judge must respond
only that the jury should impose sentence within the limits fixed by law,
as appears to be just, and what might happen afterward is of no
concern.
731
Under current statutory law, a prisoner sentenced to confinement in a
state correctional institution is eligible for parole after serving one-fourth
of the term imposed.7 3 2 Eligibility does not necessarily guarantee that pa-
role will be granted, since it is the parole board which is responsible for
granting or denying parole. Even though its decisions must be based upon
established criteria,7 3 3 the board has wide discretion in determining the
725. See Griffin v. Cunningham, 205 Va. 349, 136 S.E.2d 840 (1964).
726. Cook v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 290, 176 S.E.2d 815 (1970).
727. VA. CODE ANN. § 53-273 (Repl. Vol. 1967) (currently codified at § 19.2-304 (Repl.
Vol. 1975)).
728. VA. CODE ANN. § 53-275 (Repl. Vol. 1967) (currently codified at § 19.2-306 (Repl.
Vol. 1975)).
729. 1974 Va. Acts, ch. 205. See generally VA. CODE ANN. §§ 53-230 to -290.10 (Repl. Vol.
1978) dealing with probation and parole.
730. See note 719 supra and accompanying text.
731. Hinton v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 492, 247 S.E.2d 704 (1978). The general rule an-
nounced by Hinton had earlier been set forth by Coward v. Commonwealth, 164 Va. 639,
178 S.E. 797 (1935) where it was stated that the trial court should not inform the jury that
its sentence, once imposed and confirmed, may be set aside or reduced by some other arm of
the State. Id. at 646, 178 S.E. at 800. See also Annot., 35 A.L.R.2d 769.
732. VA. CODE ANN. § 53-251 (Repl. Vol. 1978 & Cum. Supp. 1980). In 1979, the law was
amended to extend the time in which repeat offenders become eligible for parole.
733. See Franklin v. Shields, 399 F. Supp. 309 (W.D. Va.),.cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1037
(1975) (holding that as a matter of procedural due process of law, inmates must be afforded
access to the information and criteria upon which a parole board reaches its decision to
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exact release. While there are many who complain about the parole board
and its effectiveness, 84 changes in this area are of a legislative nature.
The Virginia Supreme Court has had few cases over the past decade con-
cerning issues related to parole.
H. Right to Appeal
Statutory law in Virginia provides that "[a] writ of error shall lie in a
criminal case to the judgment of a circuit court or the judge thereof, from
the Supreme Court. 7 3 5 The Virginia Supreme Court has held that this
statute does not require an appeal as a matter of right.736 The purpose of
the section is merely to confer upon the Virginia Supreme Court the ap-
pellate jurisdiction called for by Virginia's constitution;737 it "grants only
the right to seek to invoke. . . appellate jurisdiction and does not mean
that the jurisdiction may be invoked in every case."738 Nor does the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment require that a petitioner
must be granted a writ of error as a matter of right.7 39 The United States
Supreme Court has held that the right to appellate review is not a neces-
sary element of due process. 4
In Saunders v. Reynolds, 41 the defendant argued that the appeal proc-
ess in Virginia is a violation of the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment because persons similarly situated were not treated
alike. Two grounds for such violation were asserted. First, defendant ar-
gued that the standard of review applied by the Virginia court, that is,
grant or deny parole).
734. Comment, Sentencing in Criminal Cases: How Great the Need for Reform?, 13 U.
RiH. L. REV. 899, 911 (1979).
735. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-317 (Repl. Vol. 1975).
736. Saunders v. Reynolds, 214 Va. 697, 204 S.E.2d 421 (1974); Peyton v. King, 210 Va.
194, 169 S.E.2d 569 (1969).
737. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 1 reads in part:
Subject to such reasonable rules as may be prescribed as to the course of appeals and
other procedural matters, the Supreme Court shall, by virtue of this constitution,
have appellate jurisdiction in cases involving the constitutionality of a law under this
constitution or the Constitution of the United States and in cases involving the life or
liberty of any person.
738. Peyton v. King, 210 Va. at 197, 169 S.E.2d at 571-72, cited in Saunders v. Reynolds,
214 Va. at 699, 204 S.E.2d at 423. See also Smith v. Commonwealth, 161 Va. 1112, 1115, 172
S.E. 286, 287 (1934).
739. Saunders v. Reynolds, 214 Va. at 699, 204 S.E.2d at 423. See McCue v. Common-
wealth, 103 Va. 870, 1008, 49 S.E. 623, 632 (1905).
740. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956); McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687
(1894).
741. 214 Va. 697, 204 S.E.2d 421 (1974).
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that no appeal will be refused where there is shown to have existed sub-
stantial possibility of injustice, has shifted from a determination on the
merits to a determination based upon societal importance. In support of
this contention, statistics were cited showing the rapid increase in the
number of petitions filed and the decrease in the percentage of petitions
granted.7 42 It was stated that "the statistics suggest that in the face of its
increasing workload the Court has altered the criterion for granting ap-
peals, so that a denial can no longer be considered a 'merits' determina-
tion."748 The Virginia court acknowledged in the Saunders opinion the
increased number of petitions and a disproportionate decrease in the per-
centage of petitions granted. The cause cited, however, for the apparent
imbalance was the "increase in the number of frivolous petitions
presented,"'7 44 not a withdrawal from the "merit" review. The statement
that the "merit" standard still prevails for acceptance of appeals was
echoed by a study conducted by the National Center for State Courts on
Appellate Justice in which Virginia was one of four appellate courts
studied.7 45
Secondly, the defendant in Saunders argued that Virginia's appellate
process violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
because a person convicted of a misdemeanor in a court not of record is
given an automatic appeal to a higher court while a person originally con-
victed in a court of record has no such right to an automatic appeal to a
higher court.746 The Virginia court refused to accept this argument stat-
ing that all persons convicted of a crime have equal access to the Su-
preme Court regardless of whether the crime was classified as a felony or
742. 214 Va. at 700, 204 S.E.2d at 423 citing Lilly & Scalia, Appellate Justice: A Crisis in
Virginia?, 57 VA. L. REv. 3, 14 (1971).
743. Id.
744. 214 Va. at 701, 204 S.E.2d at 424. The increase of frivolous petitions was blamed on
"newly-enunciated constitutional principles and the extension of rights of the indigent de-
fendant who, merely upon his statement that he desires an appeal from the judgment of
conviction, is now entitled to seek an appeal notwithstanding the obvious lack of merit of
his claims." Id.
745. G. Lilly, Appellate Justice Project (National Center for State Courts 1974) as cited
in Saunders v. Reynolds, 214 Va. at 701-02, 204 S.E.2d at 424. With reference to Virginia's
standard that an appeal will be granted in every case where there exists substantial possibil-
ity of injustice in the lower court, the report observed:
The justices indicate that this standard still prevails. The Appellate Justice staff saw
no evidence to the contrary, although the statistics indicating a decline in the per-
centage of petitions granted gave rise to an inference that the standard of review has
changed .... In fact, this decline in percentage may be attributable to a large num-
ber of frivolous appeals.
Id. n.36 (under the heading "The Nature of the Caseload and Workload").
746. 214 Va. at 702, 204 S.E.2d at 425.
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misdemeanor. The right of misdemeanants convicted in a court not of
record to an automatic "appeal" to a court of record and a trial de novo,
has a rational objective serving both a legitimate state interest and the
rights of the defendant, including right to trial by jury.7 47 Therefore, the
Virginia court concluded, the appellate process does not set "unreasoned
distinctions" which "impede open and equal access to the courts," a limi-
tation set by the United States Supreme Court for appellate review.748 In
cases, however, where the death penalty has been imposed, the convicted
defendant is entitled to automatic review as a result of statutory law.749
Where a person has voluntarily and intelligently plead guilty in the cir-
cuit court and is sentenced in proceedings devoid of jurisdictional ques-
tions to a term within the range fixed by law, the Virginia court has held
that he is not entitled to appeal his conviction.750 Jurisdictions are split
on the issue of allowing or denying appeals where a guilty plea was ini-
tially entered.7 5 1
Although a right to appeal is not constitutionally compelled,7 52 a state
which provides such a procedure may not deny access to its appellate
courts because of a defendant's indigency, and must provide both a free
transcript758 and the assistance of counsel.7" The Virginia Supreme Court
747. Id. at 702-03, 204 S.E.2d at 425-26.
748. Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966), cited in 214 Va. at 702, 204 S.E.2d at 425. In
Rinaldi the Supreme Court stated:
This Court has never held that the States are required to establish avenues of appel-
late review, but it is now fundamental that, once established, these avenues must be
kept free of unreasoned distinctions that can only impede open and equal access to
the courts. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353
(1963).
384 U.S. at 310.
749. VA. CODE ANN. § 17-110.1(A) (Repl. Vol. 1975 & Cum. Supp. 1980); VA. SUP. CT. R.
5:20 (applied in Giarrantano v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1064, 266 S.E.2d 94 (1980).
750. Burton v. Peyton, 210 Va. 484, 171 S.E.2d 822 (1970); Ringley v. Commonwealth, 210
Va. 413, 172 S.E.2d 124 (1970); Peyton v. King, 210 Va. 194, 169 S.E.2d 569 (1969); Bryant
v. Peyton, 210 Va. 199, 169 S.E.2d 460 (1969).
751. Compare Ramey v. State, 199 So. 2d 104, 106 (Fla. App. 1967) ("accused in criminal
case has a legal right to a review of a judgment of conviction entered against him, though he
had waived trial by jury and pleaded guilty") with Cohen v. State, 235 Md. 62, 200 A.2d
368, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 844 (1964) (only objections to trial court's jurisdiction and that
the indictment does not constitute an indictable offense survive a plea of guilty). See also
ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Crimi-
nal Appeals, 1.3(a) (1974) (which calls for a defendant's right to seek review of a conviction
based on a plea of guilty).
752. See note 739 supra and accompanying text.
753. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-326 (RepL Vol. 1975 &
Cum. Supp. 1980) (payment of expenses of appeals of indigent defendants).
754. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-326 (Repl. Vol. 1975
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has recognized that a defendant who indicates a desire to appeal is "enti-
tled to the assistance and cooperation of counsel for that purpose."7 55
I. Conclusion
While the supreme courts of some states have developed procedural
guidelines to be followed by trial courts in criminal proceedings,7  the
Virginia Supreme Court has left many standards to the discretion of the
trial courts. For example, appointment of counsel for indigents beyond
that which is mandated by the United States Supreme Court, is left to
the discretion of the trial court.7 57 Further, whether or not there should
be a change of venue due to pre-trial publicity 58 or a disqualification of a
member of the jury due to reading a prejudicial news report 59 is also
within the discretion of the trial court. Whether or not a cautionary in-
struction should be given to the jury alerting them to the accused's right
not to testify7 60 is a decision of the trial judge and not left to the prefer-
ence of the accused..78  The philosophy of the Virginia court seems to be
one of applying the minimum constitutional standards as articulated by
the Supreme Court without requiring procedures which go beyond such
standards.7 62 The wisdom of such a philosophy is not commented on here
as clearly there are good arguments for both sides.
V. SUBsTANTIvE CRIMINAL LAW
A. Introduction
The purpose of this section is to examine the decisions of the Virginia
Supreme Court during the past decade in the area of substantive criminal
law, with special attention being given to decisions which are likely to be
& Cum. Supp. 1980).
755. Ferby v. Peyton, 210 Va. 129, 131, 169 S.E.2d 438, 439 (1969). See notes 511-21
supra and accompanying text.
756. See Goldsmith & Ryan, supra note 586. See also Comment, The Independent Ap-
plication of State Constitutional Provisions to Questions of Criminal Procedure, supra
note 506; Note, Stepping into the Breach, supra note 506; Falk, Foreward: The State Con-
stitution: A More than Adequate Non-Federal Ground, supra note 506.
757. See notes 526 & 527 supra and accompanying text.
758. See notes 633 & 634 supra and accompanying text.
759. See note 639 supra and accompanying text.
760. See note 661 supra and accompanying text.
761. See note 660 supra and accompanying text.
762. See notes 556-63 supra and accompanying text (with respect to the standard for
effective counsel); note 574 supra (no jury required at first stage of "two tier" system); and
note 711 supra and accompanying text (harsher sentencing allowed in trial de novo); note
751 supra and accompanying text (person who pleads guilty not entitled to appeal).
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of interest to the criminal attorney. The decisions dealing with evidence
and criminal procedure are not covered in this section. While not every
aspect of criminal law has been addressed by the court during the past
decade, decisions by the court did provide answers to many pertinent
questions.
B. Crimes Against Persons
1. Felony Murder
Virginia has two felony-murder statutes.70 3 Section 18.2-32 of the Code
provides that "[m]urder ... in the commission of, or attempt to commit,
arson, rape, robbery or abduction ... is murder in the first degree. .. "
Section 18.2-33 provides that "[t]he killing of one accidentally, contrary
to the intention of the parties, while in the prosecution of some felonious
act. . . is murder in the second degree ... "
To convict one of felony-murder it is unnecessary to prove malice, pre-
meditation or intent.7 " The purpose behind making felony-murder rather
easy to prove is, undoubtedly, to deter life threatening conduct by those
who engage in crime. Since the statutory offenses716  can be proven by
showing that a defendant killed someone while in the commission of, or
attempted commission of a felony, a critical question in felony-murder
cases is at what point is the perpetration of the felony or attempted fel-
ony terminated. This factor is important in determining whether or not
application of the statutes is appropriate.
The Virginia Supreme Court addressed this question in the case of
Haskell v. Commonwealth.7" The defendants in Haskell argued that
once the felony had been abandoned, a subsequent killing can no longer
be felony-murder.7 6 7 In asserting this position, the defendants relied upon
the minority view in the United States: a killing committed during an
escape, after abandonment of the felony, does not fall under the felony-
murder rule .76  The Virginia Supreme Court, however, followed the ma-
763. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-32 to -33 (Repl. Vol. 1975 & Cum. Supp. 1980).
764. Painter v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 360, 171 S.E.2d 166 (1969); Wooden v. Common-
wealth, 208 Va. 629, 159 S.E.2d 623 (1968); Commonwealth v. Jones, 28 Va. (1 Leigh) 598
(1829).
765. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-32 to -33 (Repl. Vol. 1975 & Cum. Supp. 1980).
766. 218 Va. 1033, 243 S.E.2d 477 (1978). Haskell and his friends attempted to rob a
hitchhiking sailor they had picked up in their car. Unable to do so, and hampered in their
escape by the angry victim, Haskell shot and killed the sailor.
767. Id. at 1039, 243 S.E.2d at 480-81.
768. To support their view, the defendants cited People v. Jackson, 20 N.Y.2d 440, 385
N.Y.S.2d 8, 231 N.E.2d 722 (1967) and People v. Marwig, 227 N.Y. 382, 125 N.E. 535 (1919).
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jority view. This view, referred to as the res gestae doctrine, holds that
"where the killing is so closely related to the felony in time, place and
causal connection as to make it part of the same criminal enterprise"769
the killing will be felony-murder. Under the majority view adopted by the
court, the scope of section 18.2-32 would appear to include any escape.
However, the court indicated that it would deviate from this rule if the
facts and circumstances of a particular case should dictate.7 70 The su-
preme court's decision in Haskell appears to be reasonable, for while fol-
lowing the majority view, the facts of each case will determine whether
the rule will be applied.
Virginia's other felony-murder statute, section 18.2-33, applies to homi-
cides committed during the commission of any felony not enumerated in
section 18.2-32.771 Section 18.2-33 applies to accidental, as well as inten-
tional homicides, and is a catch-all statute. Its scope was examined by the
Virginia Supreme Court in the case of Doane v. Commonwealth.77 2
In Doane the Commonwealth argued that larceny was a continuing of-
fense for purposes of applying the felony-murder rule. The court, how-
ever, ruled that larceny was a continuing offense only for the purpose of
venue and not for purposes of applying the felony-murder rule.773 Had
the court ruled that larceny was a continuous offense, a nexus would have
existed between the felony and the homicide.774 The defendant argued, on
the other hand, that the court should apply the rule in manslaughter
cases requiring proximate cause to cases under section 18.2-33. 7 1 Since
the court ruled that larceny was not a continuing offense for purposes of
the felony-murder rule, the court did not reach the question of whether a
causal connection or nexus is required.7 7
6
For a survey of state law concerning the termination of the felony for purposes of the fel-
ony-murder rule, see Annot., 58 A.L.R.3d 851 (1974).
769. 218 Va. at 1043-44, 243 S.E.2d at 482-83.
770. We do not say, however, that in every case a homicide committed during escape from
a felony must be construed, as a matter of law, to come within the felony-murder
statute. Usually, as in the present cases, the question will present an issue of fact to
be determined from the evidence.
Id. at 1044, 243 S.E.2d at 484.
771. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-32 to -33 (Repl. Vol. 1975 & Cum. Supp. 1980).
772. 218 Va. 500, 237 S.E.2d 797 (1977). The defendant was charged under § 18.2-33 after
he stole an automobile which the following day, nearly three hundred miles away, he
crashed into another car killing one of the occupants of the other vehicle.
773. Id. at 502,. 237 S.E.2d 798.
774. Id.
775. Id.
776. Id. at 502-03, 237 S.E.2d at 798-99.
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The Doane case was the first decision by the court under section 18.2-
33 and the decision provides little guidance for the practicing criminal
attorney. The court did not define the term "nexus" or state when a
showing of nexus would suffice or when a causal connection would be re-
quired. The res gestae test, adopted for cases arising under section 18.2-
32, could be applied to cases under section 18.2-33; however, since many
of the felonies which apply to section 18.2-33 are not life threatening, a
requirement of causal connection may be more appropriate in many
cases. 
7 7
2. Involuntary Manslaughter
Involuntary manslaughter is an accidental killing which occurs as a re-
sult of an unlawful, though not felonious, act; or as a result of a lawful act
performed in an improper manner.7 8 The application of this definition
was the subject of several Virginia Supreme Court decisions during the
past decade.77
The court's decision in King v. Commonwealth7 80 would appear to be of
particular interest to the criminal attorney representing a defendant in an
involuntary manslaughter prosecution.78' In King, the defendant was con-
victed of involuntary manslaughter as a result of her car's collision with
another vehicle. Although the accident occurred late at night, the evi-
dence showed that defendant did not have headlights turned on at the
time of the accident.78 2 In an earlier opinion, Beck v. Commonwealth,78 3
the supreme court had ruled that "[w]hen the Commonwealth predicates
the charge [of involuntary manslaughter] upon violation of a statute, it
must only show that such violation was the proximate cause of the homi-
cide. ' 7 However, in King the supreme court held that the mere violation
of a safety statute,7 85 without more, will not justify a finding of involun-
777. For a thorough discussion of the felony-murder rule, see WHARTON'S CmRiuNAL LAW
§§ 145-49, at 201-23 (14th ed. C. Torcia 1979).
778. Lewis v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 684, 179 S.E.2d 506 (1971).
779. King v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 601, 231 S.E.2d 312 (1977); Delawder v. Common-
wealth, 215 Va. 55, 196 S.E.2d 913 (1973); Lewis v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 684, 179 S.E.2d
506 (1971).
780. 217 Va. 601, 231 S.E.2d 312 (1977).
781. Involuntary manslaughter is a common law offense. It is punished as a Class 6 felony
by VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-36 (Repl. Vol. 1975).
782. 217 Va. at 602-03, 231 S.E.2d at 313-14.
783. 216 Va. 1, 216 S.E.2d 8 (1975).
784. Id. at 2, 216 S.E.2d at 10 (citing Goodman v. Commonwealth, 153 Va. 943, 951, 161
S.E. 168, 170 (1930)).
785. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-268 (Repl. Vol. 1974) requires the use of headlights on all
motor vehicles using a highway at night.
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tary manslaughter regardless of whether the violation is the proximate
cause of the homicide. 86 The court ruled that violation of a safety statute
which is the proximate cause of an accident will justify a finding of invol-
untary manslaughter only when the violation amounts to criminal negli-
gence. The court defined criminal negligence as negligence "so gross, wan-
ton, and culpable as to show a reckless disregard for human life." While
holding that failure to turn on headlights did not amount to criminal neg-
ligence, the court left unanswered the question of which violations of stat-
utes would justify a finding of criminal negligence.
The Virginia Supreme Court's decision in King represents a change
from its earlier decision in Beck. In Beck, the court appeared to hold that
violation of a statute was per se sufficient to prove involuntary man-
slaughter saying:
[T]he degree of intoxication is a circumstance relevant to a determination
of the question whether, in light of all other circumstances, the act of driv-
ing an automobile was such an improper performance of a lawful act as to
constitute negligence so gross and culpable as to indicate a callous disregard
of human life. But because the evidence was sufficient to show ... a viola-
tion of Code § 18.1-54 [driving under the influence], and that this was the
proximate cause of the homicide, we need not decide that question .7 1
On the basis of King it now appears that a statutory violation must be
one which involves criminal negligence before a conviction of involuntary
manslaughter can result. The decision is a rational one because it recog-
nizes that many statutory violations are relatively minor and may not by
themselves justify a finding of involuntary manslaughter. On the other
hand, the decision of when a statutory violation is criminal negligence is
left to the trier of fact and may result in inconsistent findings. Since the
court in King did not overturn Beck it is clear that driving under the
influence will be criminal negligence;790 however, only future decisions
will determine whether violations of other statutes constitute such negli-
gence as to warrant criminal sanctions.
In addition to the requirement of criminal negligence, the act constitut-
ing such negligence must be shown to be the proximate cause of the
786. "[V]iolation of a safety statute amounting to mere negligence ... is not sufficient to
support a conviction of involuntary manslaughter." 217 Va. at 606-07, 231 S.E.2d at 316.
787. Id. at 607.
788. The court stated that "intentional, willful, and wanton violation of safety statutes,
resulting in death however, will justify conviction of involuntary manslaughter .... The
degree of negligence must be more than ordinary negligence." Id. at 606.
789. 216 Va. at 5, 216 S.E.2d at 10-11.
790. 217 Va. at 606, 231 S.E.2d at 316.
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homicide. 91 The Virginia Supreme Court examined the question of proxi-
mate cause as it relates to involuntary manslaughter in a 1973 decision,
Delawder v. Commonwealth.7 9 2
In Delawder the defendant was racing his vehicle against another car
when the other car apparently hit the defendant's vehicle causing him to
lose control and kill a pedestrian.7 9 3 The defendant argued that the proxi-
mate cause of the homicide was the intervening negligence of the other
driver who hit his car, causing it to go out of control.7 9" The court rejected
this argument and held that where two negligent acts occur together they
are concurring causes and neither is an intervening act which would re-
lieve liability. Furthermore, the court indicated that if the acts were sepa-
rate, the defendant would still be liable where the second act was
foreseeable.79 5
The Virginia Supreme Court's decision in Delawder that an intervening
act must be independent and unforeseeable to relieve liability was based
on established precedents in Virginia law.796 The decision also reflects the
majority opinion in the United States.7 97
3. Rape
The Virginia Supreme Court decided several non-statutory rape cases
during the past decade. 7 8 Non-statutory rape is a crime of force,79 9 an
element often at issue. Illustrative of the manner in which Virginia law
addresses the issue of force is the Virginia Supreme Court's decision in
Jones v. Commonwealth.800
In Jones, the defense argued that the element of force was not present
because no weapons were shown, no blows struck, and the victim did not
791. See W. LAFAvE & A. ScOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW §§ 78, 79, at 591-92, 596-
600 (1972) [hereinafter cited as W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr].
792. 215 Va. 55, 196 S.E.2d 913 (1973).
793. Id. at 56-57, 196 S.E.2d at 914-15.
794. Id. at 57, 196 S.E.2d at 914-15.
795. Id. at 58, 196 S.E.2d at 915.
796. See Scott v. Simms, 188 Va. 808, 51 S.E.2d 250 (1949) (intervening act must be un-
foreseeable to relieve liability); Schools v. Walker, 187 Va. 619, 47 S.E.2d 418 (1948) (con-
curring cause will not relieve liability).
797. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 791, § 35, at 258-63.
798. Jones v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 983, 252 S.E.2d 370 (1979); Schrum v. Common-
wealth, 219 Va. 204, 246 S.E.2d 893 (1978); Willis v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 560, 238
S.E.2d 811 (1977); Barnett v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 200, 217 S.E.2d 828 (1975).
799. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61 (Repl. Vol. 1975) provides in part: "If any person carnally
know a female ... against her will, by force ... [he shall be guilty of rape]."
800. 219 Va. 983, 252 S.E.2d 370 (1979).
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scream or fight the defendants. The court stated that in deciding whether
the element of force was present the inquiry should be whether or not the
victim was willing. 01 The court also said that there must be "some array
or show of force in form sufficient to overcome resistance, but the woman
is not required to resist to the utmost of her physical strength, if she
reasonably believes resistance would be useless and result in serious bod-
ily harm to her."802 In determining the amount of resistance required of a
victim, the court will examine the circumstances of the case, including the
"relative physical condition" of the parties and the "degree of force mani-
fested."803 It is also possible for the crime of rape to be proven where "no
positive resistance" by the victim is shown, if the evidence shows the
crime was perpetrated without her consent. In affirming the defendants'
convictions, the Virginia Supreme Court noted that evidence that the vic-
tim was taken to a remote area, told to submit "whether you like it or
not," ordered to disrobe by two persons physically stronger than her and
finally forced to escape by jumping from a moving car half-dressed was
sufficient evidence to convict.8 "
4. Robbery
Robbery is a common law offense in Virginia. It is defined as "the tak-
ing, with intent to steal, of the personal property of another, from his
person or in his presence, against his will, by violence or intimidation."80 5
A crime of violence and a crime against property, robbery was the subject
of several Virginia Supreme Court decisions during the past decade.ss
Of particular interest was the court's decision in Johnson v. Common-
801. Id. at 986, 252 S.E.2d at 372.
802. Id. (quoting Davis v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 936, 946, 45 S.E.2d 167, 171 (1947)).
803. 219 Va. at 986, 252 S.E.2d at 372.
804. Id. at 986-87, 252 S.E.2d at 372-73. This case is typical of earlier decisions by the
court in rape cases. See Bradley v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 1126, 86 S.E.2d 828 (1955);
Davis v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 936, 45 S.E.2d 167 (1947). Jones demonstrates that Vir-
ginia treats this controversial crime in a manner which is fair to both the victim and the
accused. Virginia, like a majority of jurisdictions, has discarded the old requirement that the
victim had to resist to the utmost of her physical ability. WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAw, supra
note 777, § 288, at 35. Moreover, victims are not discouraged from bringing charges by re-
quirements of proof which are impossible to meet and the accused is protected by the re-
quirement that the actual or constructive force be proven.
805. Durham v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 166, 168, 198 S.E.2d 603, 605 (1973) (quoting
Mason v. Commonwealth, 200 Va. 253, 254, 105 S.E.2d 149, 150 (1958); Jones v. Common-
wealth, 172 Va. 615, 618, 1 S.E.2d 300, 301 (1939)).
806. E.g., Cox v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 689, 240 S.E.2d 524 (1978); Jones v. Common-
wealth, 218 Va. 18, 235 S.E.2d 313 (1977); Crawford v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 595, 231
S.E.2d 309 (1977); Johnson v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 495, 211 S.E.2d 71 (1975).
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wealth.80 7 In Johnson, the court examined the scope of the common law
definition of robbery to determine who could be a victim of the crime.
The defendant in Johnson forced a saleslady and two cashiers at gun-
point to empty the cash drawers of an office.8 08 The defendant was
charged with robbing the saleslady. He appealed his conviction, arguing
that since the saleslady "had nothing to do with the money," it was im-
possible, under the common law definition, for him to have robbed her.8 9
The Virginia Supreme Court disagreed with the defendant's analysis of
the common law definition of robbery. The court held that robbery was
accomplished whenever force or violence, are used to take property from
someone whose right of possession is superior to that of the robber.8 10
Therefore, an employee, even though her duties did not include collection
or accounting, had a duty to protect her employer's property and thus,
had constructive possession of the property.8112 The court's decision in
Johnson was a rational one based on its facts and fully in accord with
prior Virginia law.81 2
C. Crimes Against Property and Crimes Involving Fraud
The Virginia Criminal Code contains an extensive number of statutes
forbidding various property crimes and fraudulent practices. 811 A number
of these statutes were the subject of decisions by the Virginia Supreme
Court during the past decade. Like the previous section dealing with
crimes against persons, this section will analyze a number of the court's
decisions with the hope that such an examination will aid those interested
in criminal law in Virginia.
1. Larceny
Larceny is the wrongful or fraudulent taking and carrying away of the
personal property of some intrinsic value belonging to another, without
his assent and with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of the
property.11 4 While larceny is a common law offense, the Code provides for
different punishments depending upon whether or not the property is
807. 215 Va. 495, 211 S.E.2d 71 (1975).
808. Id. at 495, 211 S.E.2d at 72.
809. Id. at 496, 211 S.E.2d at 72.
810. Id.
811. Id. at 496-97, 211 S.E.2d at 72-73.
812. See Durham v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 166, 168, 198 S.E.2d 603, 605-06 (1973).
813. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-77 to -246 (Repl. Vol. 1975 & Cum. Supp. 1980).
814. Skeeter v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 722, 232 S.E.2d 756 (1977).
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taken from the person, and the value of the property taken.81 5
In the 1977 case of Lund v. Commonwealth,816 the Virginia Supreme
Court applied the common law definition of larceny to computer'crime 817
and found it inapplicable. In Lund, the defendant was convicted of grand
larceny in the theft of computer time, cards, and printouts.1 8 The Vir-
ginia Supreme Court reversed the defendant's conviction holding that
computer time and services could not be the subject of larceny since they
could not be taken and carried away and in and of themselves had no
tangible value.8 1 9 This decision left a serious gap in Virginia law in light
of the increasing role computers play in society. Fortunately, the Virginia
General Assembly recognized the problem and passed section 18.2-98.1.820
The section states that "[c]omputer time or services or data processing
services or information or data stored in connection therewith is hereby
defined to be property which may be the subject of larceny under section
18.2-95 or section 18.2-96, or embezzlement under section 18.2-111, or
false pretenses under section 18.2-178. '"821 This section should prevent
further problems of the type encountered in Lund.
Larceny by false pretense is a crime in which the offender not only
obtains possession of property, but the title to the property as well. Lar-
ceny by false pretenses was the subject of several Virginia Supreme Court
decisions during the past decade.8 22 The case of Cunningham v. Common-
wealth8 23 provides a good discussion of the offense.
In Cunningham, the defendant paid for a car by check and received
title to it. Later, the same day, she cancelled her check at the bank. How-
ever, the next day when she went to pick up the car, she did not mention
815. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-95 to -96 (Cum. Supp. 1980). Section 18.2-95 defines grand
larceny as the taking from the person of another property or money valued at five dollars or
more or the taking of property or money, not from the person of another, valued at two
hundred dollars or more. Section 18.2-96 defines petit larceny as the taking of property or
money from the person of another valued at less than five dollars or the taking of property
or money not from the person of another valued at less than two hundred dollars.
816. 217 Va. 688, 232 S.E.2d 745 (1977).
817. See generally Nycum, Legal Problems of Computer Abuse, 1977 WASH. U.L.Q. 527,
536, which states that the development of computer technology has created the opportunity
for wrongs to be committed for which there are inadequate legal remedies.
818. 217 Va. at 688-89, 232 S.E.2d at 746.
819. Id. at 691-93, 232 S.E.2d at 748.
820. 1978 Va. Acts, ch. 686 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-98.1 (Cum. Supp. 1980)).
821. Id.
822. E.g., Cunningham v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 399, 247 S.E.2d 683 (1978); Riegert v.
Commonwealth, 218 Va. 511, 237 S.E.2d 803 (1977); Bourgeois v. Commonwealth, 217 Va.
268, 227 S.E.2d 714 (1976).
823. 219 Va. 399, 247 S.E.2d 683 (1978).
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the fact that she had cancelled payment. Defendant was subsequently
convicted of larceny by false pretenses.8 24 To prove the crime of false pre-
tenses the state must establish: "(1) an intent to defraud; (2) an actual
fraud; (3) use of false pretenses for the purpose of perpetrating the fraud;
and (4) accomplishment of the fraud by means of the false pretenses used
for the purpose. 's 25 The defendant in Cunningham argued that the al-
leged offense was completed on the day she took title to the car and that
the evidence failed to show an intent to defraud at that time.
The court disagreed with the defendant's contention, holding instead
that the crime was complete the next day when defendant took posses-
sion of the car. 2 ' The Cunningham decision, interpreting the crime to
have been committed the day after the check was cancelled, avoided a
problem encountered in some jurisdictions: since this crime involves the
misrepresentation of a present or past fact, had the offense been com-
pleted upon receiving title, the cancelling of the check would have been a
future act and the crime of false pretenses would not have been
committed.8 27
2. Bad Checks
The ability of Virginia's bad check law82s to protect banks from their
own customers was the subject of the Virginia Supreme Court's decision
in Warren v. Commonwealth.8 29 The defendant in Warren was convicted
of attempting to cash a worthless check at her own bank. As a defense she
contended that one could not be convicted under section 18.2-181 for
cashing a worthless check at her own bank because the bank should be
responsible for the information in its own records. 30 The defendant's ar-
gument that the bank was contributorily negligent was supported by sev-
eral decisions in other jurisdictions.83 1
824. Id.
825. Id. at 401-02, 247 S.E.2d at 684.
826. Id. There was evidence that the defendant was unhappy with the transaction and
called the car dealer seeking to have him return her check. The defendant took possession of
the car, thus completing the offense with knowledge that she had cancelled her check.
827. See W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, supra note 791, § 92, at 679-80.
828. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-181 (Repl. Vol. 1975 & Cum. Supp. 1980) which states:
Any person who, with intent to defraud, shall make or draw or utter or deliver
any check, draft, or order for payment of money, upon any bank ... knowing, at the
time . . .that the maker or drawer has not sufficient funds in, or credit with, such
bank ... for the payment of such check, . . . although no express representation is
made in reference thereto, shall be guilty of larceny.
829. 219 Va. 416, 247 S.E.2d 692 (1978).
830. Id. at 419-20, 247 S.E.2d at 693-94.
831. Id. at 420-21, 247 S.E.2d at 694-95. The defendant cites State v. Mullin, 225 N.W.2d
688 [Vol. 15:585
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND CRIMINAL LAW
The supreme court rejected the defendant's argument ruling that con-
tributory negligence was a civil law doctrine inapplicable in a criminal
case. The court held that while a bank has discretionary power to charge
a worthless check against an account, it is under no duty to do So.
a3 2
In refusing to reverse the defendant's conviction in Warren, the court
logically applied section 18.2-181. The court undoubtedly recognized that
with the growth of branch banking it would be extremely difficult for
banks to check each customer's account whenever the customer cashes a
check."'
D. Crimes Against Health and Safety
In Virginia, as in the rest of the nation, drug abuse offenses became an
increasing problem for the courts and legislature in the past decade.8 3 4
The Virginia Supreme Court often reviewed drug convictions, many
of which involved the distribution and possession of controlled
substances.""
1. Distribution of Controlled Substances 38
A question addressed by the supreme court on several occasions during
the past decade concerned whether possession of a significant quantity of
illegal drugs necessarily demonstrates an intent to distribute them. In
Sharp v. Commonwealth,8 3 7 the court ruled that a conviction for posses-
305 (Iowa 1975) (bank legally cannot be deceived when its responsible employees knew an
account was overdrawn); Deitle v. State, 363 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. Crim. 1963) (conviction re-
versed because teller knew or had means available to check status of customer's account).
832. 219 Va. at 421, 247 S.E.2d at 694-95.
833. Id.
834. A study of FBI statistics for the year 1976 alone reveals that out of a total of
9,608,500 arrests in the United States that year, 609,700 involved drug offenses. The number
of drug offense arrests were exceeded only by those for drunkenness, larceny/theft, driving
under the influence and disorderly conduct. The 1976 arrest figures represent a 10 year
increase of 527.7% in drug offense arrests. J. WEISSMAN, DRUG ABUSE: THE LAW AND TREAT-
MENT ALTERNATIVES 33-35 (1978).
Virginia began publishing state crime reports in 1975. See VIRGINIA UNIFORM CRIME RE-
PORTING PROGRAM, CRIME IN VIRGINIA (1975-79) which shows that 57,890 drug arrests were
made in the state from 1975-1979. During the same period, 143,410 arrests for driving under
the influence were made.
835. Statutes currently in effect forbidding the distribution and possession of controlled
substances are found in VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-248 to -248.2, -250, *-250.1 (Rep. Vol. 1975 &
Cum. Supp. 1980).
836. Controlled substances are classified in five schedules found in VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-
524.84:4 to .84:12 (Repl. Vol. 1978 & Cum. Supp. 1980).
837. 213 Va. 269, 192 S.E.2d 217 (1972).
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sion with intent to distribute could not be based solely on the amount of
drugs in the defendant's possession.""8 The trial court conviction in Sharp
was based upon a statute, stating, in part, that "[a] conviction . . . may
be based solely upon evidence as to the quantity . . . possessed."' 9 The
Virginia Supreme Court ruling that there was not a sufficient rational
connection between quantity possessed and a presumption of intent to
distribute, held that the particular section was so vague and uncertain
that it violated the due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment and
the Virginia Constitution. 4" However, the court by its decision in Sharp
did not forbid the use of quantity to prove intent to distribute in all
cases,\ as was made clear by the court's decision in Hunter v.
Commonwealth.4'
In Hunter, the defendant was in possession of a large quantity of her-
oin when arrested. Relying on the Sharp decision, he contended that the
evidence was insufficient to convict him of possession with the intent to
distribute. The court, however, upheld his conviction stating that quanti-
ty was circumstantial evidence which may be relevant to show intent and
that Sharp did not foreclose any consideration of quantity.42
The court in Hunter, in addition to the quantity of the drug, consid-
ered other circumstantial evidence, such as how the heroin was packaged
and where it was located.s Thus, if Hunter stands for the proposition
that quantity may be taken into account in conjunction with other factors
to prove intent, the decision appears consistent with Sharp.8 4
An apparent contradiction exists, however, between Sharp and Hunter.
The Hunter court stated that "quantity, when greater than the supply
ordinarily possessed by a narcotics user for his personal use is a circum-
stance which, standing alone, may be sufficient to support a finding of
intent to distribute" 45 while in Sharp a statute allowing intent to be
shown by quantity alone was declared unconstitutional . 4 6 Are Sharp and
838. Id. at 272, 192 S.E.2d at 219.
839. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-524.101(a) (Cum. Supp. 1971) (repealed by 1972 Va. Acts, ch.
798).
840. 213 Va. at 271-72, 192 S.E.2d at 218-19.
841. 213 Va. 569, 193 S.E.2d 779 (1973).
842. Id. at 570, 193 S.E.2d at 780. The court cites United States v. Childs, 463 F.2d 390,
393 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 968 (1972) which held constitutional a jury in-
struction that intent to distribute might be inferred "from possession of large quantity of
marijuana, among ... all other facts and circumstances in this case ..
843. 213 Va. at 570-71, 193 S.E.2d at 780.
844. Id. at 570, 193 S.E.2d at 780.
845. Id.
846. See note 840 supra and accompanying text.
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Hunter reconcilable? One commentator states that Hunter was a clarifi-
cation of Sharp, brought about to facilitate police work and, possibly, by
the different nature of the drugs involved in the two cases. 7 Whatever
the reasons behind the Hunter decision, it appears that quantity alone
may, in some cases, be sufficient to convict for possession with intent to
distribute. In cases where a large quantity of drugs are in the possession
of an individual, quantity alone would seem to be sufficient to support a
conviction. An example of such a case may be where the individual is
transporting a large quantity of drugs in a car trunk. In many cases, other
evidence such as packaging will usually be present.
The difficulty with the Hunter decision will arise in cases where the
trier-of-fact must determine what quantity goes beyond that normally
possessed for personal use. A heavy drug user might, conceivably, possess
a large quantity of drugs solely for personal use. Another person might
possess the same quantity only for the purpose of selling the drugs. Thus,
the standard itself invites inconsistent decisions.
Another important issue involving drug distribution is the question of
how to determine when distribution is merely an accomodation to an-
other, a minor offense compared to trafficing for profit. The issue arises
because sections 18.2-248 and 18.2-248.1" 8 of the Virginia Code provide
for different penalties depending upon whether distribution is for profit
or an accommodation. Section 18.2-248 provides, in part:
(a) Any person who violates this section with respect to a controlled sub-
stance . . . shall upon conviction be imprisoned for not less than five nor
more than forty years and fined not more than twenty-five thousand dollars;
... provided, that if such person prove that he gave, distributed or pos-
sessed with intent to give or distribute a controlled substance classified in
Schedule I or II only as an accommodation to another individual... and
not with intent to profit thereby. . .nor to induce the recipient or intended
recipient of the controlled substance to use or become addicted to or depen-
dent upon such controlled substance, he shall be guilty of a Class 5
felony.8 49
847. Eighteenth Annual Survey of Developments in Virginia Law 1972-1973, 59 VA. L.
REV. 1458, 1463-64 (1973). This commentator points to the fact that marijuana was pos-
sessed in Sharp, while heroin was the drug in Hunter; therefore, since herion is more diffi-
cult to obtain, possession of a large quantity might logically infer an intent to distribute.
848. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-248 to -248.1 (Repl. Vol. 1975 & Cum. Supp. 1980).
849. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-248 (Repl. Vol. 1975 & Cum. Supp. 1980). Class 5 felonies are
punishable from one to ten years in prison or, in the discretion of the judge or jury, confine-
ment of no more than one year and a fine of no more than one thousand dollars. VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-10(e) (Repl. Vol. 1975 & Cum. Supp. 1980). VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-248.1 (Cum.
Supp. 1980) makes a similar distinction in penalties for distribution of marijuana for profit
1981]
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On several occasions during the past decade the Virginia Supreme
Court addressed the question of when a defendant charged with distribu-
tion was entitled to an accommodation instruction. In Jefferson v. Com-
monwealth,850 the court ruled that distribution as an accommodation was
a lesser included offense of distribution for profit. 51 As such, the court
ruled that the defendant was entitled to an accommodation instruction
unless the prosecution had shown beyond a reasonable doubt that distri-
bution was for profit.
52
However, a 1973 amendment to the distribution statute placed upon
the defendant the burden of proving that a distribution was an accommo-
dation.8 53 The court in Gardner v. Commonwealth854 held that the
amendment created a rebuttable presumption which the defendant could
overcome by introducing evidence to show that there was no intent to
profit or induce use or addiction. 55
The validity of the Gardner court's construction of the statute became
suspect because of the United States Supreme Court decision in Mulla-
ney v. Wilbur.8 5 The Court in Mullaney held that a Maine murder law
was unconstitutional because it shifted the burden of proof to the defen-
dant on the issue of malice. 5 This shifting of the burden on "the critical
fact in dispute" was found to be in violation of the fourteenth amend-
ment due process clause. 8
Virginia's distribution for profit presumption was tested in Stillwell v.
Commonwealth.8 5 Relying upon Mullaney, the defendant in Stillwell ar-
gued that section 18.2-248 of the Virginia Code unconstitutionally placed
the burden of proof on him and was vague because it stated no standard
of proof. The Virginia Supreme Court rejected Stillwell's arguments and
in its decision attempted to clarify the profit accommodation controversy
which had developed. In affirming the constitutionality of section 18.2-
and distribution as an accommodation.
850. 214 Va. 432, 201 S.E.2d 749 (1974).
851. Id. at 434, 201 S.E.2d at 751 (construing VA. CODE ANN. § 54-524.101:1 (Cum. Supp.
1972) (amended by 1973 Va. Acts, ch. 479 to place burden on defendant to show accommo-
dation, repealed by 1975 Va. Acts, ch. 589 and reenacted as VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-248 (Repl.
Vol. 1975) by 1975 Va. Acts, chs. 14, 15)).
852. 214 Va. 432, 201 S.E.2d 749.
853. See note 851 supra.
854. 217 Va. 5, 225 S.E.2d 354 (1976).
855. Id. at 7, 225 S.E.2d at 356.
856. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
857. Id. at 701, 703-04.
858. Id. at 704.
859. 219 Va. 214, 247 S.E.2d 360 (1978).
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248, the court held that the rebuttable presumption against an accommo-
dation sale or distribution was valid because there was a "rational and
reasonable connection .. .between the fact of sale or distribution and
the conclusion that it was with intent to profit."8 60 The court reasoned
that section 18.2-248 created a single offense, and only after the guilt of
the defendant was established did the statute raise a presumption that
the distribution or sale was for profit;s since the presumption did not
apply to the guilt or innocence of the defendant, but only to the severity
of punishment, it was held to meet the requirements of Mullaney.8 62
While the constitutional validity of the distribution for profit presump-
tion appears established on the basis of Stillwell,86 3 it still presents a di-
lemma for the attorney representing a client charged with violation of
section 18.2-248. The attorney must weigh the evidence against his or her
client; if the evidence is strong, the attorney may be forced to introduce
evidence to show an accommodation in an effort to mitigate punishment.
Of course, evidence that shows a distribution to be an accommodation is
still evidence of distribution. So, in an effort to mitigate punishment the
attorney may be forced, in effect, to forfeit any chance of winning an ac-
quittal. Therefore, the attorney faced with this problem must weigh the
evidence against a client carefully before introducing evidence to over-
come the presumption that the distribution was for profit.
2. Possession of Controlled Substances 6
Like distribution, possession of controlled substances was also the sub-
ject of a number of Virginia Supreme Court decisions during the past
decade. Possession of a controlled substance must be intentional and con-
scious in order to convict a person of illegal drug possession under Vir-
ginia law. 65 However, such possession may be either actual or
860. Id. at 219, 247 S.E.2d at 263-64. The rational connection test was enunciated by the
court in the Sharp decision. See notes 837-38, 840 supra.
861. 219 Va. 214, 247 S.E.2d 360 (1978).
862. Id. at 223-25, 247 S.E.2d at 365-67. The court cites Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S.
197 (1977) which clarified Mullaney. In Patterson, the Supreme Court upheld the chal-
lenged statute which they characterized as allowing mitigation of punishment upon proof of
"extreme emotional disturbance" by the defendant as an "affirmative defense."
863. For a discussion of the use of presumptions in Virginia law, see generally C. FRIEND,
THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN VIRGINIA (1977 & Supp. 1980).
864. See note 836 supra.
865. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-250 to -250.1 (Cum. Supp. 1980). Section 18.2-250 states: "It
is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess a controlled substance
...." Section 18.2-250.1 contains the same language with respect to marijuana.
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constructive. 866
It is the concept of constructive possession which has been the subject
of most of the court's decisions concerning possession. In Gillis v. Com-
monwealth,867 the defendant was convicted of possessing marijuana found
in a pipe in the apartment he shared with another person. 68 Under Vir-
ginia's possession statutes, ownership or occupancy of a home or vehicle
in which a controlled substance is found raises no presumption of illegal
possession by the owner or occupant. 69 However, the court affirmed the
defendant's conviction in Gillis, holding that the evidence supported an
inference that the defendant had constructive possession of the marijuana
because it was subject to his "dominion and control. ' 8 7 0 The court
pointed to evidence which suggested that the defendant had the neces-
sary knowledge of the drug's presence, 7 1 but was silent on the question of
intent. Seemingly, a substance could be subject to a person's dominion
and control and still not be intentionally in his possession. By failing to
clearly address the question of intent, the court made the Gillis decision
somewhat vague.
This vagueness was remedied in the court's decision in Burton v. Com-
monwealth.872 In Burton the defendant was convicted of illegal distribu-
tion after she brought clothes containing drugs to a friend in jail. The
Virginia Supreme Court reversed the conviction holding that "[a]lthough
[it was] established that the defendant was in possession of drugs, it was
not established beyond a reasonable doubt that she was knowingly and
intentionally in possession. ' ' 73
Following the Burton case, the court again had the opportunity to dis-
cuss constructive possession. The defendant in Woodfin v. Common-
866. The doctrine of constructive possession was established by Ritter v. Commonwealth,
210 Va. 732, 173 S.E.2d 799 (1970) (marijuana found in defendant's mailbox). Prior to Rit-
ter, it was generally necessary to show "immediate and exclusive control" of the substance.
Id. at 741, 173 S.E.2d at 805-06.
867. 215 Va. 298, 208 S.E.2d 768 (1974).
868. Id. at 299-300, 208 S.E.2d at 769-70.
869. The defendant in Gillis was convicted under VA. CODE ANN. § 54-524.101:2 (Cum.
Supp. 1972) (repealed by 1975 Va. Acts, ch. 589, reenacted as VA. CoDn ANN. § 18.2-250
(Repl. Vol. 1975) by 1975 Va. Acts, chs. 14, 15).
870. 215 Va. at 302, 208 S.E.2d at 771.
871. Id. at 301, 208 S.E.2d at 771. The marijuana was in a pipe on a table in plain view.
The defendant had been home for over an hour and had a previous conviction for possession
which established that he was familiar with marijuana.
*872. 215 Va. 711, 213 S.E.2d 757 (1975).
873. Id. at 713, 213 S.E.2d at 758.
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wealth 74 was charged with possession of cocaine found in the home of a
female acquaintance. The court held that the evidence, which showed
only that the defendant was a frequent visitor to the house and had some
belongings there, was insufficient to convict. The court held that the evi-
dence failed to show dominion and control or "to show that the defendant
was aware of the presence and character of the. . . substance." 875
As in the Stillwell87 6 decision dealing with distribution, the Virginia
Supreme Court attempted to answer the questions surrounding presump-
tions and proof of illegal possession in Clodfelter v. Commonwealth.877 In
Clodfelter, the defendant was convicted of possession of drugs found in
the hotel room he had rented. 78 The court held that while occupancy of
the room "did not create a presumption that he either knowingly or in-
tentionally possessed the drugs... it was a circumstance which could be
considered . . . along with the other evidence, in determining ...
guilt. '87 9 However, the court stated that in order to convict, the Common-
wealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was
aware of the "presence and character of the particular substance and was
intentionally and consciously in possession of it." 880
Clodfelter would seem to establish that where constructive possession
is involved, it must be shown that the defendant was conscious of the
substance and had the necessary intent to possess it before a conviction
can result. Therefore, where a conviction is based on constructive posses-
sion, the dominion and control of the drug by the defendant apparently
must include knowledge and intent.
In light of the court's interpretation of constructive possession and the
fact that ownership or occupancy of cars or dwellings does not create a
presumption of guilt in possession cases," 1 it would appear that adequate
safeguards are provided to protect the innocent. While protecting the in-
nocent, Virginia's possession law is still capable of serving its purpose,
which is to curb drug abuse.""
874. 218 Va. 458, 237 S.E.2d 777 (1977).
875. Id. at 459-61, 237 S.E.2d at 778-79 (citing Ritter v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 732, 741,
173 S.E.2d 799, 805-06 (1970)).
876. See note 859 supra and accompanying text.
877. 218 Va. 619, 238 S.E.2d 820 (1977).
878. Id. at 621, 238 S.E.2d at 821.
879. Id. at 623, 238 S.E.2d at 822.
880. Id. at 622, 238 S.E.2d at 822 (citing Ritter v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 732, 741, 173
S.E.2d at 799, 805-06 (1970)).
881. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-250 to 250.1 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
882. For a survey of state laws governing the possession of illicit drugs, see Annot., 91
A.L.R.2d 810 (1963) and Annot., 56 A.L.R.3d 948 (1974). For an example of a statute in
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3. Driving Under the Influence
Like other forms of drug abuse, the abuse of alcohol has been a serious
problem in Virginia during the past decade. The problem of drivers under
the influence of alcohol or other drugs is especially troublesome because
of the danger to human life.88
3
The Virginia Supreme Court had an opportunity to consider this prob-
lem in the case of Williams v. City of Petersburg.m In this case the de-
fendant was found guilty of operating an automobile while under the in-
fluence of alcohol. The evidence showed that the defendant was
discovered in a parking lot slumped over the steering wheel of his car
with the motor running.885 On appeal, the defendant argued that the evi-
dence did not show him to be operating or driving the vehicle.se The
court affirmed the conviction, following a broad view of the term "operat-
ing." The court held that "operating" means "physical control of the ve-
hicle and [the engagement of] machinery of the vehicle which alone, or in
sequence, would have activated its motive power."8 7 The broad definition
of "operating" a vehicle followed by the court in Williams is supported
by decisions in other jurisdictions.888 It is also consistent with other deci-
sions involving this offense issued by the court during the past decadesss
The decision in Williams was a logical response by the court to the seri-
ous problem the intoxicated driver poses to himself and others.
E. Conclusion
During the past decade, the Virginia Supreme Court has proven to be a
conscientious and progressive force in Virginia law. While there have, at
times, been inconsistencies in certain decisions, the court has shown a
which ownership or occupancy creates a presumption of illegal possession, see N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 220.25 (McKinney 1980).
883. See note 834 supra.
884. 216 Va. 297, 217 S.E.2d 893 (1975). Williams was charged with violating PETERsBuRG
CODE § 22-142 (1964), which provides that "[n]o person shall drive or operate any automo-
bile... while under the influence of alcohol... ." The state statute VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-
266 (Cum. Supp. 1980), as amended by VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-54 (1964), is essentially the
same.
885. 216 Va. at 298, 217 S.E.2d at 894.
886. Id. at 299, 217 S.E.2d at 895.
887. Id. at 301, 217 S.E.2d at 896.
888. See Jacobson v. State, 551 P.2d 935 (Alaska 1976); Rose v. State, 168 Ind. App. 674,
345 N.E.2d 257 (1976); State v. Graves, 269 S.C. 356, 237 S.E.2d 584 (1977).
889. See Lyons v. City of Petersburg, 221 Va. 10, 266 S.E.2d 880 (1980); Nicholls v. Com-
monwealth, 212 Va. 257, 184 S.E.2d 9 (1971); Gallagher v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 666, 139
S.E.2d 37 (1968).
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willingness to explain and expand prior decisions where necessary. In do-
ing so, the court has kept Virginia's criminal law in the mainstream of
modern American law.

